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Various studies in the past have attributed the slow level of economic development in 
many African countries to the underdeveloped real sector of these economies, especially 
the manufacturing sector.  The situation appears to be worse for resource rich countries, 
such as the oil producing countries in Africa due to the problem of Dutch Disease. 
Consequently, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in separate 
appraisals of the African economy have called on African oil exporting countries to 
embrace diversification in their economies by developing their manufacturing sectors. 
The role of monetary policy in promoting the growth of the manufacturing sectors of 
Africa’s Oil Exporting Countries (AOECs), has therefore been questioned by a number 
of authors. 
The purpose of this study, which is to assess monetary policy and the growth of 
manufacturing sectors in the AOECs, is organised under three major objectives. Firstly, 
the study examines the relationship between oil and the manufacturing output growth of 
the AOECs using a panel data analysis. Secondly, the study also assesses the 
relationship between the manufacturing output growth and the monetary policy using a 
panel cointegration analysis. Thirdly, the study conducts an individual analysis of each 
member of the AOECs, using the net oil exporters only and examines the monetary 
policy transmission mechanism, oil price shock and output relationship in each country 
using the a structural vector autoregression (SVAR).  
After empirical analysis, the study contributes to the existing literature in the following 
ways: Firstly, a negative or inverse relationship is obtained between oil and 
manufacturing output growth of the AOECs which might be an indication of the 
existence of Dutch Disease in these countries’ economies. Secondly, through the panel 
cointegration analysis the study will discover that there exists a very weak long-run 
relationship between monetary policy variables and manufacturing output, but the 
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relationship appears to be stronger in the short-run. Thirdly, building on the panel 
results where the countries exhibit individual cross-sectional differences, the SVAR 
shows that the effectiveness of monetary policy in promoting the growth of the 
manufacturing sector in the AOECs is ultimately affected by oil price shock, with the 
severity depending on the following: the exchange rate system; monetary policy 
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1.1 Context of the Study 
Various studies have shown that many countries, that are rich in natural resources show 
poorer economic performance when compared to those economies with fewer natural 
resources (see Olomola, 2007; Bulmer-Thomas, 1994; Auty, 2001; Sachs and Warner, 
1997).  For instance, in the past decade, members of the Organisation of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) have been experiencing a stunted gross domestic product 
(GDP) (Gylfason, 2001) and in some African oil-exporting countries (AOECs) the story 
is the same. Nigeria, which is the largest producer of oil in Africa, fell short of the 
United Nations projected GDP-per-capita by US$495 in 2005 (see Olomola, 2007), 
while, in 2009, Sudan’s and Egypt’s GDP per capita of US$1,388 and US$2,450, 
respectively,  were far below the GDP per capita of countries like Morocco, US$2,847, 
and Tunisia, US$3,794, that are not oil-exporting countries(see International Monetary 
Fund(IMF) (2010). 
Both the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, have emphasized the need for 
the oil exporting countries in Africa to embrace diversification as a panacea for their 
economic problems, (see World Bank, 2004; IMF, 2008) and the manufacturing sector 
has been tipped as a major sector that can help in the diversification process 
(Kayode,2000). This sector has been described as a major catalyst that can boost local 
output of the real sector of the AOECs. For instance, among 65 countries  that can be 
classified as natural resources rich, between 1970 and 1998, only Botswana had long 
term investments exceeding 25% of its GDPand also recorded GNP per-capita growth 
exceeding 4% in a year(see Olomola, 2007; Gylfason, 2001). The major reason for the 
success of this economy was its ability to effectively diversify through accelerated 
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growth in domestic output, which was made possible through a vibrant manufacturing 
sector (Olomola, 2007). 
However, the manufacturing sector in the AOECs has generated a lot of concerns. In 
Nigeria, for instance, the contribution of the manufacturing sector to GDP has been 
dwindling over the years from 2.6% in 1994 to 1.4% in 1996, 1.02% in 1998 and 0.5 % 
in 2000.In Algeria the manufacturing sector’s contribution to GDP fell from 6.6% in 
2003 to 5.2% in 2005 and 4.9% in 2006In Libya, it  fell  from 4.2% in 2003 to 3.5% in 
2006, while in Angola it  fell from 3.4% in 2003 to 2.2% in 2006 (League of Arab 
States Reports, 2004;Majid, 2006). Based on the foregoing, it appears that the 
manufacturing sector of the AOECs has not been performing very well over the years.  
In the literature, the relevance and role of monetary policy in solving the myriad of 
problems confronting the AOECs’ manufacturing sectors, has been a subject of debate 
(see for example Mohamed, 2011; Corden and Neary,1982; Lama and Medina, 2010). 
Different tools and approaches to monetary policy have been discussed in these studies. 
One of these approaches is the adoption of the Taylor Principle, as a major tool of 
monetary policy administration by various central banks around the globe. However, 
several studies have concluded that administration of monetary policy in many 
developing countries, which also include the AOECs, contributes to the woes of the 
manufacturing sector due to non-compliance with the Taylor Principle (see for example 
Woodford,2001;Jordi and Mark,2007;Clarida and Gali,2000; and Gali and 
Gertler,1998).  Some studies indicate otherwise and stress that central banks of many 
developing countries, including the AOECs, follow a forward looking Philips curve, 
which can stimulate the growth of the manufacturing sector, by boosting output once 
the central banks are not tempted to push output beyond its natural level (see for 
example Kydland and Prescott,1977; and Barro and Gordon,1981). 
According to Taylor (1993, 1999), with inflation and the output gaps at zero, the central 
bank is expected to keep the current and expected future real interest rates at zero. On 
the other hand, if the economy shows a positive output gap and inflation, the Taylor 
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Principle has it that the central bank raises nominal interest rates. The feedback exceeds 
unity, which means that nominal interest rates rise more than one-for-one with inflation. 
Consequently, this ensures that the central bank raises real interest rates sufficiently to 
contract demand (i.e. by stimulating a positive sequence of real interest rate gaps). 
Conversely, as the economy weakens and inflation falls, the 1Taylor Principle suggests 
that the central bank makes arrangements within its policy framework to sufficiently 
provide demand stimulus (see Jordi and Mark, 2007). Woodford (2001) and Clarida and 
Gali (1998; 2000), opined that the greatest undoing of the developing economies, which 
include the AOECs, was in their failure, in the past years, to abide by the Taylor 
Principle which they described as a way of stimulating real output through the 
production sector, especially the manufacturing sector.  
 
However, considering the two divergent views on the role of monetary policy in 
promoting the manufacturing sector of the AOECs, it appears that the interaction 
between monetary policy and the manufacturing sector of the AOECs, calls for 
empirical investigation. A number of studies on oil exporting economies like Olomola 
(2007), Mohamed (2011), Corden and Neary (1982), and Acosta, Lartey and Moudelina 
(2009), among others, have tried to examine the growth problems of oil exporting 
countries from different perspectives. While Olomola (2007) focused on the impact of 
oil rent on AOECs growth, Mohamed (2011) was more concerned with the effect and 
solution to the Dutch disease in AOECs. Corden and Neary (1982) studied the effect of 
spending and exchange rates on the manufacturing sector of oil exporting countries. 
Acosta (2009) appraised the impact of oil remittances on some selected oil exporting 
economies. None of these studies or any other that we are aware of, have assessed the 
impact of monetary policy on the growth of AOECs’ manufacturing sector, that have  





Furthermore the IMF (Year) and World Bank (Year) have recommended that AOECs 
should diversify their economies. Whether or not and how, the monetary policy can 
stimulate manufacturing, to serve as a springboard for sustainable economic growth, 
requires a thorough investigation of the relationship between the oil (which is the main 
factor that distinguishes AOECs from other developing economies), manufacturing 
sectors and monetary policy. This is will help in understanding how the monetary policy 
framework can be used in the diversification process in AOECs (See IMF, 2004; World 
Bank 2010).  
Mohamed (2011),Corden and Neary (1982) and Lama and Medina (2010) have 
questioned the role of monetary policy in promoting the growth of the manufacturing 
sector in AOECs. Bouakez, Rebei and Vencatalechellum (2008), however, have 
maintained that administration of monetary policy administration varies from country to 
country, with different effects on their economic growth. This study contributes to the 
literature by examining monetary policy administration and how it can be used to 









1According to Taylor, interest rate is increased at the time of high inflation or employment above the full 




1.2Objectives of the study 
The main objective of this study is to investigate the relationship between the 
manufacturing sector’s performance and monetary policy in AOECs. Specific objectives 
of the study are: 
(i) To examine oil revenue and growth of the manufacturing sector in 
AOECs; 
(ii) To assess monetary policy and growth of the manufacturing sector in 
AOECs; 
(iii) To investigate the monetary policy transmission mechanism and growth 
of the manufacturing sector in AOECs; 
(iv) To examine the interaction between monetary policy and the 
manufacturing sector in AOECs. 
 
1.3 Organisation of the study 
The study starts with chapter one where the introduction discusses the context of the 
study and its broad objectives. Chapter two follows with an analysis of the first broad 
objective of the study, which deals with oil revenue and manufacturing sector growth in 
AOECs. Chapter three addresses the second broad objective of the study, which is an 
assessment of monetary policy and growth of the manufacturing sector in AOECs. 
Chapter four presents an exposition of the third and fourth objectives of the study, 
which is investigating the monetary policy transmission mechanism and growth of the 
manufacturing sector in AOECs and examining the interaction between monetary policy 
and the manufacturing sector in AOEC. This chapter is very broad because it is an 
individual country-based analysis. Therefore, it covers three sub-sections. Section one 
discusses the literature and reviews each of the AOEC’s covered in the study. 
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The second section of the chapter focuses on the methodology adopted to analyse the 
third and fourth broad objectives. The third section is a discussion of the results 
obtained and inferences on each AOEC. 
Chapter five presents a summary and conclusion of the study. Policy implications and 




















Oil Revenue and Manufacturing Sector Growth in Africa’s Oil Exporting 
Countries (AOECs) 
2.1         Introduction 
Over the years controversies have surrounded the relationship between oil rents and 
other sectors of the economy of an oil producing country. For instance in the study of 
Arab oil producing countries, Lay and Mahmoud (2004),Beblawi and Luciani (1987) 
and Karl (1997) opined that the presence of oil in Arab countries like Libya, Algeria, 
Egypt, Iraq, Syria and Saudi Arabia has created serious impediments to the growth of 
the manufacturing sector of these countries. They based their arguments on the 
phenomenon of Dutch Disease and resource curse. On the other hand, Stauffer (1984), 
Vahid and Jabber (1997), Majid (2006) and Amuzegar (2001) have argued that many oil 
exporting countries have utilized the forward linkage effect of the oil industry to 
improve the growth of their manufacturing  sector.  
According to Majid (2006) the contribution of oil in some Arab oil exporting countries 
in recent times, is evident in the tremendous growth witnessed in the petrochemical 
industry, which was initially based on natural gas and it’s liquid. He further stated that 
after the first oil price boom, the development of the industrial sector, especially the 
petrochemical companies, was accelerated as a result of more liberal government 
policies, that created an enabling climate for the effective utilization of oil as a catalyst, 
for aiding diversification in the industries. In the Arab oil exporting countries, the 
contribution of the oil sector to the manufacturing sector, in terms of value added 
increased from US$25 billion  in 1990 to US$54 billion in 2004(OPEC Fund for 
Industrial Development (OFID), 2006). 
However, different studies have been conducted on the effect of oil on the growth of 
some oil producing economies. Olomola (2007), focused on the effect of oil wealth on 
the growth of Africa’s oil exporting economies. Majid(2006), examined the contribution 
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of the oil sector to the economic development of Arab countries. In 2009, 2League of 
Arab States and the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western 
Asia, examined how industrial development can be sustained in Arab countries.  
From the findings of all these studies, it appears that there are two separate views 
concerning the relationship between oil and the manufacturing sector of an oil 
producing country. In addition, it is obvious from these studies that the nature of the 
relationship might vary from country to country. Unfortunately, the exact relationship 
that exists between oil rents and the manufacturing sector in the AOECs particularly is 
yet to be explored, and the controversy that was explained earlier is yet to be 
empirically examined. 
This study, therefore, will contribute to the growing literature on oil/manufacturing 
nexus in oil-rich countries, by providing policy alternatives that can serve as a catalyst 
for boosting growth, specifically in the AOEC’s manufacturing sector. 
Consequently, apart from the major objective of the study, which is to conduct an 
empirical assessment of the impact of oil revenue on manufacturing sector growth of 
major AOECs, using a panel data analysis, the study will also investigate the presence 
of Dutch Disease in the AOECs. Finally it will also assess the nature of the relationship 
between manufacturing sector growth and other macro variables such as exchange rate 





2The Arab oil exporting countries are part of the Arab league of countries. The UN, World Bank and IMF 
usually discuss these economies within the context of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. It 




2.2           Oil revenue and manufacturing output growth relationship 
Over the years the relationship between oil revenue and growth has been the subject of 
discussion. However, the question of how the proceeds from oil, affect output growth of 
the industrial sector, especially the manufacturing sector, appears not to have been 
given sufficient attention. Nonetheless, there is consensus from the studies on the issue 
of ‘resource curse’ and the existence of Dutch Disease, a problem which many 
researchers believe is confronting the development of oil rich countries (see Olomola, 
2007; Bulmer-Thomas,1994; Auty, 2001; Sachs and Warner, 1997). 
To further justify the relevance of this research, some of the findings of the few related 
studies are discussed in this section. Gawad and Muramalla (2013) examined the 
relationship between the oil and gas sectors and foreign direct investment in some 
sixteen countries. Each country was examined, using the ordinary least squares 
estimating technique. Their results showed that the relationship between oil production 
and foreign direct investment was only significant in two countries, while it was not 
significant in the remaining fourteen oil producing countries. This supports the position 
of many researchers on the issue of the resource curse, in that the existence of oil, in oil 
rich countries, has not promoted the necessary investment for economic development.   
In the same vein, Eksi, Izgi and Senturk (2011) investigated the nexus between oil price 
and industrial production in OECD countries. The study made use of co-integration 
analysis and also examined the causality between oil price and production. Their results 
show that there is meaningful short run causality between oil price and industrial 
production for almost all the countries, with the causality running from oil price to 
industrial production only. Again, the result indicates that a similar situation was 
observed in oil exporting countries such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi 
Arabia, where oil prices had a significant short run impact on industrial production. If 
we compare these findings to that of the previous studies, it implies that while oil 
production fails to have a significant effect on foreign direct investment, the oil price 
does have a significant effect on industrial production in the short run. 
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Similarly Majid (2006) examined the linkage between oil and economic development in 
Arab oil exporting countries. The study discovered that, the effect of oil on the 
development in these countries varies from one country to the other. The size of the oil 
sector, stage of economic development and the size of their non-oil sector are major 
determinants of the effect of oil on the economic development of these countries. The 
implication of these results is that the relationship between oil and development, in 
these Arab oil exporting countries is significantly affected by the size of their non-oil 
sector. 
Teka (2011) studied the backward linkage effect of the oil sector on the manufacturing 
sector in Angola. The study used both descriptive and inferential analysis; also both 
secondary and primary data were used to study individual manufacturing firms. One of 
the major findings of the study is the existence of a weak backward linkage effect of oil 
production on the manufacturing sector. In the same vein, the study also discovered 
limited local content in the localized manufacturing function. This is an indication that 
despite the fact that Angola is one of the largest net oil exporters in Africa, the 
manufacturing sector in the country appears not to be benefiting much from oil 
production, thus making the economy much more dependent on imported goods.  
As part of the empirical literature on the relationship between oil and economic 
development, Odularu (2008) found that Nigeria, as the largest oil producer in Africa, 
appears not to be translating oil wealth into economic development. This was Odularu’s 
conclusion from his study where he found that there was no significant relationship 
between crude oil production and economic development in Nigeria. Furthermore, Fiess 
and Verner (2003) took their own research further to cover the agricultural sector. Here 
they focused on the relationship between oil, agriculture and the industrial sector, within 
Ecuador’s economy, by applying a co integration and error correction model. Findings 
from the research indicated a strong and significant relationship between the 
agricultural sector and the industrial sector, especially in the short run. However, a weak 
relationship was obtained, between the oil sector and the industrial sector, as well as the 
agricultural sector.  
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A common factor in all these studies is that they generally all tend to assess the 
relationship between oil and output growth.. However, just a few delve into 
manufacturing output. 
Rosser (2006), is of the opinion that, the problem of naturally endowed countries might 
not be the resource curse but rather political and administrative issues within the 
countries. Botswana, Chile, Malaysia and Indonesia, are given by Rosser (2006), as 
examples of countries that have utilized their various natural resources, for the positive 
development of their economies. According to Rosser (2006) these countries have better 
manufacturing sectors, compared to other resource endowed countries and the 
relationship between the growth of their natural resources and their manufacturing 
output has been positive.  It is therefore imperative to ascertain if the same relationship 
exists between the oil sector and the manufacturing sector of the AOECs. 
2.3Theoretical Framework on oil and Manufacturing output growth 
2.3.1       Introduction 
Generally, economic theories have viewed the relationship between oil and 
manufacturing output in two distinct ways. Firstly, some theories have looked at oil as a 
source of wealth, that is, revenue and its growth implications. Prominent among these 
theories is the resource curse hypothesis and the Dutch Disease phenomenon. Secondly, 
other theories consider oil as a form of energy that is necessary for the production 
process. The idea under this category is centred around theoretical foundations on 
energy and growth relationship. Important theories in these lines are the mainstream 
theory of growth, growth models with natural resources and growth models without 
natural resources. 
2.3.2       Oil revenue growth and manufacturing output growth 
This aspect of theories on oil and manufacturing sector growth centres on the resource 
curse and Dutch Disease hypotheses. Dutch Disease is a product of resource curse. A 
situation where countries with abundant natural resources are more economically 
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backward than those countries with little or no natural resources is referred to as 
resource curse. The product of this situation is Dutch Disease and the phenomenon is 
discussed as follows; 
2.3.2.1    An overview of “Dutch Disease” phenomenon  
A phenomenon that describes a situation, where a booming sector (natural resources) 
leads to the rise in the relative prices of non tradable commodities, to that of tradable 
commodities, and consequently, leading to a total reallocation of factors of production, 
in favour of the natural resources sector and thereby hampering the growth of non-
resource tradable commodities sector is referred to as Dutch Disease (See Corden and 
Neary, 1982). 
One of the prominent models that described Dutch Disease was developed by Corden 
and Neary (1982). A small economy that produces three commodities was used in the 
model. Two of the commodities have their prices fixed by the world markets, therefore, 
these two are subject to international competition and comprise of booming tradable 
sector (B) and non-booming tradable sector i.e lagging sector (L). The third sector in the 
model economy is the non-tradable sector (N) where domestic forces of supply and 
demand determine its prices. Therefore, it is not prone to international competition.  
Typically, the booming tradable sector referrers to the oil sector, while the non-booming 
tradable sector refers to the manufacturing sector and the non-tradable sector is the 
service sector. However, the assumptions underlying the Dutch Disease hypotheses are 
as follows; firstly, the definition of the real exchange rate is the ratio of the price of non-
booming tradable commodities to that of non-tradable sector. Secondly, the three 
sectors use common factors of production, which comprise of a non-mobile factor that 
is capital and a mobile factor that is labour, which can move around among the sectors 
to optimize its wages. Thirdly, the goods produced have positive income elasticity, in 
that, they are normal goods. These arrangements lead to a boom which arises in any of 
the following three ways; (1) A favourable shift in production function occurs, due to a 
once for all development in the technology in the booming sector (2) a kind of windfall 
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in the natural resources e.g oil windfall (3), the booming sector produces primarily for 
export hence its price changes are exogenous. 
With this economic set-up Corden and Neary (1982) pointed out that the economy can 
be affected in two ways, the resources movement effect and the spending effect. Salter 
diagram in figure 1 describes the effect of the boom on the economy. The vertical axis 
comprise of the outputs of the tradable sector (TG) which includes both the oil tradable 
sector and non-oil tradable sector (manufacturing). While the horizontal axis has the 
output of the (NTG) that is non-tradable sector (services). 
The diagram has a production possibility curve (PPC). The PPC is represented by curve 
SP and it indicates all possible output that can be produced, with the available factors of 
production and technology, by both the tradable and non tradable sector. Io is the 
society’s indifference curve and the demand curve. Before the boom, the equilibrium in 
the economy, initially is E, which marks the intersection of the production possibility 
curve SP, with the indifference curve Io. The exchange rate initially is the slope of EPo 
and the tangent of the two curves. At the initial equilibrium E the output of the tradable 
sector (TG) is OT1 and that of non-tradable sector NTG is OT2.Note that, also at point E 
, income is equal to expenditure or demand. Oyo describes the demand expansion path 
if exchange rate is held constant at EPo and national income rises. 
Examining the effect of oil windfall, due to the increase in oil income, assuming oil is 
not consumed locally, thus indicating that the boom will not affect the maximum output 
of the non-tradable sector OS, but output of tradable sector rises, especially oil. 
Therefore the PPC shifts upward from the initial position OP on the vertical axis to 
OP*. let us assess the spending effect of this situation; 
Spending effect 
The boom shifts the PPC from SP to SP* and thus bringing a new equilibrium at E* and 
EE* is the increased oil production, that leads to the boom, but the output of both the 
no-oil tradable sector and that of non-tradable sector remain at E. The exchange rate 
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remains the same since E* lies vertically on E, EP1 is parallel to EPo. As income 
increases, demand for non-tradable goods rises through the expansion path OYo and 
stay at N, which is a disequilibrium position, since optimum output is at E*.The 
implication is that the consumers intend to consume at point N but the producers are 
willing to produce to point E*. 
Figure 2.1: The spending effect 
 
 
Therefore, the excess demand for tradable goods is represented by NM and Note that 
the output of the non tradable goods still remains at E at the relative price EPo 
(exchange rate) also excess demand for non-oil tradable commodities, is shown by EM, 
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while the rest of the same particular line that is ME* is the balance of payment 
situation. 
The implication of the whole situation is that for market clearance in the economy, the 
exchange rate must rise and it’s shown by EP*, this is necessary to reduce the excess 
demand for non tradable goods and also to make sure that the balance of payment is 
restored. Consequently, the new equilibrium will definitely fall between E* and 
intersection of SP* with the expansion path line OYo. Point D on the diagram is an 
example the new equilibrium. The summary of the implication is that, oil boom 
increases demand for non-tradable commodities from M to N, and the real exchange 
rate appreciates, thus lowering the demand for non tradable goods to N* leading to net 
rise by MN* which is equal to rise in non tradable output from T2 to T3. Again, 
considering the implication on the non-oil tradable sector (manufacturing sector), the 
boom increases demand by EM but the rise in real exchange rate increases it further to 
EM*. This is a decline in the output of the non-oil tradable sector at T1T4. 
At the new real exchange rate (relative price) EP** the domestic output of both the non 
tradable and non-oil tradable sectors move along the initial production possibility curve 
SP to a new point  D* on the same SP. This represents the new equilibrium of both non-
oil tradable sector (manufacturing) and non-tradable sector (services). At this new 
equilibrium, the effect of the boom now shows that non-oil tradable sector output falls 
from T1 to T4 while non-tradable sector output rises from T2 to T3. But to cover the 
increased demand for the output of the non-oil tradable sector, importation of non-oil 
tradable goods must rise by DD*.  
Resource movement effect 
Figure 2.2 describes the resource movement effect. Just as we held factor mobility 
constant, to be able to explain the spending effect, we also hold income elasticity for 
non tradable goods constant. The implication is that the income consumption curve, 
which indicates the expansion path in the previous diagram that is Oyo, is now 
vertically passing through E and intersects SP* at j. Labour will be attracted to the oil 
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sector from both the non tradable sector and the non-oil tradable secto,r due to the 
increase in marginal product of labour and wages.   With same real exchange rate EP1, 
B is the new point of production following the boom in the oil sector. Note that the 
relative prices EP1 is parallel to EPo hence same real exchange rate. The implication of 
this is there will be a rise in oil sector output and decrease in the non-oil tradable sector 
output (manufacturing sector) and non tradable output (service sector). 
Figure 2.2: The resource movement effect 
 
 
The resource movement into the oil sector which has depleted the factors of production, 
available to the two remaining sectors will lead to excess demand for the non -tradable 
goods. This is shown by point C on the same Figure 2.2 which is the intersection of the 
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Oyo and EP1. In clearing the market the real exchange rate needs to rise. This means 
that prices of non-tradable sector goods rises. This will remove the excess demand and 
thereby cancelling the decline in the output of the non-tradable sector output which is 
caused by the resource movement effect.  
Point D could be the new equilibrium which shows that the output of the non-tradable 
sector has fallen, compared to its output in the initial equilibrium thus, indicating the 
effect of the resource movement. Similarly, the output of the non-oil tradable sector 
(manufacturing) must have declined due to the real exchange rate appreciation. 
In conclusion, Corden and Neary (1982) shows that both resource movement and 
spending effects shift the mobile factor away from the manufacturing sector and 
currency also appreciates in value. This occurs since we assume that one specific 
mobile factor and one non-mobile factor is used in all the sectors. The implication is 
that the non-oil tradable sector (manufacturing) becomes less competitive and 
consequently, its output continues to fall whenever there is oil boom. 
For the non-tradable sector, the results are ambiguous, while the spending effect leads 
to expansion, the resource movement effect leads to contraction of the sector. The 
underlying power of spending effect depends on the propensity to consume the output 
of the non-tradable sector. The propensity to consume the service sector (non-tradable 
sector output) is relatively high, mostly in the resources endowed countries (Stijns, 
2002). But the strength of the resources movement effect depends on the factor intensity 
in the sectors. The resource movement is more effective where the production process is 
more labour intensive and in such economy it will be overshadowed by the spending 
effect. 
According to Corden and Neary (1982), the fall in output of the non-booming sector 
(lagging sector or the manufacturing sector), as a result of resource movement is 
referred to as direct de-industrialisation. While the currency appreciation caused by the 
decline in the output of the non-tradable sector as a result of excess demand for its 
output is referred to as indirect de-industrialisation.  
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Finally, the theoretical relationship between oil and manufacturing sector is clearly 
shown in these analyses of Dutch Disease phenomenon, which is a result of the resource 
curse hypothesis. 
2.3.3     Oil as an input (energy source) and manufacturing output growth 
The neoclassical perspective of production function explains the linkages between 
energy and growth. A general form of production function describes the relationship 
between oil as a form of energy and economic activity. The function is presented thus;  
(𝑄𝑖 …… ,𝑄𝑚) = 𝑓(𝐴, 𝑋𝑖 …… ,𝑋𝑛, 𝐸𝑖 …… ,𝐸𝑝)                                                             .2.0  
Where 𝑄𝑖 are various outputs i.e manufactured goods and services 
             𝑋𝑖 are various inputs such as capital, labour among others. 
              𝐸𝑖 are energy inputs used in the manufacturing production process i.e oil, gas, 
coal etc. 
According to the neo classical economists, the relationship between energy and growth 
of the GDP gross domestic products can be affected by the following agents 
(i) Substitution between energy and other inputs 
(ii) Technological change 
(iii) Shifts in the composition of the energy input 
(iv) Shifts in the composition of outputs 
Other factors can be a shift in the mix of the inputs used in the production for instance 
either capital intensive or labour intensive. Basically, the linkage between oil as an 
input and growth is explained by Mainstream economist through their growth theories 





2.3.3.1    Growth theories with natural resources (A review)  
These growth theories centred on natural resources as a source of energy for production 
process. Basically, natural resources are categorized to renewable and non renewable 
energy sources. Oil is referred to as non-renewable natural resources just like other 
fossil fuels; crude oil is produced from the remains of plants and animals over millions 
of years. Renewable natural resources must be replaceable within a reasonable amount 
of time, ranging from days to maximum of years. But in the case of  oil it takes millions 
of years to be replaced, too long for people to wait around for more to be made (see 
Smulders, 1999). 
The major issue growth theory assessed is the issue of sustainability of output level, 
since most of the renewable resources are exhaustible. Therefore, if growth depends on 
them, sustainable economic development might not be guaranteed. Conversely, non 
renewable resources like oil are believed to be inexhaustible depending on the 
production function. A situation where there are two inputs in a production function that 
is manufactured capital and natural resources (oil) offer alternative growth paths to 
economic growth. These growth paths depend majorly on institutional arrangements. 
One of the growth paths followed the optimal growth model, which maximizes the 
discounted social welfare, mostly during an infinite period of time or achieves a 
sustainable social welfare (that is a non-declining social welfare). Therefore, the growth 
theories on natural resources and output growth centre on what permits sustainable 
economic growth, which is synonymous with a non-declining utility or consumption. 
Consequently, the issue of “Sustainability” is very germane in assessing the role of 
natural resources like oil, in economic growth. Technical and institutional conditions 
have been identified as major factors, which can affect oil guaranteeing sustainable 
economic growth. The technical conditions have to do with the mixture of renewable 
and non-renewable resources, capital and natural resources endowment, and the 
possibility, as well as ease of substitution, among various inputs used in production 
process. While, the institutional set-up covers the market structure which can be 
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competition or central planning, it also involves issues of property rights which can be 
common property or private property and lastly the system values itself. 
Solow (1974), through his growth model, showed that sustainable growth can be 
achieved with finite non-renewable resources with no extraction cost and capital that is 
assumed not to be depreciating. In other words, according to Solow, sustainability is 
only possible if the non-renewable resources are produced with the usage of natural 
resources and capital. Oil as a non-renewable resource and input in production, might 
not completely fit in into the Solow growth model due to the unrealistic assumptions. In 
addition, oil might not even guarantee sustainable growth, since the same model under a 
market competition may eventually lead to extinction of the natural resources used in 
the production of the non-renewable resources (oil) and this will also lead to the decline 
in social welfare and finally lead to the collapse of the economy (see Stiglitz, 1974; 
Dagupta and Heal, 1979) 
However, standard growth theory advocates for substitutions of the depleting natural 
resources. According to the theory, the substitutes must be more in abundance and it can 
also be equivalent to human or man-made capital, which may be machines, capital or 
factories among others. All these are still within technological arrangements to ensure 
growth sustainability. Notwithstanding, the neoclassical economists, are more 
concerned with how institutional arrangements can aid crude oil as a non-renewable 
resource, to guarantee growth sustainability as  opposed to  technical arrangements. The 
neoclassical growth theory believes the priori that technical arrangements can guarantee 
sustainable growth. But under what institutional arrangement is this feasible? This is the 
question theory tends to answer (see Stern, 2003). 
Oil as a non-renewable resource in production process, is also affected by elasticity of 
substitution, in the production function for “substitutability” of the resources. This leads 
to sustainable economic growth. According to Stern(2003), the elasticity of substitution 
σ, between capital, that is, machines, factories and environmental inputs such as natural 
resources, ecosystem services and waste assimilation, is a term that measures how much 
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an input is to be  reduced in order  to increase another input and still maintain the same 
level of output. Economic theory shows that a large elasticity of substitution implies 
that a rising cost of input, say oil, can easily be ameliorated by switching to another 
production technique which makes use of alternative capital. 
However, if elasticity of substitution σ=1,  is a case of “perfect substitutability”,  this 
means that if the ratio of two inputs is changed with a given percentage while holding 
output constant, the ratio of the  marginal products of the two inputs will change in 
opposite direction. This implies that as the usage of resources (oil as an input) falls, the 
usage of capital in the production process can be increased to infinity and still maintains 
same level of output. This also means that cost of production remains constant along the 
isoquant. However, when elasticity of substitution σ=0 this is the case of no 
substitution. Under this condition the two inputs must be used in fixed ratios but where 
the inputs are infinitely substitutable, the producer cannot differentiate between the 
inputs and will only go for the cheaper one. 
2.3.3.2 Factors affecting substitution of oil as an input in production process 
Solow (1997), in his model, identified two different forms of substitution; substitution 
within category and between category. The within category is the substitution that takes 
place within category of the same input for example fuels. While substitution between 
categories refers to that substitution between different forms of inputs, such as the one 
between energy or say oil and machine. Solow attached more importance to the first 
category, in the case of oil as an input in production. The substitution of renewable 
resources for non-renewable resources has affected the usage of natural resources in 
most of the advanced countries. Example is substitution of wood for oil. 
Notwithstanding, ecological economist have also identified another form of substitution 
which is manufactured capital for natural capital. The following factors have therefore 
been identified as variables that can affect the rate at which oil can be substituted in 





This has to do with the level of energy fundamentally required in the transformation 
process of a certain material into different thermodynamic states ( See Ruth 1993; 
Islam, 1985). The thermodynamic limit is strongly affected by the rate of energy usage 
during the transformation process. Therefore, where technological development shows a 
very strong diminishing returns owing to thermodynamic limits do normally have 
serious implications on possibility of substitution. 
“Complimentarity” 
Since production process is combination of different forms of capital to generate output 
consequently, oil as a natural capital substitution is prone to availability of relevant 
compliments like manufactured capital which is also used in the transformation process 
(See Cleveland et al; 1984). According to the Georgescu-Roegen’s (1976) fund flow 
model, manufacturing production process describes an activity which involves 
transformation of a flow of energy, materials and information by two agents namely; 
labour and manufactured capital. Materials, energy and services from natural resources 
are been transformed while manufactured capital effect the transformation. For instance, 
in an energy industry more manufactured capital (machines) may be used to extract 
more oil from a petroleum reservoir if jointly used with some natural capital. Therefore 
“complimentarity” limits substitution.   
Critical Natural capital 
It has been argued that some natural capital at macro level is not replaceable by 
manufactured capital at least beyond a certain critical stock size. According to 
Costanzaand Dlay, 1992, there is a limit to the stock of produced capital that can be 
used since certain level of stock provides life support for the economy as a whole. 
Therefore excessive substitution of man-made capital for natural capital may approach a 
threshold beyond which natural system may not be able to cope again and cause a 
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system collapse. Therefore critical natural capital may definitely limits the ease of 
substitution of oil in production process.  
2.4     Methodology and Data 
There are two divergent views regarding the impact of oil revenue on the growth of the 
manufacturing sector in AOECs. While some believe that the presence of oil in these 
countries contributes to the growth of their manufacturing sectors (see Majid,2006; 
OPEC Fund for Industrial Development (OFID), 2006), others are of the opinion that 
the presence of oil is a setback for their manufacturing sectors (see, Olomola, 2007; Ali, 
2013; Ali and Harvie, 2013). To examine the impact of oil on the development of the 
manufacturing sector in AOECs, a study of six major net oil exporting countries in 
Africa, namely: Nigeria, Cameroun, Gabon (Sub-Saharan Africa),Egypt, Algeria, and 
Libya (non-Sub-Saharan Africa) is carried out using pooled data analysis. Initially this 
study covered all oil-exporting countries in Africa. However, due to the fact that not all 
of them have dominant oil sectors, the focus was changed to the six net oil exporters 
only. Our model follows the endogenous growth model of Barro and Lee (1993) with 
public good, who argue that public expenditure makes private production more 
profitable. Barro and Lee’s (1993) model is expressed thus: 
𝑦 = 𝐴𝑘1−∝𝑔∝                                                                                                              (2.1) 
wherey is subject to diminishing returns to capital (k) and g is a vector of control 
variables constituting electricity, exchange rate and per capita income. The individual 
firm takes gas fixed or independent of his decision about k.Fedderke (2003) identified 
the nature of the marginal product of capital (mpk) as the reason why some countries 
with high per capita output experience lower growth rates than the ones with lower per 
capita output. That is, if 
𝑦𝑥 = 𝐴𝑘𝑥
(1−∝)𝑥𝑔𝑥
∝𝑥                                                                                                   (2.2) 





∝𝑧                                                                                                   (2.3) 
Where yzis the per capita output growth of country z with lower per capita output, then 
 
∆𝑦𝑧 > ∆𝑦𝑥                    (2.4)
 
where both ∆yx and ∆yz, which are the changes in the per capita output growth, 
represent the growth rate of per capita output in country x and z, respectively. For the 
condition in equation (2.4)to have taken place, mpk must be a constant and not 
associated with per capita output. Fedderke (2003) attributes the constant nature of the 
mpk to the spill-over effect of knowledge in the process of capital stock accumulation. 
This means that knowledge has the characteristics of a public good. That is: 
𝑘𝑡 = 𝜗∅𝑡                                                                                                                     (2.5) 
Equation (2.5) shows that capital stock k at time t depends on knowledge ϕ at time t 
such that 𝑑𝑘𝑡
𝑑∅𝑡
= 𝜗 > 0.This means that knowledge is seen as investing in a process that 
increases capital stock in all economies. According to Fedderke (2003), investors might 
not have the power to internalize all the benefits of knowledge. At least some of it still 
leaks out to the benefit of the whole economy. This simply means that the spill-over 
effect of knowledge ϕ is non-excludable. Consequently, investors will not want to 
invest in capital to the point where: 
Smpk = Smpc (spill-over effect)         (2.6) 
Where,smpkis the social marginal product of capital and smpc is the social marginal 
cost of capital. Investors will rather stop investing in capital when: 
pmpk = pmc                                                                                                                  (2.7) 
where pmpk is private marginal product of capital and pmc is the private marginal cost 
of capital, thus, avoiding the spill-over effect. The implication of equation (2.7) is that: 
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smpk>smc                                                                                                                    (2.8) 
This is because once investors set the private marginal product of capital equal to the 
private marginal cost, the cost of knowledge becomes higher than social marginal cost 
of capital. Consequently, a more drastic measure will be taken to prevent the spill-over 
effect by investors.  
This situation might be detrimental to growth of the economy as a whole. At this point, 
government intervention comes in by aiding production through subsidizing major 
inputs in the production process (Fedderke, 2003). Therefore, equation(2.8) can be 
rewritten as follows: 
𝑦 = 𝐴𝑘1−∝−∞𝑔∝𝜆∞                                                                                                     (2.9) 
where, 𝜆∞ is the additional input subsidized to aid production. This is to reduce the 
higher cost of production resulting from setting pmpk to pmc. This will enable investors 
to relax their drastic measures to internalise the benefits of knowledge and the spill-over 
effects can benefit other sectors of the economy. 
Our model follows equation (2.9) and 𝜆∞ is viewed as oil, which is heavily subsidized 
in many AOECs. Consequently, our model is stated as: 
𝑦 = 𝐴𝑘1−∝−∞𝑜𝑖𝑙∞𝑔𝛼                                                                           (2.10) 
Taking logs of the equation it becomes: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐴 + 𝛽𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + ∞𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑖,𝑡+∝ 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                    (2.11) 
Where yi,t is the manufacturing sector output growth rate of county i at time t, A is the 
intercept, k is capital, β is the elasticity of capital and it is equal to 𝛽 = 1−∝ −∞, oil is 
oil revenue, 𝑔𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of control variables that comprises electricity, exchange rate 




2.4.1   Definition of Variables 
All variables measured in monetary terms are in constant US dollars. Manufacturing 
sector growth(y) is the dependent variable. It is measured by annual growth rate for 
manufacturing value added. 
2.4.1.1 Explanatory Variables 
Capital (𝑘) is an endogenous variable in the model. It is measured by gross capital 
formation. It consists of outlays on additions to the fixed assets of the economy plus net 
changes in the level of inventories.  
Oil Revenue (oil) is our real variable of interest. It is measured by the value of fuel 
exports (% of merchandise exports).These fuels comprise premium motor spirit (PMS), 
dual purpose kerosene (DPK) and automotive gas oil (AGO).  
2.4.1.2    Control Variables: The control variables (g) are strictly exogenous covariates. 
They are: per-capita income (pci), real exchange rate (exr), and electricity generation 
(ele). Per capita income is captured by GDP per capita based on purchasing power 
parity (PPP). PPP GDP is gross domestic product converted to international dollars 
using purchasing power parity rates. The exchange rate is the official exchange rate 
(local currency unit (LCU) per US$, period average). It is the exchange rate determined 
by national authorities or determined in the legally sanctioned exchange market. It is 
calculated as an annual average based on monthly averages (LCU relative to the U.S. 
dollar). 
The electricity generation is measured by electricity production, which is also measured 
at the terminals of all alternator sets in a station. In addition to hydropower and nuclear 
power generation, it covers generation by geothermal, solar, wind, and tide and wave 
energy, as well as that from combustible renewable and waste sources. Production 
includes the output of electricity plants that are designed to produce electricity only, as 
well as that of combined heat and power plants. 
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2.4.2   Estimation Technique 
According to Gujarati (2007), if T, which is the number of time series data, is large and 
the number of cross sectional units is small, the fixed effects approach is more 
appropriate. This is referred to as a long panel. According to Toress(2010), the fixed 
effects panel regression, unlike the ordinary least squares, considers heterogeneity 
across groups and time, hence the estimates from the fixed effects model are more 
efficient. Hauser (2010) argues that the assumption that individual intercepts must be 
uncorrelated with the error term before random effects can be used is usually violated in 
a long panel, thus making the random effects model inconsistent.  
According to him, one of the immediate solutions is to use fixed effects. However, 
Gujarati (2007) sums up all these views about the choice of fixed or random effects by 
stressing that, if the panel is long 3(i.e the number of time series T is larger than the 
number of cross sectional units N) there is likely to be little difference in the values of 
the parameters generated by both fixed and random effects. Therefore, the choice is 
based on computational convenience and consequently he advises that fixed effects are 
preferable in this circumstance. Since our data is from 1970 to 2010 (i.e 40 years) and 
the number of countries under consideration is only six, the choice of the fixed effects 
model appears appropriate. 
The fixed effects equation in its original form is presented as follows: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡
6
𝑗=5 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡                                                                                 (2.12) 
Where 𝛽1 is the intercept while 𝛽𝑗  represent the slopes or the parameter estimates of 
each of the explanatory variables used in our model. 𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡 to are explanatory variables for 
each of the six countries(cross sectional units) at time t,  
3 When T number of series is greater than the number of cross-sectional units N it is called long panel. 




The index i stand for the ith cross-sectional unit (country), and t is a year counter. That is 
i={1,2,3,4,5,6} and t={1,2………,40}.The pooled regression analysis can be done by 
estimating equation (2.12). According Gujarati (2007), it is necessary to explore the 
specific effects of the cross-sectional units. This takes us to the fixed effects least-
squares dummy variable (LSDV) approach. LSDV has been described as a way of 
accounting for the specific effects of the countries on y. This is done by allowing the 
intercept to vary across the cross-sectional units and leading to equation (2.13). 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡
6
𝑗=2 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡                                                                                 (2.13) 
The subscript iappended to β suggests that the intercepts of the individual countries may 
be different, which may be attributed to the country’s system of administration, 
leadership style and administrative philosophy. The fixed effects or the LSDV use the 
different intercept dummies to measure the specific effects of the cross-sectional units. 
Accordingly, equation (2.13) can be rewritten as: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 =∝1+∝𝑖 ∑ 𝐷𝑖
7
𝑖=2 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑡
5
𝑘=1 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡                                                                (2.14) 
Equation (2.14) is also known as the least-square dummy variable model.  
 Gujarati (2007) further states that there is a possibility of a multicolinearity problem in 
the fixed effects LSDV model due to the addition of many dummy variables especially 
in small samples. Again, because of the assumption of strict exogeneity of LSDV, the 
fixed effects model may possibly have an endogeniety problem. This is the situation 
where the random variable is possibly correlated with the regressors xit thereby leading 
to inconsistent and biased estimators. 
To improve the performance of the estimators, we explore the dynamic panel data 
approach popularised by Arellano and Bond (1991). According to Franz (2009), when a 
static specification of the fixed effects model is joined with autoregressive coefficients, 
which is the lagged value of the dependent variable, it allows feedback flowing from the 
past or current shocks to the current value of the dependent variable. This method of 
specification is known as the generalized method of moments (GMM). The dynamic 
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specification takes away the temporal autocorrelation in the residuals and prevents 
running a spurious regression, which may lead to inconsistent estimators. The GMM 
model is specified thus: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 + ∑ 𝜌𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑚
𝑛
𝑚=1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑡
6
𝑘=2 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡                                            (2.15) 
Equation (2.15) is the modified form of the fixed effects model in equation (2.14) with 
the addition of the lagged value of the dependent variable. Note that m and k are lag 
length and numbers of parameters respectively. 
Taking the first difference of equation (2.15), we obtain equation (2.16) as follows: 
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 + ∑ 𝜌𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑚
𝑛
𝑚=1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘∆𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑡
6
𝑘=2 + ∆𝜓𝑖𝑡                                      (2.16) 
Avoiding possible correlation between 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 and 𝜓𝑖𝑡 necessitates the use of an 
instrumental variable that will not be correlated with both, and through matrix 
transposition of the explanatory variable, instrumental variable 𝑍′ is obtained. Equation 




′∆𝜓𝑖𝑡                                                 (2.17) 
Estimating equation (2.17) using the generalized least square (GLS) yields one step 
consistent GMM estimators. However, additional input to the approach used by 
Arellano and Bond (1991) evolved over the years and was developed by Blundell and 
Bond (1998).It is referred to as system-GMM. There is not much difference between 
this approach and GMM except that system-GMM exercises more precaution in the 
usage of the instrumental variables. It was developed to tackle the problem of possible 
weak instrumental variables, which may occur in GMM. Therefore, the SYS-GMM is 
expected to yield more consistent and efficient parameter estimates. This will be 






Data on manufacturing growth rate, capital stock proxied by gross capital formation of 
each AOEC, per capita income, oil revenue and electricity generation were sourced 
fromWorld Bank Tables 2012 edition. Data on exchange rates were sourced from Penn 
World Table (PWT) 6.1. 
 
2.5 Empirical Results 
2.5.1     Descriptive Statistics of the Variables 
Table 2.1 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables for the six countries under 
study. 
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics  





246 5.14711 9.601761 -26.58229 47.8 
Percapita income 246 7.021713 2.248785 -1.547871 9.610885 
Capital 246 20.19376 4.445465 7.40117 24.79918 
Oil revenue  246 3.41651 2.031008 -9.124365 4.601729 
Exchange rate 246 79.49115 159.761 .0003482 733.0385 
Electricity generation 
rate 
246 22.412 1.548126 18.55171 25.59877 
Source: Author’s Computation 
All variables appear in log form to show their elasticities except the manufacturing 
sector growth rate and real exchange rate.  
The mean represents the average value of the data set. Attention is given to 
manufacturing growth rate and oil revenue because they are our core variables of 
interest. The mean value of the manufacturing growth rate is 5.14711. The value shows 
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that the mean lies at the lower end of the distribution. The majority of our data values 
on manufacturing growth rate for all the countries must be concentrated at the lower 
end. The highest manufacturing growth rate is 34.6 while the lowest is -2.4. This means 
that the mean drifts toward the lower end as earlier stated. Therefore, on average it 
appears that the manufacturing growth rates of the AOECs are relatively low. 
Comparatively, the mean value of 3.41651 of oil revenue falls inthe middle level of the 
distribution, which is an indication that oil revenue growth rate is relatively moderate at 
a higher level than manufacturing growth rate for all the AOECs. 
The table shows that the standard deviation of manufacturing growth rate is 9.60176 
while that of oil revenue is 2.031008. This is an indication that the data on 
manufacturing growth rate show a more dispersed distribution. That is, they appear to 
have larger variance across the six countries more than the data on oil. This means that 
the patterns of growth of the manufacturing sector of these countries have been 
somewhat unstable. 
The description of manufacturing sector growth rate (mgr) and oil revenue (oil) is again 
presented in Figure 2.1. The figure describes the characteristics of the two variables 
across the six countries. 
The graphs simply corroborate the result of the descriptive analysis of the data shown in 
Table 2.1 That is, the pattern of manufacturing sector growth (mgr) shows more 
variation through the undulating line graph than oil revenue in the six AOECs which 
almost show a straight line graph across the countries. While the oil revenue line graph 
follows a non-negative movement fairly above the origin for most of the countries, the 
manufacturing sector growth has been very unstable and undulating around the origin 
for all the six countries. The similarities in the patterns  of distribution across the six 
countries is an indication that the findings can be generalized for all other African oil 


















































1.0000      
Per capita income -0.1843 1.0000     
Capital 0.0210 0.1436 1.0000    
Oil revenue -0.0879 0.1919 -0.1571 1.0000   
Exchange rate -0.0894 0.4251 0.0348 0.2291 1.0000  
Electricity generation 
rate 
-0.0925 0.1939 0.0750 0.2431 -0.4048 1.0000 
Source: Authors Computation 
Table 2.2 shows the correlation and covariance nature of the variables used in our panel 
model. The variables exhibit different forms of relationship with one another. However, 
very important to our discussion is the correlation between the oil revenue and the 
manufacturing sector growth rate which is -0.0879.  This is an interesting result as it is 
shown that the two variables have an inverse relationship. Though, the value is very 
low, thisis an indication of a weak negative relationship. Generally, apart from capital 
formation, all other independent variables show a negative relationship with the 
manufacturing sector growth of the AOECs. 
2.5.2 Panel estimation results 
The idea of using panel data analysis is justified in that it takes care of the unobserved 
heterogeneity. Therefore, to be able to explain in detail the causal-effect relationship 
between the dependent and the independent variables and to study the within variations, 
we use the error-components model. This includes fixed effect and random effects. 
However, based on the nature of our data, where we have forty time series and six 
cross-sectional variables, as explained in the methodology, we use only the fixed effects 
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analysis. This is explored in the form of within variation and least squares dummy 
variables (LSDV). 
Table 2.3: Fixed Effects (within variation regression) Estimation Results for 
Manufacturing Sector Growth Rate 
*Dependent variable: Manufacturing sector growth rate 
Variables Coefficient Standard error t value 
Constant 99.38583*** 22.19101 4.48 
Per capita income 0.4735527 0.4819848 0.98 
Capital 0.3638414 0.9524375 0.38 
Oil revenue -0.0285611 0.409897 -0.07 
Exchange rate 0.0168206 0.009636 1.74 
Electricity generation rate -4.729151** 1.472804 -3.21 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
R2 = 0.0857(within) R2  =0.0010(overall) F(5,230)=4.31*** 
* Statistical significance at 10%** statistical significance at 5%.** *statistical significance at 1% 
Source: Author’s Computation 
Table 2.3 shows the fixed effect results. From the Table, it is clear that there is an 
inverse relationship between manufacturing sector growth in the AOECs and their oil 
revenues. The result corroborates our descriptive analysis in the correlation matrix 
presented in Table 2.1 where we found that the coefficient of correlation between the 
two is negative. In one sense this is supporting the evidence of Dutch Disease in these 
countries because the inverse relationship can be termed as a situation where the oil 
output is growing and the manufacturing sector growth is falling. However, the 
coefficient is not statistically significant. Again, the overall R-square is very low. The 
regressors explain about 10% systemic variation in manufacturing sector growth. The F 
value of 4.31 is significantly different from zero at 1% confidence level. 
To be able to demonstrate the specific effects of the cross-sectional units, we also 
compute the fixed effect LSDV. The purpose of this is to examine if individual country 
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impact is likely to have any influence on our results. Despite the fact that Figure 1shows 
almosta similar pattern for both manufacturing sector growth and oil revenue, there may 
still be a difference in the impact analysis of these variables. This is done by allowing 
the intercept to vary from country to country. The result of the fixed effects LSDV is 
presented in Table 2.4.   
Table 2.4: Fixed Effects(LSDV) Estimation Results for Manufacturing Sector Growth 
Rate 
*Dependent variable: Manufacturing sector growth rate 
Variables Coefficient Standard error t-value 
Constant 101.4067*** 22.82078 4.44 
Dum 2 8.907043** 2.999682 2.97 
Dum 3 -19.43958** 6.15398 -3.16 
 Dum 4 3.684153 11.99062 0.31 
Dum 5 -6.937674** 3.100352 -2.24 
Dum 6 1.925871 2.673398 0.72 
Per capita income 0.4735527 0.4819848 0.98 
Capital 0.3638414 0.9524375 0.38 
Oil revenue -0.0285611 0.409897 -0.07 
Exchange rate 0.0168206 0.0096936 1.74 
Electricity generation rate 4.729151 1.472804 3.21 
Note: Standard error in parenthesis 
R2 = 0.1149(overall) F(5,230)=2.84** 
** Statistical significance at 5%.** *statistical significance at 1%. 
Source: Authors Computation 
The fixed effects LSDV results presented in Table 2.4 show some important revelations 
when compared to the previous results in Table 2.3. As earlier indicated, the use of the 
fixed effects LSDV is justified by the need to examine the specific effects of the 
countries on our results by allowing the intercept to vary across the countries. Again, 
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the bias of inconsistent estimator varnishes when T is large and N is small in the LSDV 
model. In our model T=41 and N=6. The dummies represent the individual intercept of 
the six countries. The F statistics falls to 2.84 but it is statistically different from zero at 
5% confidence level. Also, the results show that three of the intercepts (constant 
inclusive) are individually statistically significant. That is, the intercept values of three 
out of six countries are statistically different from zero. This shows that there is a 
relative country-specific effect in our model, which may be attributed to the individual 
country’s system of administration, leadership style and administrative philosophy (see 
Olomola, 2007; Gujarati, 2007). 
The LSDV fixed effects’ results also show that the parameter estimate of oil is negative. 
This is consistent with earlier findings in the fixed effects within group estimation. It 
further confirms the existence of Dutch Disease problems in the AOECs. The value of 
the R-square in the LSDV is higher compared to the fixed effects within variation in 
Table 2.3. The F-statistic rises significantly confirming that the fixed effects LSDV 
model is also significant. According to the results, none of the explanatory variables is 
statistically significant at conventional levels. For instance, the elasticity of capital 
formation in the AOECs is positive, indicating a direct relationship between capital 
formation and the manufacturing sector growth rate. Although, this is normal and 
conforms to the a priori expectation, it is not statistically significant. This further 
justifies the inverse relationship between the oil sector growth as measured by the 
revenue from oil and the manufacturing sector growth of the AOECs. This is evident in 
the huge investment in the oil sector of these economies since all other sectors including 
the manufacturing sector appear to have been neglected.   
The per capita income elasticity is also positive but not statistically significant, meaning 
that the per capita GDP of the AOECs has no significant impact on the manufacturing 
sector growth. This might be the major reason why the contribution of the 
manufacturing sector to the GDP of these countries is very low. The coefficient of the 
exchange rate is also not significant but it is positive, indicating a direct relationship 
between manufacturing sector growth and the exchange rate. A probable explanation is 
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that as the exchange rate rises manufacturing sector growth is likely to rise in the 
AOECs and vice versa.  
The elasticity of electricity is also positive but also not statistically significant. The non-
significance of the electricity coefficient simply means that in the AOECs, the quantity 
of electricity generation is still not enough to ensure sustainable growth in the 
manufacturing sector. For instance, Nigeria, which is part of the AOECs under 
investigation, has been experiencing an erratic supply of electricity for decades and this 
has been adversely affecting the manufacturing sector of the country. Many 
manufacturing firms in the country rely on gas powered generators in their production 
processes and this has contributed significantly to the increase in the cost of production 
of these firms. Recently, some giant manufacturing firms closed down their operations 
in Nigeria and relocated to neighbouring Ghana due to the high cost of production 
caused by excessive expenditure on gas and diesel. Specifically, in 2009 PZ 
Pharmaceuticals, Unilever Nigeria PLC, and United Africa Company (UAC) relocated 
substantial parts of their companies to neighbouring Ghana. They blamed this 
development on the deplorable state of infrastructural facilities in the country, 
especially energy (see Nigeria Village Square (NVS) Forum, 2009). 
Finally, the fixed effects LSDV results are capable of yielding a consistent estimator 
when the T is large and N is small. According to Arellano and Bond (1991), to obtain 
an efficient estimator in panel models, the dynamic panel model is preferred. 
Consequently, we proceeded to generalised method of moments (GMM) and the system 
generalized method of moments (SYS-GMM) estimation by Arellano and Bond (1991) 
and Blundell and Bond (1998), respectively. The use of the two is justified by the need 
to study the consistency of our results in dynamic panel models, having found out that 





2.5.2.1     Dynamic panel estimation for manufacturing sector growth 
Arellano and Bond (1991) argued that fixed effects LSDV might be inefficient hence 
the need to exploit the orthogonality conditions that exist between the lagged values of 
the dependent variable and the disturbance term through the use of an additional 
instrument in the model. This approach is called the generalized method of 
moments(GMM). This was modified by Blundell and Bond (1998) due to the fact that 
the assumption of strict exogeniety is more relaxed and is capable of yielding a more 
efficient estimator(see Roodman, 2006).This approach is a form of dynamic panel 
modelling that limits the tendency of having a spurious regression, which may lead to 
wrong inferences that is common in static models. The results of the dynamic panel 
models are presented in Table 2.5. 




Variables Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Z Prob z 
GMM 
 
Manufacturing growth rate(-1) -0.0202367 0.0645919 -0.31 0.754 
Per capita income 0.4383802 0.5013518 0.87 0.382 
Capital 0.4004976 0.9312599 0.43 0.667 
Oil revenue -0.2915597 0.3998965   -0.73 0.466 
Exchange rate 0.0197917** 0.0098749 2.00 0.045 
Electricity generation rate 5.089826 1.552222 -3.28 0.091 
Wald chi2(6)          =     18.78,    Prob> chi2           =    0.0045 
SYS-GMM Manufacturing growth rate(-1) 0.0778381            0.0507784 1.53 0.125 
Per capita income -0.3366477           0.392417 -0.86 0.391 
Capital 0.3981301 0.2572094 1.55 0.122 
Oil revenue -0.7079312** 0.3125724 -2.26 0.024 
Exchange rate 0.0001853           0.0062226 0.03 0.976 
Electricity generation rate 0.0465988 0.259019 -0.18 0.857 
Wald chi2(6)          =     15.29            Prob> chi2           =    0.0181 
 
** statistical significance at 5%.** *statistical significance at 1% 
Source: Author’s Computation 
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The results of the GMM and SYS-GMM are shown in Table 2.5. This is another 
confirmation of our inferences from the previous estimated models. It is clearly shown 
that there is consistency in our results regarding the different models estimated i.e. from 
the fixed effects within group estimation to the fixed effects LSDV and dynamic 
models, which comprise both the GMM and SYS-GMM. All the coefficients’ signs are 
almost the same for the two dynamic models. For instance, they both show that the 
coefficient of oil is negative, which is the same as what we obtained from our previous 
fixed effects models. The two dynamic panel models are statistically significant at 5% 
level with Wald Chi-squared probability value of 0.0045 and 0.0181 for GMM and 
SYS-GMM, respectively.  
The only difference in the results obtained from all the models is in the significance of 
the parameter estimates. The SYS-GMM results, which according to the literature 
produce the most reliable parameter estimates, confirm the statistical significance of the 
oil parameter coefficient. That is, the coefficient of oil is negative and statistically 
significant, showing that oil revenue growth, which can be seen as a measure of oil 
sector growth, has a significant negative impact on the manufacturing sector of the 
AOECs. Specifically, 10% rise in oil revenue (oil sector growth) will lead to about 
7.1% fall in the manufacturing sector growth of the AOECs. 
We conclude that there is an inverse relationship between oil revenue and 
manufacturing sector growth of the AOECs. In terms of impact analysis, we conclude 
that oil revenue, which is a measure of the growth in the oil sector, has a significant 
negative impact on manufacturing sector growth in the AOECs. 
2.5.2.2     Test for over-identification and serial correlation in the dynamic panel data 
It has been observed that over-identification is a common problem with dynamic panel 
data in both systemic genaralised method of moments SYSGMM and genaralised 
method of moments GMM. This problem is associated with the finite sample behaviour 
of the GMM estimator and there are two major factors that affect this finite behaviour 
of samples. These are strength of identification and numbers of moment conditions (See 
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Hayakawa, 2013). The latest test for the vailidity of the identification problem is the 
Sagan/Hassen test which is also refered to as the J test. This test has been proven to be 
valid under weak moments asymptotics even when the number of instruments is large in 
the cross sectional regression (See Windmeijer,2009; Woutersen, 2013).  
Again, the presence of serial correlation or autocorrelation in the estimates of dynamic 
panel data has also been pointed out as one of the problems of dynamic panel data 
estimators. The implication is that it limilts the effeciency of both GMM and SYSGMM 
estimators (see Hayakaya, 2013). 
The results of the over-identification test and the test for serial correlation are presented 
in tables 2.6 and 2.7 respectively. 
Table 2.6 Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions 
H0: over-identifying restrictions are valid 
chi2(152) 236.4587 
Prob> chi2 0.0000 
 
The results show that the null hypothesis is rejected. Therefore, over-identifying 
restrictions are invalid. The implication is that the number of instruments used in the 
GMM estimation does not have any negative effect on the estimators of the GMM. 
Table 2.7 Arellano and Bond test for serial correlation 
H0: no autocorrelation 
Order Z Prob>z 
1 -16.228 0.0000 




Table 2.7 shows the acceptance of the null hypothesis at lag length two which is the lag 
length used for the GMM estimation. The implication is that the null hypothesis that 
there is no autocorellation is accepted at the lag length two. Therefore the GMM 
estimates are not affected by the problem of serial correlation hence there esimates 
remain consistent and efficient. 
2.5.3     Discussion and Conclusion 
We draw some important inferences from the study. The analysis shows that the six 
AOECs used in our study did not exhibit much difference in the relationship between 
their oil sector and the manufacturing sector. This is confirmed from the descriptive 
statistics, which show that there is no overwhelmingly significant country-specific 
effect on the nature of both oil revenue and the manufacturing sector in the six 
countries. The fixed effects LSDV results also do not show absolute support for 
country-specific effects.  The implication of this result is that the findings can be 
generalized to other oil-exporting countries in Africa not included in the study.  
The existence of Dutch Disease is observed in the negative relationship between the oil 
sector and the manufacturing sector of the AOECs. This is supported by all models. The 
inference supports the view of several studies that have used different variables and 
analyses to confirm the existence of Dutch Disease in oil-exporting countries (see Égert 
and Leonard, 2007; Olomola, 2007; Ismail, 2010; and Majid, 2006). 
The study confirms that the negative impact of the oil sector on the manufacturing 
sector of the AOECs is more significant in the dynamic panel model than in the static 
models. The finding is at variance with Mehrara, Sadr and Farhani (2007) who 
concluded that oil revenue does not have a significant negative impact on the non-oil 
manufacturing sector. Though they confirm a negative relationship, they concluded that 
it is not significant. It can now be seen that their conclusion might be due to the static 
model they used. Our dynamic model, specifically the SYS-GMM model, which is 
capable of showing a more reliable result when compared with the static models, 
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indicates that oil has a negative significant impact on the manufacturing sector of the 
AOECs. 
Another important inference from the study is the existence of a positive relationship 
between the exchange rate and manufacturing sector growth. A similar result was 
obtained by Égert and Leonard (2007) in their study of the oil-rich Republic of 
Kazakhstan. The coefficient of the exchange rate is not significant on the AOECs 
manufacturing growth rate but a direct relationship is confirmed. 
The stunted growth of capital formation in the manufacturing sector of AOECs is 
revealed in our study. Both the static and dynamic panel models show that capital does 
not have a significant impact on the manufacturing sector of the AOECs. This means 
that the manufacturing sectors are less capital intensive (see Ismail, 2010). 
 Finally, the non-significance of the estimator of electricity generation in most of our 
models shows further support for the low investment in energy in the manufacturing 
sector of the AOECs. This situation is evident in some oil-exporting countries such as 
Nigeria where manufacturing firms are closing down and relocating to neighbouring 
countries where there is a more stable supply of electricity. Many of these firms take 
this step to reduce the high marginal cost of production resulting from the need to find 
alternative sources of energy. 
It can be concluded that there is Dutch Disease in the AOECs as shown by the negative 
relationship between oil revenue and the manufacturing sector growth. Thus, the study 
contributes to the growing consensus on the existence of Dutch Disease in many oil-rich 
nations in the world. It is discovered that the growth of the oil sector has a significant 
negative impact on the manufacturing sector of the AOECs. The implication of this is 
that apart from addressing policies to improve the manufacturing sector through 
diversification and investment policy, among others, efforts must be made to plough 
back the revenue realised in the oil sector to the real sector of the economy. Utilizing a 
substantial part of oil revenue for the development of the manufacturing sector may 
43 
 
likely cause the oil sector to start exhibiting positive and meaningful effects on the 
manufacturing sector of the AOECs  
The study confirms that the exchange rate demonstrates a positive relationship with the 
manufacturing sector growth of AOECs. This corroborates the findings of Égert and 
Leonard (2007), among others, who also concluded from their studies that the exchange 
rate has a direct relationship with the manufacturing sector growth of the oil-rich 
Kazakhstan Republic. This implies that an increase in the exchange rate may likely 
promote the growth of the AOECs manufacturing sectors. The transmission mechanism 
through which this occurs might not be unconnected to the fact that a rise in the 
exchange rate discourages importation of manufacturing competitive goods. This in turn 
will most likely promote the growth of the manufacturing sector. A currency 
devaluation policy complemented by the provision of adequate incentives to promote 
the domestic manufacturing output is recommended.  
We can also conclude that the level of investment in the manufacturing sector of the 
AOECs is grossly inadequate. This implies that the manufacturing sectors of the 
AOECs are suffering from inadequate capital. As shown in the discussion of the 
literature, the more the manufacturing sector is capital intensive, the stronger is its 
resistance to negative influence from the oil sector. This dearth of investment in the 
manufacturing sector of the AOECs is further revealed through the observation that 
electricity generation does not have any significant impact on manufacturing sector 
growth. Consequently, our study supports the call for aggressive investment policy that 
will accelerate a massive investment in the manufacturing sector of the AOECs. 
Finally, it is apparent that there is a problem with the manufacturing sector of the 
AOECs and there isa need to address this problem if the growth of these countries is to 
be enhanced. Generally, any of the following courses of action can be employed to 
address these problems: (i) diversification; (ii) currency devaluation with adequate 
incentives to promote domestic manufacturing output; (iii) aggressive investment policy 
to increase capital formation in the AOECs manufacturing sector; (iv) stabilization of 
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the oil sector and utilization of the oil revenue for more investment in the manufacturing 
sector; and (v) political will to carry out all these necessary measures. It should be noted 
that none of these measures is, on its own a perfect panacea for the problem of the 
AOECs manufacturing sector. All these efforts can be launched together or 





















Monetary policy and growth of the manufacturing sector in Africa’s oil exporting 
countries (AOECs) 
3.1 Introduction 
It has been observed that there are two divergent views regarding the effects of 
monetary policy on manufacturing growth. These include the studies that maintain that 
monetary policy has been properly administered by many developing economies 
including AOECs and that this has promoted the growth of their manufacturing sector 
and the overall growth of the economy and the studies that argue that monetary policy 
has not been properly practised in the developing economies, leading to the current 
problem in their manufacturing sector (see Woodford,2001;Jordi and Mark, 
2007;Clarida and Gali,2000; and Gali and Gertler,1998). 
Other studies have also concluded that it might be necessary to assess the existing 
relationship between monetary policy and the manufacturing sector in a country before 
any of the two views can be adjudged to be correct. This might provide insights on how 
policy administration can be used to improve manufacturing sector growth. The 
rationale behind this argument is that countries differ from one another in terms of 
natural resources endowment, level of development, and institutional and structural set-
up. The idea, therefore, is that priorities and objectives of monetary authorities in 
different economies might depend on these factors thereby making monetary policy to 
have varying degrees of effects on the manufacturing sector (See Blanchard and Gali, 
2007; Bouchaour and Al-Zeaud, 2012).  
Based on the foregoing, there is a possibility that the unique characteristic of oil 
abundance in oil-rich countries might influence the relationship between monetary 
policy and the manufacturing sector in the AOECs. In addition, it appears that there is 
yet to be a consensus on how monetary policy influences the output of the 
manufacturing sector especially in the AOECs. Among other studies Olomola (2007) 
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was more concerned with the relationship between oil rent and economic growth in oil 
exporting countries in Africa. Other studies such as (Mohamed (2011), Corden and 
Neary (1982), and Acostal, Lartey and Moudelina(2009) were more focused on the 
issue of “Dutch Disease” in some oil exporting countries. None of these studies or any 
one that we are aware of focused on the manufacturing sector of the AOECs that has 
been described has a major sub sector in the real sector of the AOECs that can play an 
important role in economic diversification. 
While there is a near consensus that monetary policy does not have a long run impact on 
growth, there are some studies that still contradict this (See Nelson and Plosser, 1982; 
Tobin, 1965; Samba, 2013). Consequently, to provide a wider policy alternative that can 
help in promoting the growth of the manufacturing sector, this study explores the 
relationship between monetary policy and manufacturing growth in the AOECs using a 
panel cointegration analysis. Apart from allowing us to study the specific relationship 
between monetary policy and manufacturing output growth, the choice of panel 
cointegration will also allow us to verify if a long run relationship between the two 
variables exists in the AOECs or not. 
3.2 Monetary policy and growth relationship 
The issue of super-neutrality of money has been a subject of debate over the years. 
Arguments on whether the stock of money has lasting effects on real economic 
variables or not, have continued to generate contributions from many scholars (see for 
example, Sidrauski, 1967; Samba, 2013). However, according to Papademous (2003) 
the link between monetary policies and growth can best be explored, when we consider 
theoretical arguments, surrounding the relationship between monetary expansion and 
economic growth. 
 
Theoretical analysis dating as far back as the 1960s, has contributed immensely to 
answering the questions surrounding the long-run super-neutrality which means that a 
change in money growth will only affect inflation in the long-run and, therefore, might 
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not have an effect on the real variables (Nelson and Plosser, 1982). However, this 
argument has to do with whether a permanent change in money growth would have a 
long-term or short-term effect on interest rates, capital accumulation and output growth. 
Briefly we shall assess these contributions as well as the empirical evidence on them 
sequentially.  
 
In his model, Tobin (1965), examined a situation, which consists of agents saving for 
future consumption, only from their current income, by holding a cash balance or 
investing it in real capital assets. According to Tobin (1965), in such a situation, an 
increase in monetary expansion can lead to higher output growth. This assertion refutes 
the super-neutrality of money. The transmission mechanism through which this works, 
is that an increase in money, leads to higher inflation, which in turn reduces the rate of 
return on money and thus causes a portfolio shift in favour of real capital (Tobin, 
1965).,The increase in capital stock, in turn, will lead to a rise in output per person in 
the long run. 
 
After Tobin’s (1965) work, there has been an emergence of advanced theories on the 
relationship between money, inflation and growth (see for example Stockman, 1981; 
Sidrausiki, 1967). These theories have challenged Tobin’s analysis, that monetary 
expansion would have a positive and lasting effect on growth. The characteristics of 
these theories are that they consider an infinitely-lived representative agent with 
optimistic utility behaviour and where money is supernatural. That is real variables, 
including the growth rate of output are independent of money supply growth in the 
long-run. 
 
According to Papademoos (2003), despite the generalization, this has not led to a 
complete consensus, or robust conclusion, on whether money has a long-run or short-
run effect on growth. According to him, in a theory where economic agents are 
infinitely lived and taking cognizance of some other assumptions, such as money being 
a compliment to capital, monetary expansion might not influence real interest rates as 
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well as economic growth.“Super-neutrality of money holds here” but if we consider the 
alternative approaches where “overlapping generations” are used, support is provided 
for Tobin’s theory under an explicitly optimizing framework, where an increase in 
inflation as a result of money supply growth, causes a shift to consumption of portfolio 
investment. The increase in capital stock can cause outputs to rise in the long-run. 
 
Blanchard and Simon (2001), have also pointed out, that the conclusion of theories on the 
role of money, in growth, depends on the relationship between real monetary balance 
and capital, for instance, if they are complimentary, higher monetary balance and 
inflation may reduce capital accumulation and growth in the long run. This is because 
there is a “cash-in-advance” constraint on spending, since money balance is employed 
to finance consumption and investments. But the reverse is the case when monetary 
growth and capital are treated as substitutes, as in Tobin’s (1965) model. Therefore, 
different hypotheses on functions of money, lead to different and even conflicting 
conclusions on the size and signs of permanent effects of monetary expansion on 
growth.  
 
However, some theories have also supported the view, that there exists a long-run 
relationship between monetary expansion and growth, but they maintain that such a 
relationship will be negative (see for example Fischer and Modigliani, 1978; Lucas, 
1987, 2003). Their analyses were based on welfare cost of inflation. The cost of 
inflation, which includes the cost of economic institutional structures, clearly implies a 
negative effect of increase in monetary growth (inflation) on economic growth. The 
uncertainty caused by inflation impairs the price mechanism. Which affects its 
efficiency and this can be expected to have adverse effects on productivity and 
consequently on economic growth.  
 
On the whole, studies have supported the view that monetary expansion, leading to a 
permanent rise in inflation, will adversely affect long-term growth (see for example 
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Lucas, 1987, 2003). Notwithstanding this, a few empirical studies have identified a 
positive and others a negative long-run relationship between higher monetary expansion 
and growth. Nonetheless, the rate of inflation must be confined to a relatively low rate. 
This is in support of the position of Tobin (1965) and Alexey (2011), that a small dose 
of inflation might be necessary to promote growth and employment. 
 
However, Papademos(2003),is of the opinion, that despite different positions on the 
negative effects of monetary expansion or inflation on growth, in the long-run it is still 
subject to consideration of empirical evidence.  Consequently, we explore some 
empirical evidence to further examine the relationship between monetary policy and 
growth. 
Nneka (2012), investigated the performance of monetary policy on the manufacturing 
sector in Nigeria. The study used interest rate, inflation rate, exchange rate, money 
supply, company tax rate and company lending rate as independent variables. A vector 
error correction model was used and Granger causality test was carried out among the 
variables. The study found a positive relationship between money supply and an index 
of manufacturing production, while other variables such as interest rate, inflation rate 
and exchange rate showed a negative relationship.  
Alexey (2011), investigated the Dutch Disease and monetary policy in an oil-exporting 
economy with special focus on Russia. He employed a DSGE framework. The result 
showed that monetary policy, based on the Taylor principle, performs poorly in 
promoting economic growth of the oil exporting economy, while consumer price index, 
inflation targeting and exchange rate pegging, produce a more pronounced effect on the 
output level. 
Onyeiwu (2012), examined the impact of monetary policy on the growth of the Nigerian 
economy. An ordinary least square estimating technique was used in the study. Results 
of the analysis showed that money supply has a positive impact on growth and balance 
of payment of the Nigerian economy, but a negative impact on the rate of inflation. The 
study recommended that monetary policy should be used to facilitate provision of a 
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favourable climate for investment through appropriate exchange rate, interest rates and 
liquidity management.  
Ridhwana, De-Groot and Rietvelda (2011), examined the regional impact of monetary 
policy in Indonesia. The study used vector auto-regression to measure the regional 
impact of monetary policy shocks on regional output levels in Indonesia. From their 
results, the impulse responses derived from the estimated model, displayed variations in 
regional response to monetary policy shocks both in terms of magnitude and timing. 
The study supported the view that regional responses to monetary policy depends on 
different sectors’ composition, especially the manufacturing sector. It was also deduced 
from the study, that a firms’ size was part of the reason for differences in regional 
responses to monetary policy. 
Anthony and Mustafa (2011), studied the impact of the financial sector and monetary 
policy reforms on non-oil exports of the Nigerian economy. They employed 
cointegration and error correction mechanisms. The results showed that the monetary 
and financial sector liberalisation has a significant positive effect on the growth of non-
oil exports in Nigeria, hence the need to sustain a deregulated monetary policy in order 
to promote the non-oil output in Nigeria. 
Peersman and Smet (2002), using the European economy, examined the impact of a 
change in monetary policy on output, in eleven industries between the period1980-
1998. The study employed panel cointegration analysis and found that the negative 
effects of monetary tightening were more significant during recessions than in boom 
periods. The result also revealed the presence of cross-industry heterogeneity and that 
an asymmetric monetary policy effect was significant on the financial structure of the 
industries. 
Gul, Mughal and Rahim (2012), examined the linkages between monetary policy 
instruments and growth in Pakistan. The method of ordinary least square was employed. 
The results showed that monetary policy tightening, with appropriate balance 
adjustment, in inflation rates, exchange rates and interest rates will have a positive 
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impact on growth in Pakistan. However, they pointed out that evidence from previous 
studies has suggested that in the short-run, an expansionary monetary policy will likely 
have positive effects on growth. 
Nenbe and Madume (2012), empirically assessed the role of monetary policy in 
maintaining macro-economic stability in Nigeria. The study made use of a cointegration 
and error correction model, the results revealed that there exists a long run relationship 
between monetary policy variables and macro-economic stability in Nigeria. Money 
supply was shown to have a significant positive impact on the growth of the country. 
Ditimi, Nwosa and Olaiya (2012), examined the impact of monetary policy on 
economic stabilization using an ordinary least squares estimating technique. They found 
that a monetary policy mix involving exchange rates and money supply have a 
significant impact on the growth of the Nigerian economy. They also established a long-
run relationship between monetary policy variables and the growth of the economy as a 
whole. 
Sahinoz and Cosar (2010), assessed sectoral growth cycles and the impact of monetary 
policy on the growth of the manufacturing sector in Turkey. Using a vector auto-
regression model (VAR), it was found that the Turkish manufacturing sector, responded 
to a contractionary monetary policy shock, through a pronounced reduction in output. 
The degree of response varied from firm, to firm in the entire manufacturing industry of 
Turkey, with paper, chemical and paper product manufacturing firms being the most 
responsive. 
Ibrahim and Amin (2005), assessed the relationship between exchange rates, monetary 
policy and manufacturing output growth in Malaysia. The study employed a VAR and 
found out that exchange rate shocks have a significant impact on manufacturing output - 
more than the overall growth of the economy. It was also shown that monetary policy 
tightening leads to a negative response from real activities. On the whole the study 
found that manufacturing output responds sharply to both monetary and exchange rate 




Romer (1996) in his modification of Arrow’s seminal work on the economies of 
learning by doing pointed out that investment in knowledge (experience) has a strong 
linkage with increase in productivity. According to Romer (1996), the indexes of 
experience by cumulative investment follow the following production function. 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝐹(𝐾𝑖𝑡, 𝐴(𝑡)𝐿𝑖𝑡).                                                                                                 (3.1) 
Where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is the output of firm i , A(t) is the stock of knowledge of firm i at period t,  
𝐾𝑖𝑡 and 𝐿𝑖𝑡 are the capital and labour of the firm at period t. Romer (1996) pointed out 
that labour is more productive due to accumulation of knowledge which also depends 
on experience. However, experience is a function of past investment. Consequently the 
growth rate of output of the firm can be written as a function of indexes of experience 
by cumulative investment as follows: 
𝐺(𝑡) = ∫ 𝐼(𝑣)𝑑𝑣 = 𝑘(𝑡)
𝑡
−∞
.                                                                                        (3.2) 
Where G(t) is the growth rate of the output of the firm, I(v)dv is the index of the 
cumulative investment which is equal to capital stock k(t). However, the growth rate of 
output of the firm according to Romer (1996) is equal to the per-capita production 
function (real output/income) i.e. 
𝑦 = 𝑘(𝑡)                                                                                                                       (3.3) 
Substituting 3.2 in equation 3.3 shows that: 
𝐺(𝑡) = 𝑦.                                                                                                                     (3.4) 
Where y is the real output  
Again, in the money demand function, Romer(1996) postulated a relationship between 
inflation, money growth and interest rates as such that demand for real money balance 






= 𝐿(𝑟, 𝑦)                                                                                                                  (3.5) 
This can be written in linear form as: 
𝑀
𝑃





+ 𝛽𝑟                                                                                                                (3.7) 
Dividing both sides by 𝛼 leads to: 
𝑦 = 1/𝛼 (
𝑀
𝑃
) + 𝛼/𝛽(𝑟)                                                                                              (3.8) 
where 1/𝛼  and 𝛼/𝛽  are elasticities of real money balances and interest rates 
respectively.Substituting equation 3.7 into 3.8 leads to: 
𝐺(𝑡) = 1/𝛼 (
𝑀
𝑃
) + 𝛼/𝛽(𝑟)                                                                                        (3.9) 
Thus the growth rate of a firm can be presented as a function of the real money balance 
and interest rate which determines capital stock investment, where labour remains 
constant. 
Our model is a modification of equation 3.9. In our attempt to study the impact of 
monetary policy on the growth rate of the manufacturing sector of the AOECs, apart 
from the monetary policy instruments like interest rates and money supply, we also 
include in the model as explanatory variables, some policy variables like exchange rates 
and inflation rates. Net domestic credit represents the financial sector indicator while 
gross capital formation is used as a control variable.  The growth rate of the 
manufacturing sector is the dependent variable. More explicitly our model is expressed 
as: 
𝐺𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜛0 + 𝜛1𝐾𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝜛𝑗
6
𝑗=2 𝑀𝑗𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡                                                               (3.10) 
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where𝐺𝑖,𝑡is the growth rate of output of the manufacturing sector of country i at time t, 
𝑀𝑗𝑖,𝑡 comprises of the monetary policy instruments; real money balance measured by 
real money supply and real interest rate. It is also comprises of policy variables such as 
real exchange rates, and inflation rates as well as a financial sector indicator that is net 
domestic credit in the economy in country i at time t.𝐾𝑖,𝑡is the capital of country i at 
time t and μi,t represents the country specific stochastic variable. Note that i=1,2.....9 and 
t=1,2………,40. 
3.3.1 Definition of Variables 
Based on literatures the following variables are used in the model, their definitions and 
unit of measurement are presented as follows. 
Dependent Variable: Manufacturing sector growth 𝐺𝑖,𝑡is the dependent variable. It is 
measured by annual growth rate of manufacturing value added. The aggregates are 
based on constant US dollars.
 
Explanatory Variables 
Monetary Variables  (𝑀𝑝𝑡) 
(i) Monetary policy instruments: real interest rates (%) and real aggregate 
money supply i.e quasi money (M2) (constant US dollar). 
(ii) Policy variables: It involves real exchange rate (local currency unit per US 
dollar (period average) and CPI inflation rates. 
(iii) Financial sector indicator: Net domestic credit (constant US dollar), 
Control variable 
This is the physical Capital (K)in the model. It is measured by the gross 
capital formation. It consists of outlays on additions to the fixed assets of the 






3.3.2   Estimation Technique 
The estimation technique adopted for this study is the panel data error correction 
approach proposed by Westerlund(2007)4. Westerlund (2007) developed a new panel 
cointegration test that makes use of the structure dynamics rather than residual 
dynamics (see Demetriades and Fielding, (2010). Therefore since the new panel 
cointegration test makes use of structural dynamics it does not impose the restriction of 
common factors like the one that makes use of residual dynamics. The procedure is 
divided into three. The first stage is to test for stationarity,i.e panel unit root test. 
 
The second stage is the error correction based panel cointegrationtest and the third stage 
is the estimation of both the long run and the short-run equations. Another rationale for 
this study’s choice of this approach lies in the fact that Westerlund’s (2007) panel 
cointegration is based on error correction. Therefore, short run relationships/dynamics 
are given more attention. This is necessary because of the near consensus that monetary 
policy often exhibits weak or no long-run relationship with real variables (see Tobins, 
1965; Mundel, 1963). Again, the panel cointegration test is an array of tests that are 
normally distributed and can accommodate generally unit-specific short-run dynamics, 
unit-specific trends and slope parameters as well as cross-sectional dependence. 
As earlier stated, Westerlund developed four panel cointegration tests which are divided 
into two separate groups. The first two tests developed by Westerlund(2007) test the 
alternative hypothesis that at least one cross-sectional unit is cointegrated, while the 
other two test the alternative hypothesis that the whole panel is cointegrated. The 
process of estimating our model starts with the panel unit root test. 
 
 
4 The Westerlund cointegration implements a relatively new command in stata. The idea is to test for the 
absence of cointegration, that is to determine if any of the panel test is error correcting or not 




3.3.2.1   Panel unit root test 
The panel unit root test explores the data characteristics of the panel before proceeding 
to the panel cointegration test. The idea here is to test for stationarity of each variable 
used in the study. According to Engel and Granger (1987) a variable may not be 
stationary but a linear combination of the non-stationary variables maybe stationary. So, 
we test for cointegration just to verify this. The method of panel unit root test adopted 
for this study is the Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS) test. The test has been proven to be 
suitable in verifying stationarity of variables in panel data (see Im, Pesaran and Shin, 
2003; Maddala and Wu, 1999).  
Again, the choice of IPS has to do with the problem of intercept heterogeneity 
associated with many estimates. IPS allows for heterogeneity of the intercept. The IPS 
unit root tests are superior to the homogenous test when N (cross sectional unit) is 
relatively smaller than T (series). Therefore, in this study where T>N, the IPS is more 
suitable for the unit root test (See Chris Brooks, 2013). The basic IPS specification is 
given by: 
∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑗∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝑗
𝑝𝑖
𝑗=1 + 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡…                              (3.11) 
where, β0 is the constant, xi,t represents the explanatory variables, ∆yi,t is the explained 
variable, β1t is a time trend and pi is the required lag length. The null hypothesis to be 
tested for the IPS is H0:αi=0, for all ‘i’s while the alternative hypothesis is H1:αi<0, for 
at least one i. The lag lengths are selected using the Akaike Information Criterion which 
is used mostly in panel estimation. According to Westerlund (2007) all series must be 
largely non-stationary series i.e. I(1) before a panel cointegration test can be carried out. 
3.3.2.2 Error-correction based panel cointegration test 
After the stationarity test, we proceed to the cointegration testor the error-correction 
based panel cointegration test developed by Westerlund (2007).The panel cointegration 
test model is given by: 
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∆𝐺𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜃𝑖𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑗∆𝐺𝑖,𝑡−𝑗
𝑝𝑖
𝑗=1 + ∑ 𝜋𝑖𝑗∆𝑋𝑖,𝑡−𝑗
𝑝𝑖
𝑗=0 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                       (3.12) 
Where X and 𝐺𝑖,𝑡 are explanatory variables and manufacturing growth rate respectively, 
αi, βi and πi are parameter estimates.ECT is the error correction term while parameter θi 
determines the speed of adjustment at which the system corrects back to equilibrium 
when there is a sudden shock. If θi< 0, it means that there is error correction, which 
simply implies that 𝐺𝑖,𝑡 it and mpit are cointegrated. But if θi= 0, then there is no error 
correction hence there is no cointegration. Therefore the null hypothesis is stated as 
H0:θi  = 0 for all i while the alternative hypothesis depends on the assumption we made 
about the homogeneity of θiand this varies in the four panel cointegration tests (see 
Demetriades and Fielding, 2010; Westerlund, 2007). The four tests are divided into two, 
namely: the group-mean test and the panel test. 
3.3.2.3 Estimating the group-mean tests  
Considering equation 3.12 which is the error correction based panel cointegration 

















𝑖=1                                                                                                     (3.14) 
Consequently, the first two tests which verify existence of cross-sectional unit 
cointegration are estimated using equations 3.13 and 3.14. Both 𝑉𝜏 and 𝑉𝛼 test statistics 
test the null hypothesis that there is no cointegration across all the cross sectional units, 
against the alternative hypothesis that there is cointegration in at least one cross-
sectional unit(i.e 𝐻0𝑉:θi  = 0 for all i) while 𝐻1𝑉:θi< 0  for at least one i. Therefore the 






3.3.2.4 Estimating the panel tests 
The second sets of tests are the panel tests for cointegration. The test statistics are 




                                                                                                                  (3.15) 
𝐵𝛼 = 𝑇𝜃                                                                                                                     (3.16) 
Equations 3.15 and 3.16 are panel test statistics for cointegration. The null hypothesis is 
that there is no cointegration for the whole panel (i.e 𝐻0𝐵:θi  = 0 for all i)against the 
alternative hypothesis that there is cointegration for all the cross-sectional unitsi.e the 
whole panel( 𝐻1𝐵:θi< 0 for all i). Once the null hypothesis is rejected it means there is 
cointegration for the whole panel.  
The P values are computed based on both asymptotic test distribution and cross 
sectional dependence which makes use of the bootstrap values of the parameter 
estimates as the robust P values.  
Asymptotic test distribution 
According to Westerlund (2007) the asymptotic distribution of error-correction test is 
purely based on sequential limit theory which simply implies that T is taken to infinity 
before N. The implication of this is that for the test to be justified, T must be 
substantially larger than N. This is peculiar in our current study which features T=41 
and N=9. Asymptotic P values are obtained for all the four categories of tests 
highlighted in equations 3.13, 3.14, 3.15 and 3.16 (see Elberhardt, 2011; Frimpong, 




The bootstrap approach of computing the parameter estimates is used to capture the 
cross-sectional dependence. The idea behind this is that there is a possibility of cross-
sectional correlation existing which can affect our results. Consequently, Westerlund 
(2007) developed bootstrap values which take care of any expected cross-sectional 
dependence (Ishibashi, 2012; Demetriades and Fielding, 2010). The P values obtained 
here are referred to as the robust P values even in the presence of common factors in 
time series. In this study the lags and the leads are set using the Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC) as used by previous studies (see Westerlund, 2007; Pedroni 
2000;Ishibashi, 2012; Demetriades and Fielding, 2010)and the Bartlett Kernel window 
width are set according to 4(T/100)2/n. The time series in this study is 41 years i.e T=41. 
Putting this into the formula for selecting the Kernel window gives approximately 3 
which is the Irwindow. Considering the T which is 41, the number of replications 
regarding the bootstrap values is 400 (see seeWesterlund, 2007; Pedroni 2000). 
Finally, after the estimation of the model, we test for cross sectional dependence. The 
essence of the test is to find out if the presence of common factors has an effect on the 
panel cointegration test result. Notwithstanding, bootstrapping has been identified as a 
remedy for the presence of the common factor (see Persyn, 
andWesterlund,2008;Ishibashi, 2012; Demetriades and Fielding, 2010).This further 
provides justification for bootstrapping. However, the test requires that T>N and in our 
study T=41 and N=9.This condition is not violated. Therefore, we can conveniently test 
for cross sectional dependence in the residuals. 
3.3.3   Data 
Data on manufacturing growth rate, capital stock proxied by gross capital formation of 
each AOEC, CPI inflation rates, interest rates, money supply and exchange rates are all 
sourced from World Bank Tables, 
3.4   Results and discussion 
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This section presents data analysis and interpretation of the empirical results. We start 
by exploring the panel dimension of our data so as to understand the individual nature 
of the variables and to ascertain their suitability for the estimating technique adopted. 
This is done through the test for stationarity which is also known as the unit-root test. 
As explained in the methodology, determination of the order of integration is very 
important before embarking on the panel cointegration test. A non-stationary series 
contains unit roots and such series have the tendency of sustaining shocks. The reverse 
is the case for a stationary series,i.e a series that does not contain unit-roots. It is 
important that all the series are integrated in the same order before the error-correction 
based panel cointegration can be applied 
Consequently, our first task is to perform the unit root test and determine the order of 
integration of all variables. In recent panel studies there are two well established and 
appropriate unit-root tests: the Im Pesaran and Shin(IPS) test and the Augmented 
Dickey Fuller (ADF)-Fisher Chi square unit root test (see Demetriades and Fielding 
2010; Ishibashi, 2012; and Frimpong, 2012). Therefore this study also employs these 
two types of unit-root tests as follows: 
3.4.1 Results of the unit root test. 
Table 3.1 IPS and ADF- Fisher Chi square unit root tests 
Variable IPS Unit-root test  ADF-Fisher Chi Square Unit roottest 




P Value Order of 
integration 
Mgr -5.1512 0.000*** I(1) 201.5101 0.000*** I(1) 
Infr -4.2698 0.000*** I(0) 165.8511 0.000*** I(1) 
Intr -6.9332 0.000*** I(1) 90.5803 0.000*** I(1) 
Ms -2.8047 0.006*** I(1) 105.4495 0.000*** I(1) 
Ndc -4.9793 0.000*** I(1) 176.3935 0.000*** I(1) 
Exr -4.7159 0.000*** I(1) 199.6552 0.000*** I(1) 
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Cap -4.9161 0.000*** I(1) 190.9667 0.000*** I(1) 
“***” “**” and “*” represent statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
Each model includes trend and constant terms 
Table 3.1 shows the results of the unit-root test. It is clear that the series are integrated 
of order one, which is I(1) except the inflation rate which is stationary in levels under 
IPS unit root test only is assumed to be I(1) since this what we obtained under ADF-
Fisher test. We nonetheless treat all variables as I(1), consistent with the ADF-Fisher 
Chi Square Unit root test results. The ADF-Fisher test has been identified as a better test 
for unit roots in panel data because it doesn’t impose stringent measures like IPS where 
the panel must be balanced before it can be applied. Again ADF-Fisher also permits 
usage of different lag lengths in the ADF regressions. This might be difficult in IPS(see 
Demetriades and Fielding, 2011).We therefore proceed to the error-correction based 
panel cointegration test. 
3.4.2 Error-correction based panel cointegration test results 
Four basic types of tests were explained in the methodology for the purpose of testing 
for cointegration in panel data. The tests are conducted based on both asymptotic 
distribution and cross-sectional dependence i.e bootstrapping. Results of the asymptotic 
distributionfor the four tests are shown in Table 3.2 
Table 3.2 Westerlund panel cointegration test (Asymptotic distribution values) 
Statistics Value Z-value P-value 
Vt -3.771 -1.942 0.026** 
Va -3.534 5.481 1.000 
Bt -4.494 4.389 1.000 
Ba -1.898 4.948 1.000 
“***” “**” and “*” represent statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.  
Each test includes trend and constant terms. The lag and lead lengths are selected based 
on AIC and the Bartlett kernel window width is set according to 4(T/100)2/n ≈ 3. In 
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asymptotic property estimation, the Bartlet kernel window has been shown to have the 
tendency of producing improved property relative and improved power size better than 
other conventional kernel like quadratic kernel. The T in the formula for calculating the 
Bartlet kernel window represents the number series which is 41 in our study and n is the 
number of cross-sectional units which is 9 countries. By substituting these values in the 
formula we get approximately 3 (See Philips and Sun, 2003). 
The Table shows that cointegration is confirmed in one out of the four tests. This is at 
Vt only but Va , Bt and Ba all show acceptance of the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration. This is an indication that there appears to be a very weak long run 
relationship between the explanatory variables and the manufacturing growth rate. This 
might not be unconnected with the presence of the monetary policy instruments that are 
among the independent variables on which there is a near consensus that they are often 
not likely to have long run relationships with the real variables. Notwithstanding this, 
we estimate the error correction model in equation 3.12 using the fixed effect within 
regression. This is because Toress (2010) explained that fixed effects, unlike the 
ordinary least squares, considers heterogeneity across groups and time, hence the 
estimates from fixed effects models are more efficient. The results are presented in 
Table 3.3. 
3.4.3 Fixed effect panel estimation  
Table 3.3 shows the error-correction based panel cointegration regression result. The 
results are basically divided into two: the long and the short run relationships. The first 
aspect displays the variables in the non-differenced forms and thus explaining their 
long- run relationship while the second aspect shows the variables in their differenced 
forms showing their short-run relationships. Considering the long-run relationships, our 
empirical results indicate that besides monetary policy instruments, the policy variables 
which include exchange rates and inflation rates have no significant long-run 
relationship with the manufacturing growth rate in the AOECs. On the other hand the 
short-run relationship is different. The results show that three of the monetary variables 
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have a significant impact on manufacturing growth rate of the AOECs. Precisely, net 
domestic credit, the economy, money supply and exchange rate exhibit a significant 
impact on manufacturing growth rate of the AOECs.  
The net domestic credit shows a negative relationship with the manufacturing growth 
rate. This is contrary to apriori expectations, which postulate a positive relationship. 
The reason for this might not be unconnected with the views of Nnanna (2002) and 
Kayode (2000) that most of the domestic credit meant for the development of the 
manufacturing sector through selective credit control policy in many developing 
countries is often diverted to other sectors by the banks. Thus, the positive effect of the 
released credit to the economy is not felt on the domestic manufacturing output growth. 
However, from the result, the negative effect or the inverse relationship between net 
domestic credit and manufacturing growth turns positive in the long-run, but no longer 
significant, meaning that the significant effect dies out in the long-run. 
The exchange rate also shows a significant direct relationship in the short-run with 
manufacturing growth. Likewise, this significant effect is not sustained to the long-run. 
The direct relationship on one side means that increases in exchange rate (currency 
devaluation) may stimulate manufacturing growth rates of the AOECs in the short-run 
but in the long-run the effect appears not to be significant any longer. In addition, 
money supply also appears to have a significant and positive relationship with the 
manufacturing growth rate only in the short-run. The effect is also not significant in the 
long-run. 
Considering the overall R square on table 3.3, it indicates that about 24 percent 
variation in the manufacturing growth rate is explained by all the explanatory variables. 
The estimated fixed effects model is also statistically significant when we consider the 
F statistic of 4.89 at 1% level of significance and the F probability value of 0.000. The 
implication is that the monetary policy instrument, policy variables as well as the 
financial sector indicator and the gross capital formation may jointly have a significant 






Table 3.3 Fixed-effects (within) regression results of manufacturing growth rate and 
monetary policy. 














































F(16, 121) =4.89; Prob> F = 0.0000;R-sq: within  = 0.39 ; between = 0.100; overall = 
0.24 
Source: Author’s Computation 
3.4.4 Test for cross-sectional dependence 
Furthermore, because of the possibility of cross-sectional dependence among the cross-
sectional units we conduct a cross-sectional dependence test5.In particular, the AOECs 
share a common feature of having oil as the mainstay of their economies hence there is 
a tendency of similarities among the cross-sectional units which may lead to cross-
members’ correlation. We generate the correlation matrix of the residuals and carry out 
a Breusch-Pagan LM test of independence (see Persyn and Westerlund, 2008; 
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Westerlund, 2007). The results of the cross-sectional dependence test are presented in 
Table 3.4. 
 
Table 3.4: Correlation matrix of residuals 
 --e1 --e2 --e3 --e4 --e5 --e6 --e7 --e8 --e9 
--e1 1.000         
--e2 -0.023 1.000        
--e3 0.178 0.068 1.000       
--e4 -0.083 0.971 0.104 1.000      
--e5 0.252 -0.156 0.176 -0.105 1.000     
--e6 -0.070 -0.288 -0.098 -0.278 -0.113 1.000    
--e7 0.018 0.949 0.118 0.956 0.047 -0.299 1.000   
--e8 -0.096 -0.342 0.322 -0.308 0.305 0.051 -0.329 1.000  
--e9 -0.102 -0.127 0.518 -0.040 0.294 -0.060 -0.080 0.790 1.000 
Breusch-Pagan LM test of independence: chi2(36) =181.946, Pr = 0.0000,H0:There is 
no cross-sectional dependence 
Source: Author’s Computation 
Table 3.4 shows the results of the cross-sectional dependence test. The results indicate 
the presence of common factors affecting the cross-sectional units. This confirms the 
possibility of cross-member correlations in the series. 
This result necessitates bootstrapping in order to obtain a reliable result. Persyn and 
Westerlund, (2008) describe the bootstrapping option as a means of getting a robust P 
value even in the presence of cross-sectional dependence. Consequently we proceed to 
the panel cointegration test, taking into account cross-sectional dependencies. The 







Table 3.5 Panel cointegration test with cross-sectional dependence 
Statistics Value Z-value P-value Robust P-value 
Vt -3.771 -1.942 0.026** 0.030** 
Va -3.534 5.481 1.000 0.995 
Bt -4.494 4.389 1.000 0.760 
Ba -1.898 4.948 1.000 0.885 
“***” “**” and “*” represent statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
respectively. Each test includes trend and constant terms. The lag and lead lengths are 
selected based on AIC and Bartlett kernel window width is set according to 4(T/100)2/9 
≈ 3.We allow for 400 bootstrap replications. 
Source: Author’s Computation 
The results in Table 3.5 show that in spite of taking into account cross-sectional 
dependence, the cointegration test still rejects the null hypothesis of no cointegration in 
only one of the four tests. This confirms a weak long-run relationship between monetary 
policy variables and manufacturing sector growth of the AOECs. From our previous 
discussions on the fixed effects estimated model, it is clear that the monetary policy 
variables are likely to exhibit a stronger influence on the growth of the manufacturing 








5 The test for cross-sectional dependence is based on the fact that T (number of series) must be greater 
than N that is number of cross-sectional units. According to Persyn (2008) this test will be impossible if 




3.4.5. Dynamic panel estimation (SYS-GMM) 
Furthermore, we explore the dynamic nature of the relationship between the monetary 
policy variables and the manufacturing growth rate through the use of dynamic panel 
data (see Mitze, 2010; Frimpong, 2012). The idea behind this is the fact that the 
dynamic panel analysis will be able to yield a more efficient, consistent and on the 
whole a more reliable estimator than the fixed effect model. In addition, the analysis of 
the estimation results of the fixed effects model has shown that the monetary variables 
appear to have a more significant impact in the short run than in the long run. Since 
dynamics are associated with the short run, we estimate a dynamic panel for our second 
level analysis. Given the performance found in many Monte Carlo simulation studies 
(see for example Soto, 2007) preference is given to Blundell-Bond SYS-GMM, thus 
serving as a robustness check on our estimated model in Table 3.3.  The results of the 
SYS-GMM estimation are shown in Table 3.6. 
Table 3.6: Dynamic panel data estimation of the relationship between manufacturing 
growth rate and monetary policy using SYS-GMM. 
Variables Coefficient Standard error 
Differenced log of lagged value of 
manufacturing growth rate 
3.54e-13 2.70e-13 
Differenced log of inflation rates 1.38e-13 2.93e-13 
Differenced log of interest rate -1.63e-12 1.02e-12 
Differenced log of money supply 2.59e-12 1.60e-12 
Differenced log of net domestic credit -5.20e-12** 1.55e-12 
Differenced log of exchange rate 2.71e-11*** 2.40e-12 
Differenced log capital formation 6.38e-12*** 1.51e-12 
Constant -8.54e-13 4.56e-13 
 Wald chi2(15)   = 315.95                          Prob> chi2   = 0.000 






Table 3.6 shows the results of the dynamic panel data analysis. The SYS-GMM results 
which indicate the short run relationship shows that both net domestic credit and 
exchange rates have a significant impact on manufacturing growth rate. Capital 
formation also, as expected, has a significant positive impact on manufacturing growth. 
These findings show consistency in our results when compared to the fixed effects 
estimation.  
In the dynamic model, money supply shows a positive but not statistically significant 
relationship with manufacturing growth. However, both net domestic credit and 
exchange rates maintained their respective significant effects both in the short-run fixed 
effects model and in the dynamic panel model.Net domestic credit retains its significant 
inverse relationship with manufacturing growth in the short-run. 
The exchange rate shows a positive significant relationship with manufacturing growth 
in the dynamic model. This means that our results support devaluation to promote the 
growth of the manufacturing sector in the short-run. In addition, all other monetary 
policy variables such as inflation rates, interest rates and money supply fail to have any 
significant impact on the manufacturing growth rate of the AOECs.  
Finally, considering the overall test of statistical significance, the dynamic model is 
statistically significant, like the fixed effects model. This shows that with the focus on 
short run effects only, all the monetary policy variables used in our model will jointly 
have a significant influence on the growth of the manufacturing sector in the AOECs. 
3.4.6 Inferences and comparison with previous empirical studies 
Firstly, the results show that there is a weak long-run relationship between individual 
monetary policy variables and growth of the manufacturing sector in the AOECs. In 
both the static and dynamic panel models, all monetary policy variables demonstrate a 
more significant impact in the short-run than in the long-run. This is in line with 
findings of some authors who have shown that monetary policy variables demonstrate 
little or no significant long-run relationships with growth of real output (see Mundel, 
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1963). However, our findings do not completely refute the existence of a long-run 
relationship because it appears that Tobin’s Principle which supports the existence of 
long run relationship between money and output is also supported by our result.  
According to Tobin(1965), the monetary transmission mechanism through which 
growth can be boosted in the long-run is via expansionary monetary policy which 
increases the volume of money in circulation. This will lead to an increase in inflation 
which in turn leads to higher portfolio investments. The increase in capital stock can 
thus bring about improvements in growth in the long-run. Many authors have found the 
existence of a long-run relationship between some of the variables e.g exchange rate, 
capital formation and growth (see Cipollini, Hall and Nixon, 2012; Nenbe and Madume, 
2011; Gul, Mughal and Rahim, 2012).   
It can be inferred that the panel estimation results are reflections of the fact that we 
focused on manufacturing growth rate only rather than the over-all growth of the 
AOECs’ economies. This shows that the manufacturing sector growth can be 
significantly affected by monetary policy instruments, especially money supply in the 
short-run(transitory). The interest rate however, has not been shown to be a strong 
determinant of manufacturing sector growth even in the short run. Moreover, it appears 
that monetary policy generally appears to have more of a transitory effect on 
manufacturing growth rate in the AOECs. 
Secondly, our result fails to convincingly support the general belief that expansionary 
monetary policy will have a positive and significant relationship with growth. This is 
because despite the fact that the coefficient of money supply is statistically significant 
in the fixed effects model, it fails to show a significant impact on the manufacturing 
sector growth in the dynamic model which produces a more reliable estimator. These 
findings are consistent with Anthony and Mustafa, (2011); Gul, Mughal and Rahim, 
(2012); and Ditimi, Nwosa and Olaiya, (2011) who found that expansionary monetary 
policy will promote manufacturing growth, although some see it otherwise (see, Nenbe 
and Madume, 2011). 
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Our results also show that net domestic credit has a significant negative relationship 
with growth of the manufacturing sector in the AOECs in the short-run, but the 
significant effect dies off in the long-run. The implication of this is that an increase in 
domestic credit might not necessarily promote the growth of the manufacturing sector in 
the AOECs. This might well be the reason why the money supply does not have a 
significant impact on manufacturing sector growth of the AOECs. Apparently, selective 
credit control often used by the central banks to increase credit supplies to a particular 
sector of the economy, might not be effective in controlling credit channels after all in 
some AOECs. 
 Our investigation shows that credit allocation to the manufacturing sector in some 
AOECs has been dwindling over the years. For instance, in Algeria it fell from 16.5% in 
2009 to 14.8% in 2011; in Egypt it fell from 42% in 2009 to 31.3% in 2011;while in 
Nigeria, it fell from 38.6% in 2008 to 21.15% in 2011 (World Bank, 2012). In another 
separate finding, the Central Bank of Nigeria(CBN) (2008) discovered that less than 5% 
of the Nigerian banks comply with the selective credit control policy of the CBN. 
It should be noted that selective credit control is one of the policies of the CBN 
designed to develop some particular sectors of the economy. According to the policy, 
the CBN usually directs or mandates commercial banks to improve credit allocation to 
particular sectors of the economy. Nnanna (2000) reveals that the CBN special order or 
directive is not being followed by many of the commercial banks in Nigeria. This is 
evident in the Nigerian economy where huge loans are made available to civil servants 
in the form of soft loans. Many of these loans were supposed to be made available to 
manufacturers if the directive of the CBN is followed, but because of the problem of 
loan recovery associated with manufacturing loans among others, many of the Nigerian 
banks often divert loans meant for the manufacturing sector to other sectors where loan 
recovery will be easier(see Kayode, 2000; CBN, 2009; and Nnanna, 2003). This is an 
indication that credit diversion is rampant in the AOECs, and consequently the purpose 
and intention of monetary authorities of either to follow a market based credit allocation 
or selective credit control are often sabotaged by financial intermediaries. 
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Furthermore, findings from our study also show that inflation has a positive but not 
significant effect on the growth of the manufacturing sector both in the long run and the 
short-run. This is an indication that the level of inflation currently experienced in the 
AOECs might not be having a notable influence on manufacturing industries’ output. In 
the same vein, the interest rate has the appropriate inverse relationship, but it still fails 
to have any significant impact on manufacturing sector growth in the AOECs. This has 
further supported the inverse relationship between manufacturing growth rate and net 
domestic credit. It shows that interest rates have not played a significant role in 
stimulating the growth of the manufacturing sector in the AOECs. The reason might not 
be unconnected to Aiyegbusi (2010) who observed that the large number of people that 
do not have access to banking in most developing countries, have limited the 
effectiveness of monetary policy tools, such as interest rates. 
The exchange rate has a significant positive relationship with manufacturing growth 
rates in the short-run.  This finding has supported the growing literature on currency 
undervaluation and growth in most developing countries. Many empirical studies have 
strongly supported the view that the positive relationship between growth and exchange 
rates is more pronounced in developing countries than in the developed countries (see 
Rodrik, 2008). Our study has not deviated from this position since all the AOECs are 
developing countries. It further shows that despite our focus on the growth of the 
manufacturing sector, the currency value that is based on equilibrium level of exchange 
rate has been shown to have a significant and positive relationship with the 
manufacturing growth rate in the AOECs.  The mechanisms through which this works 
can be explained within the confines of development economics in that an increase in 
the exchange rate (i.e fall in value of currency) will discourage imports and encourage 
exports. This has the tendency of boosting domestic output and consequently promotes 
the growth of the real sector (see Todaro, 2003). 
Finally, our findings have shown that a combination of the monetary variables will have 
a significant impact on the growth of the manufacturing sector of the AOECs. This is 
shown in both the dynamic panel and fixed effects models. The overall test of statistical 
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significance through both the Chisquare test value and Wald test confirmed this. This 
result is similar to the conclusion of many studies that have posited that an appropriate 
monetary policy mix that reflects the empirical relationship obtained in this studywould 
have a significant effect on the manufacturing growth rate and overall growth of most 
economies (see Olomola, 2007; Oladipo and Fabayo, 2012).  
3.5 Summary and Conclusion  
3.5.1 Summary 
The study explores the impact of monetary policy on the growth of the manufacturing 
sector of AOECs. Selected monetary policy variables are used and through the 
endogenous growth approach a model expressing manufacturing growth rate of the 
AOECs as a function of the selected monetary variables is formulated. Specifically, the 
selected variables are interest rates, inflationary rates, money supply and exchange rates 
while capital formation is added as a control variable. Based on the nature of our data, 
the recently developed panel cointegration analysis with special focus on Westerlund’s 
(2007) error-correction based panel cointegration test is employed. This approach 
makes use of the structure rather than residual dynamics i.e a structurally based panel 
cointegration test. Data for the analysis were collected from both the World Bank 
Tables and Penn World Tables. 
The analysis begins with the exploration of the nature and panel dimension of the data 
used. This is carried out using two methods of the unit-root test namely: Im, Pesaran 
and Shin(IPS) test and ADF-Fisher Test. The results from the stationarity test indicate 
that all the variables are integrated of order one I(1). Consequently we proceed to the 
error-correction panel cointegration test. The four tests i.e the group-mean test which 
are Vt, Va, and the panel tests; Bt and Ba developed by Westerlund, (2007) are first 
conducted based on asymptotic distribution. The results show that cointegration is 
confirmed at Gt only while it is rejected in the remaining three tests. This indicates that 
there is a weak long-run relationship between manufacturing growth rate and the 
monetary policy variables. 
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The model estimation is next and the fixed effect within group approach is used to 
estimate both the long-run and the short-run relationship between the monetary policy 
variables and the manufacturing growth rate. The results from the model estimation fall 
in line with the results obtained from the cointegration test as two of the monetary 
policy variables are significant in the short-run against none in the long-run. 
Specifically, both exchange rates and net domestic credit show a significant relationship 
with the manufacturing growth rate in the short-run while none of the variables is 
significant in the long-run. Considering the tendency of existence of cross-sectional 
dependence in our analysis, we carried out a cross-sectional dependence test and the 
results show the presence of cross-sectional unit correlation. This can have negative 
implications on our analysis hence bootstrap values are used to conduct the panel 
cointegration test again.  The results are similar to the previous ones on asymptotic 
distribution even after taking care of the cross-sectional dependence. The existence of a 
long-run relationship is also confirmed in one of the four tests. 
Following previous studies, we use the dynamic panel analysis to estimate only the 
short-run relationship between monetary policy variables and manufacturing growth. 
The results show an almost similar result to the fixed effects estimation. Net domestic 
credit, exchange rate and capital formation all show a significant relationship with the 
manufacturing growth rate in the dynamic panel analysis. 
Explicitly, in the short-run, money supply shows an insignificant positive relationship, 
net domestic credit shows a significant negative relationship while exchange rates show 
a significant positive relationship with the manufacturing growth rate. Moreover, the 
over-all significance of the two model estimations, that is, both the fixed effect and 
dynamic panel analysis, show that they are both statistically significant. The F test of 
the fixed effect estimation, the Chi-square value and the Wald test in the dynamic 
analysis all confirmed this. The implication of this is that the combination of the 





Some important conclusions can be made from the findings and inferences drawn from 
our empirical analysis. Firstly, we can conclude that based on the findings of this 
research, it appears that monetary policy has more transitory (short-run) than long run 
effects on the growth of the manufacturing sector of the AOECs. This is evident from 
the fact that we obtained a weak long-run relationship. A relatively large number of the 
monetary policy variables are individually statistically significant in the short-run, while 
in the long run all monetary variables are statistically insignificant.  
Net domestic credit has shown a significant and negative relationship with the 
manufacturing growth rate. Consequently, our findings have shown that an increase in 
net domestic credit in the economy might not translate to the growth of the 
manufacturing sector. Further investigations show that in many of the AOECs there are 
indications that the bulk of net domestic credit does not go to the manufacturing sector. 
Again, because credit diversion is noticed in many of these countries, selective credit 
control policies of some central banks appear not to be working for their manufacturing 
sectors. Accordingly, the aims of the monetary authorities are often not achieved and 
this has prevented the total credit in the economy from having a significant positive 
impact on manufacturing growth in the AOECs. The aforementioned findings could 
have been the reason why the money supply fails to have any significant impact on the 
manufacturing sector’s growth. 
Furthermore, it appears that interest rates do not have any significant impact on growth 
of the manufacturing sector, both in the long and short-runs. This finding can be linked 
to the behaviour of the net domestic credit in the AOECs. Since interest rates are not 
showing any significant influence on the manufacturing growth rate, net domestic credit 
and money supply in the economy are not likely to have a positive effect on the 
manufacturing sector. Investigation has revealed however, that most of the developing 
nations still have a large number of people that do not have access to banking, and 
investment decisions are at times often based on profit and rate of return rather than cost 
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of capital. This has been limiting the effectiveness of interest rates in controlling the 
real sector of the economy of the AOECs. Despite this, the study has also shown that 
the level of inflation in AOECs is not a major factor determining the growth rate of the 
manufacturing sector. 
In addition, exchange rates have demonstrated a significant positive relationship with 
the growth of the manufacturing sector. This has contributed to the growing body of 
literature showing that undervaluation of currency promotes growth of output in 
developing countries; although our results have also shown that this only happens in the 
short run. That is, the situation might be reversed in the long-run as exchange rates are 
usually prone to shocks. 
Finally, findings in this study show that all the variables used jointly have a significant 
impact on the growth of the manufacturing sector in the AOECs. Therefore, to promote 
the growth of the manufacturing sector in the AOECs, an appropriate monetary policy 
mix that focuses more on boosting investment (capital) in the manufacturing sector 
through an increase in money supply should be embraced. Since currency valuation 
based on equilibrium exchange rate appears not to be working, monetary policy 
approaches might embark on alternative ways of boosting credit allocation to the 
manufacturing sector. This study has shown that a shortage of net domestic credit to the 
sector appears to be having an adverse effect on its growth. 
 In addition the study shows that the exchange rate has a positive and significant impact 
on manufacturing growth in the short-run. The implication is that the appropriate 
monetary policy mix to boost the growth of the manufacturing sector should also 
discourage overvaluation of currency. This approach has the tendency of restricting 







 Monetary policy transmission mechanism and growth of the manufacturing sector 
in Africa’s oil exporting countries (AOECs). 
4.1 Introduction. 
There is near consensus that monetary policy has only transitory effects on economic 
activity. However, the way in which monetary policy influences economic activity 
remains a subject of debate. This debate has given rise to some research on the 
assessment of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy and its influence on real 
activities. While there are some studies on this assessment in developed economies, 
there is still limited research on the developing economies (see Ngalawa and Viegi, 
2011). 
The situation is worse for oil rich countries in Africa. Empirical literature on the 
monetary policy transmission mechanism in Africa’s oil exporting countries remains 
limited. Several studies have been carried out on the subject in Nigeria, which is the 
largest oil producer in Africa. Mordi and Adebiyi, (2010), Mahmud, (2009) and Riman, 
Akpan and Offiong, (2013) among others, have studied issues relating to monetary 
policy mechanisms and growth in Nigeria within the context of oil price shocks. 
A unique aspect of the AOECs is the fact that oil is the mainstay of their economies and 
contributes the largest percentage to their GDPs, while also providing the highest 
foreign exchange earnings. For instance in Nigeria the oil sector contributed about 44.9 
percent to the GDP in 2012, and accounted for 87 percent of the total export earnings; 
in Algeria oil generates 97 percent of the total export earnings; in Angola it generates 
85percent of the total export earnings, and in Gabon it generates 80percent of the total 
export earnings. Another factor common to AOECs, are the enormous resources 
generated from oil which have not been translated into overall economic development 
(World Bank, 2012; IMF, 2010). The prevalence of unemployment, poverty, an 
excessive importation of manufactured goods, infrastructural decay, inadequate power 
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and energy supplies and low human development index are testimony to the position of 
the World Bank and the IMF.     
The dwindling nature of oil reserves in most AOECs and the myriad of problems facing 
them resulted in the stern warning by the IMF in 2010 that if by the end of the next two 
decades there is no positive effort towards diversification of these economies; most will 
run into deep economic recessions (IMF, 2010). This is where the manufacturing sector 
of these countries has a key role as many of the AOECs are heavily dependent on 
imported manufactured goods. The focus on the oil sector has led to the neglect of the 
manufacturing sector leading to a fall in domestic output and a rise in the prices of local 
manufactured consumer goods. For instance, the Algerian government has been 
subsidizing the price of manufactured consumer goods since year 2000. The 
manufactured goods subsidy bill rose from 185 million USD in 2011 to about 3 billion 
USD in 2012.This huge amount of money could have been invested in promoting the 
growth of the manufacturing sector. 
Lack of growth in the manufacturing sector of the AOECs has aggravated the existence 
of structural imbalances in terms of high inflation rates and increased unemployment 
rates. In Nigeria in the past two decades more than 160 textile manufacturing firms have 
closed down leading to a loss of about 100,000 jobs (Adegbite, 2012).  
Structural imbalances and economic instability in the AOECs have made inflation and 
exchange rate policies less effective in resuscitating ailing manufacturing sectors. In 
addition, building a virile non-oil sector that will be able to contribute about 50 percent 
to the GDP has been identified as a way of reducing dependence on the oil sector and 
promoting development of the AOECs (African Development Bank (ADB) report, 
2010). This, according to the ADB (2010) requires a thorough assessment of the 
monetary policy administration in a way that will involve strategic synergy with both 
the exchange rate and inflation rate polices to create an enabling environment for the 
non-oil sector to thrive. 
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Consequently, manufacturing as a crucial part of the non-oil sector requires a 
favourable climate in terms of inflation and exchange rate polices and general 
administration of monetary policy to be able to remain domestically competitive in the 
AOECs.  
For instance, there are two divergent views on the type of exchange rate system suitable 
for monetary policy instruments’ effectiveness in the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism (MTM). According to Aliyev (2012), policy makers are often faced with the 
challenges of choosing between a fixed exchange rate regime which is a good recipe for 
maintaining economic stability and a flexible exchange rate which gives independence 
to monetary policy. This challenge is even tougher in the oil rich countries that are 
faced with volatile foreign exchange windfalls. Some studies follow the Mundel-
Flemming model that identified a flexible exchange rate system as the most suitable for 
monetary policy (see Blanchard, 2008; Degrauwe, 2000 and Gregory, 2007) while 
others have criticized some assumptions of the model and have posited that monetary 
policy can also be effective under a fixed exchange rate system. These researchers 
criticize the assumptions of exogenous money supply, perfect international capital 
markets and inelastic exchange rate expectations in the Mundell-Fleming model. They 
argued that in reality, the Central Bank has the power to operate within specific 
asymmetric bounds which enable it to control the domestic interest rate exogenously. 
(see Serrano and Saumna, 2010; Habib and Sttrashy, 2008; Habib and Kalamova, 
2007). 
This study, therefore, is a country based analysis using five AOECs that have adopted 
different types of exchange rate systems. This will allow us to ascertain the exchange 
rate regime that is more suitable for monetary policy instruments to have a significant 
impact on manufacturing growth in the AOECs within the framework of the MTM. 
Since Chapter Three has shown that monetary policy is more effective in the short run, 
a Structural Vector Auto-regression model is adopted since it is based on short run 
analysis. In addition, the idea of studying individual economies separately follows 
directly from the findings in Chapter Three where the panel result confirmed that 
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country specific factors might affect the results. That is, individual countries in the 
AOECs might likely possess some peculiar characteristics that distinguish them from 
each other.  
Based on the foregoing, examining the linkages between the MTM and manufacturing 
output growth in the AOECs is imperative. This has the potential to expose the 
problems of the manufacturing sector and consequently tackle them through a robust 
monetary policy arrangement. To the best of our knowledge, there is no study that we 
are aware of that has investigated the monetary transmission process in AOECs, with 
particular attention to the manufacturing sector. In addition, this study, among others, 
contributes to the literature by attempting to understand the relationship between oil 
price shocks and manufacturing sector growth in AOECs within the context of the 
monetary transmission process. 
4.2 Objectives  
The major objective of this Chapter is to examine the relationship between oil price 
shocks and manufacturing sector growth within the framework of the monetary policy 
transmission process in AOECs. The study will also investigate: 
(i) the behaviour of monetary policy instruments (MPIs) to shocks from oil 
prices; 
(ii) vulnerability of manufacturing output growth to both monetary policy 
shocks and oil price shocks; 
(iii) the role of oil output as an intermediary in transmitting shocks from oil 
prices through the monetary policy transmission mechanism (MTM); 
(iv) relative effectiveness of different exchange rate regimes in the monetary 
policy transmission mechanism; and 
(v) comparative patterns of monetary policy administration in individual 





4.3   Scope of the study and justification 
Africa has been identified as one of the few continents in the world with many countries 
that are naturally endowed with mineral resources. Prominent among these resources is 
oil. With about eleven net oil exporters the unique feature of oil production in Africa is 
that all the major oil producing countries (i.e AOECs) which are net oil exporters are 
controlled by a cartel called Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).  
Therefore, both oil production and export are regulated by OPEC. The bulk of oil export 
in Africa is controlled by the following net oil exporters; Nigeria, Algeria, Libya, 
Angola, Egypt, Sudan, Equitorial Guinea, Garbon, Cameroon, Congo Democratic 
Repubic and Chad. 80 percent of the total oil production in Africa is produced by these 
countries (OPEC, 2008). 
However, the focus of the study is on Nigeria, Algeria, Libya, Egypt and Gabon . These 
countries are used as case study for the AOECs. The rationale behind the selection of 
these five countries is based on the OPEC data presented in Table 4.1 below. 
Table 4.1 Ranking of Africa’snet oil exporting countries 
Strata Countries Oil export bpd Rank 
First  
(above 1m bpd) 
Nigeria 2.2 million bpd 1st 
Algeria 2.1 million bpd 2nd 
Angola 1.9 million bpd 3rd 
Libya 1.7 million bpd 4th 
Second 
(500,000-1m bpd) 
Egypt 680,000 bpd 5th 
Third 
(below 500,000bpd) 
Sudan 487,000 bpd 6th 
Equatorial Guinea 346,000 bpd 7th 
Rep. of Congo 274,400 bpd 8th 
Gabon 241,700 bpd 9th 
Source: OPEC data 2010 
*Bpd: Barrels of oil per day 
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From the first stratum, Nigeria, Algeria and Libya are picked for the purpose of our 
analysis. Angola is excluded due to non-availability of data on some of the variables 
needed. Egypt is included as the only country that falls in the middle class or the second 
stratum. In the third stratum, three of the countries in the group belong to the same 
monetary zone, the Central African Monetary Zone 
(CommunauteEconomiqueetMonetaire de l’ AfriqueCentrale(CEMAC))5.They are: 
Equatorial Guinea, Congo and Gabon. Monetary policy in these countries is 
administered by only one Central Bank called 6BEAC.  Sudan is the only country in the 
group outside the monetary zone. 
Over the years the Sudanese economy has been ravaged by incessant war characterized 
by civil and political unrest, making it difficult to get data on some of the variables 
needed. Consequently, Gabon which appears to have the most complete data set on all 
the variables needed, and is among the members of CEMEC, was picked to represent 
the group. Since we are considering a monetary policy transmission mechanism, it is 
obvious that these three countries i.e Equatorial Guinea, Congo and Gabon, are most 
likely to share common features in monetary policy administration because their 







5 CEMAC (Central African Economic and Monetary Community) is a monetary zone which comprises of 
six countries namely; Cameroun, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Central Africa Republic, Rep of Congo and 
Chad.6BEAC is the Central Bank controlling the CEMAC monetary zone and operates a fixed exchange 
rate system where their currency is pegged to the Franc.  
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4.4.  A brief review of the five economies 
4.4.1 Introduction 
Based on the discussion in chapter four the following countries are selected among the 
AOECs for the purpose of assessing the relationship between oil price shocks, monetary 
policy transmission mechanism, and output growth of the manufacturing sector: 
Nigeria, Algeria, Libya, Gabon and Egypt. However, to provide enough empirical 
evidence for the assessment it is important to examine the individual peculiarities of 
these countries in terms of their economic structure with regardto monetary policy 
administration, and the status of their manufacturing sector. 
Consequently, this chapter focuses on an assessment of all the five net oil exporting 
countries in Africa so as to provide an adequate reference for the findings at the end of 
the empirical assessment. This chapter also examines some literatureon past empirical 
studies that are related to the subject under consideration. This will form a basis for 
making a comparison between our findings and those of other studies. It is our belief 
that this will guide us in making appropriate inferences that will lead to a more realistic 
conclusion at the end of this study. 
4.4.2. Nigerian economy and monetary policy administration 
Nigeria is the largest producer of oil in Africa. With oil production of about 2.2 million 
barrels per day, it is not surprising that the economy is driven solely by the oil sector 
(OPEC, 2008). Since 2004, the growth of the economy has been on a downward trend. 
The growth rate of real GDP fell from 7.4 percent in 2011, to 6.6 percent in 2012. 
Despite enormous deposits of crude oil the economy has been finding it difficult to 
transform wealth from the oil sector to the overall development of the economy. This 
major challenge facing the economy is compounded by an upsurge in insecurity arising 
from religious and ethnic conflict making the investment climate in the economy very 
precarious for prospective investors. The oil sector grew at an average growth rate of 
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8.0 percent in 2012, while the non-oil sector growth rate has been -0.35 percent for the 
same year.  
Despite having 34 different recorded minerals including gold, limestone, iron ore, tin 
and exporting approximately 2.3 million barrels of oil per day, the growth of the 
economy has not seen any structural changes leading to sustainable economic 
development. The unemployment rate rose from 21 percent in 2011 to 24percent in 
2012. The economy has been tailored towards two main aspects of development, 
namely oil and agriculture. However, external shocks in the form of flooding and 
security challenges have continued to affect the development of the agricultural sector.  
The manufacturing sector has been dormant since the 1990s. In the 1980s the sector was 
driven by 209 textile mills, which have now been reduced to less than 40 (NVS, 
2009).The economy witnessed a massive deindustrialization since the 1990saggravated 
by the closure of major manufacturing companies, such as the United Africa 
Company(UAC). Some major challenges in the manufacturing sector are poor 
infrastructural facilities, erratic supplies of power and energy and an influx of Chinese 
textile products. Coupled with a high rate of insecurity, this has made the entire 
investment climate in Nigeria unfriendly. 
Monetary policy in Nigeria has focused mainly on reduction of the inflation rate to 
single digits, leading to monetary tightening since 2011. A steady decline in the 
inflation rate was recorded in December 2011 when it fell from 11.2 percent in January 
2011, to 10.3 percent in December 2011. The inflation rate picked up steadily in 2012 
owing to a partial removal of the oil subsidy. Consequently, in mid 2012 the CBN 
increased tightening measures on monetary policy which led to a very sluggish growth 
of the money supply. Major drivers of inflation in the economy have been prices of 
consumer goods, electricity, housing, water and transport. The high inflation rate in 
2011 led to an increase in the interest rate as the CBN’s monetary policy tightening 
measure. The exchange rate regime has been a controlled floating system with the use 
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of external reserves to augment shortfalls. This has seen the value of the Naira against 
the US dollar hovering around 157 and 160 naira for both years 2012 and 2013 
The oil sector is contributes about 85percent of the total export earnings and about 
40percent of the total GDP making the sector the most vibrant of all the sectors in the 
economy. Figure 4.1shows the summary of the contributions of various sectors to the 
GDP. 
Figure 4.1: Contributions of each sector to the Nigerian GDP in 2010 
 
 
Source: World Bank 2010  
From figure 4.1, the total percentage contribution of each sector to GDP is as follows: 
Agriculture, 3.9 percent; extraction and construction, 1.2 percent; electricity, gas and 
water, 0.2 percent; real estate and business services, 6.2 percent; manufacturing, 1.9 
percent; oil, 40.9 percent; other services, 18 percent; and Government services, 0.7 













4.4.3   Algerian economy and monetary policy administration  
Algeria is the second largest producer of oil in Africa, after Nigeria. The Algerian 
economy is largely driven by oil and produces about 2.1 million barrels of oil per day 
(OPEC, 2008). In recent times however the attention of the government has shifted to 
diversification of the economy and since the turn of the century, the dominance of the 
oil sector has drastically declined. The contribution of oil to the country’s GDP fell 
from 40.2 percent in 2005, to 36.7 percent in 2011. Nonetheless, oil still constitutes 
almost 97 percent of the total exports of the Algerian economy. 
Foreign reserves have increased considerably from 181 billion USD in 2011 to about 
190.7 billion USD in 2012. This was achieved following the development of 
hydrocarbons components for pharmaceuticals. The proceeds have been used to 
modernize the economy and the development of social and infrastructural facilities. 
This has significantly increased government expenditure by 2.3 percent, widening the 
budget deficit to 3.3 percent of GDP in 2012. 
The manufacturing sector has not witnessed any significant growth in the past two 
decades. Recent surveys have shown that its contribution to GDP fell from 4.2percent in 
2011 to 3.9percent in 2012 leading to a rise in the prices of manufactured consumer 
goods. Consequently, the Algerian government has been subsidizing domestic prices of 
consumer manufactured goods for some years now. The total subsidy expenditure has 
risen from 175 million USD in 2009 to about 3billion USD in 2012. This has 
aggravated government expenditure and increased the inflation rate from 4.49percent in 
2011 to 8.3percent in 2012. 
Monetary policy has been handled by the Bank of Algeria with the primary objective of 
controlling inflation, money supply and exchange rates. Despite the control measures by 
the bank, inflation rose to 8.9 percent in the first quarter of 2013. The country practices 
a controlled floating exchange rate system. The exchange rate is strictly controlled 
around a minimum rate of Algeria Dinar to US dollar. In January 2014  the exchange 
rate was 81.5 DZD to 1 USD and this has been monitored strictly with the use of 
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external reserves. Despite the rise in growth rate of broad money (M2) from 
11.97percent in 2011 to 19.9percent in 2012 owing to the increase in domestic credit, 
the cash in circulation continues to dwindle. The currency in circulation fell by 8percent 
in 2012 and overnight deposits collected by banks also fell by 3percent in 2012. 
Currently the monetary authorities are pursuing a reduction in the inflation rate to single 
digits by 2014. The contribution of each sector to the GDP is shown in figure 4.2. 
Figure 4.2: Contributions of various sectors to GDP in Algeria in 2010 
 
Source: World Bank 2010 
 
Allocation of percentage contributions to the GDP as shown in figure 5.2 is as follows: 
Agriculture8.6 percent; construction9.6 percent; electricity0.8 percent; real estate and 
business services3.2 percent; manufacturing3.9 percent; petroleum38.5 percent; 
government services16.2 percent; and other services19.2 percent. 
It is apparent that the Nigerian and Algerian economies have a lot in common. Apart 
from the fact that the oil sector is the predominant sector in these economies, their 
manufacturing sectors are also among the least contributors to the GDP. 











4.4.4 Libyan economy and monetary policy administration 
Libya is among the largest net oil exporters in Africa. With an average of 1.7 million 
barrels of oil production per day, the oil sector in Libya has continued to drive the 
economy. The activities of insurgents in the Arab countries in recent years have 
adversely affected the economic performance of Libya. Although our study covers the 
pre-revolution period in Libya, both the pre- and post-revolution economic 
performances will be briefly examined. 
Like most other AOECs, Libya’s economy is largely dependent on oil and economic 
performance is predicated on the growth of the oil sector. The oil sector contributed 
about 90 percent of the total government revenue in 2007.It also accounts for almost 95 
percent of total exports. However, following the revolution that eventually toppled the 
administration of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, by 2012, oil production declined to about 
1.2 million barrels per day.  
Government expenditure depends largely on oil revenue and virtually all the 
government’s budget is financed through the proceeds from oil. Fiscal deficit widened 
from 5.6 percent in 2007 to about 6.6 percent of the government budget in the wake of 
the Libyan revolution in 2010. The major reason for this has been the contraction in oil 
production, the major source of government revenue. 
Before the revolution, government had been making efforts to diversify the economy 
but the US and UN sanctions in early 2000 were major factors against the effectiveness 
of the economic diversification policy. Lifting of sanctions in 2004 created renewed 
interest by the government in diversifying the economy and within two years 
improvements were seen in the contributions of agriculture, construction and services, 
but this progress was halted again in the wake of the 2011 revolution. 
The performance of the manufacturing sector has continued to dwindle since 1970 when 
the country experienced an oil boom. The sector’s contribution to GDP fell from 7.8 
percent before the oil boom to 6.2 percent in 1986. Contributions of other non-oil 
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sectors to GDP have not been encouraging. Agriculture contributes about 5.5 percent to 
GDP while the manufacturing contribution was 6.7 percent in 2007. Problems in the 
manufacturing sector have been compounded by disruptions caused by civil and 
political unrest.  
Libya’s monetary policy is handled by the Central Bank of Libya (CBL). The primary 
objective of the bank has been price stabilisation because Libya practices a fixed 
nominal exchange rate system. The exchange rate of the Libyan Dinar (LD) to the USD 
is pegged, which seems unrealistic due to the incessant lack of competitiveness in the 
foreign exchange market on the part of the Libyan Dinar. This situation has made the 
country experience several phases of fixed exchange rates within the last three decades. 
There were different peggings in 1980, 1985, 1990, 1999 and 2001. To forestall the 
frequent change in the pegging of the exchange rate, the Central Bank of Libya adopted 
what they called dual fixed exchange rate system in 2001. The official fixed nominal 
exchange rate was 1 LD to 2.5 USD, and another special exchange rate which is close to 
the prevailing parallel market was fixed at 1 LD to 0.36 USD (IMF, 2003). All these 
inconsistent exchange rate policies have been taking their toll on the non-oil sector of 
the economy. The increase in the money stock through the proceeds from oil put more 
pressure on domestic prices of manufactured and other tradable goods, thereby leading 
to the appreciation of the real exchange rate which further reduced the growth of the 
manufacturing sector (exchange rate effect of Dutch Disease). 
In the face of the inconsistency in the exchange rate policy, CBL has continued to 
pursue an aggressive inflation policy, keeping the rate of inflation at single digit of 4.7 
percent in 2010 despite the incessant rise in government expenditure. Figure 4.3 shows 






Figure 4.3: Contributions of various sectors to GDP in Libya in 2010 
 
Source:  World Bank 2010 
As with the two big oil exporters, Libya’s economy is predominantly a crude oil based 
one. This is evident in figure 4.3. Oil contributes the most while the manufacturing is 
among the sectors that contribute the least to the GDP. 
4.4.5 Egyptian economy and monetary policy administration 
The Egyptian economy has witnessed tremendous changes within the last three decades. 
The most pronounced one is the recent revolution in 2011 that led to the toppling of 
President Hosni Mubarak’s administration. Before this unrest economic performance in 
Egypt was generally stable. 
The Egyptian economy appears more diversified than other AOECs. Despite being a 
major net oil exporter, oil is not the mainstay of the economy. However, real GDP 
growth rate has fallen from 5.5 percent in 2010 to 2.2 percent in 2011. Total investment 
growth rate, which was 16.7 percent in 2010, fell to 15.5 percent in 2011/2012. Public 
consumption as a percentage of GDP rose from 73 percent in 2005 to 79 percent in 
2011/2012. The economy has continued to operate largely in deficit since the 











revolution. A rescue mission of the IMF could not be adopted by the Egyptian 
government because of the persistent political and civil unrest. Fiscal deficit as a 
percentage of GDP rose from 9.7 percent in 2010 to 10.8 percent in 
2011/2012.However, net foreign reserves reached an all-time low at 13.6 billion USD 
as at May 2013. This is in sharp contrast to the years before the revolution when the 
external reserves stood at an average of 35 billion USD. 
As at 2007, the manufacturing sector contributed 17 percent to GDP while the oil sector 
contributed 15.5 percent. Besides the two, other dominant sectors in the Egyptian 
economy are tourism, agriculture, construction and telecommunications. However, 
tourism and the manufacturing sector have been hit the worst by the revolution. The 
contribution of the manufacturing sector to GDP has since dropped drastically to about 
12 percent of the GDP, while tourism dropped to about 5.1 percent in 2011/2012. Post 
revolution performance has not significantly affected agriculture, real estate or 
construction.  
Before the revolution, the manufacturing sector attracted almost 14 percent of the total 
investment, but by 2011/2012 the percentage had dropped to about 8.7 percent. 
However, investment in the oil and gas sector still attracts the largest investments, 
estimated at 25 percent of total investments.  The administration of monetary policy in 
Egypt can also be discussed under pre- and post-revolution periods. The Central Bank 
of Egypt (CBE) is the monetary authority responsible for monetary policy 
administration in the country and since 2000 Egypt has adopted a floating exchange rate 
system. However, as a result of the dwindling nature of the Egyptian pound (EGP) in 
2003, the CBE started pursuing what is termed a managed floating exchange rate with 
the objective of achieving EGP 6 to 1USD. However, with the severe economic 
downturn caused by the political unrest, in 2013 the exchange rate fell to EGP 6.5 to 1 
USD. The central bank of Egypt has been using foreign reserves to sustain the exchange 
rate since 2004, compounding the pressure on the country’s external reserves. This has 
contributed to the sharp fall in the Egyptian foreign reserves which at present can barely 
cover three months’ of imports. Despite the upsurge in money supply as a result of an 
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increase in government expenditure during both pre and post revolution, the interest rate 
has continued to be on the upward trend thereby overshadowing the effect of an 
increase in money supply in the real sector of the economy prior to 2008. 
After the revolution, the Central Bank of Egypt discovered that inflation had dropped 
owing to contraction in government activity caused by the political unrest. The inflation 
rate fell from 8.9 percent in 2010 to about 4.4 percent in 2011/2012. However, the 
Central Bank of Egypt noted that imbalances in output supply of consumable goods and 
prices are likely to be responsible for the existing inflation rate. Consequently, a 
ministerial committee was constituted in January 2013 to address this structural cause of 
inflation. Figure 4.4 shows the contribution of different sectors to the Egyptian GDP.  
Figure 4.4 Contributions of various sectors to Egyptian GDP in 2010. 
 
Source: World Bank 2010 
From Figure 4.4 it is apparent that the Egyptian economy is far more diversified than 
other AOECs discussed earlier. The manufacturing sector which contributed the least in 
previous economies discussed is the highest contributor to GDP in Egypt.  
 











4.4.6 Gabonese economy and monetary policy administration 
Gabon is a country in sub-Saharan Africa that belongs to the Central African Monetary 
Zone. The country’s economy is mainly driven by the extraction industry, especially oil. 
The country is heavily dependent on oil revenue which contributes about 50percent to 
GDP and more than 80percent of the total export. The real GDP growth rate has 
followed a rising trend over the years up to 2005 when the oil reserve of the country 
started shrinking. Between 2004 and 2005, oil production had fallen by 1.3 percent and 
fell a further 3.1percent in 2006 (ADB/OECD, 2007). Gabon produces 241,700 barrels 
of oil per day making her one of the net oil exporters in Africa. The increase in 
government spending owing to increased wage bills and dwindling oil resources 
culminated to an increase in inflation rate by 1.9percent in 2012.  
The shrinking oil reserves have brought about a new development plan in the economy 
which is driven towards diversification in a bid to prepare for the aftermath of the oil 
era. The economy of Gabon has achieved increasing growth of the mining sector with 
manganese (not oil), wood, forestry and the service sectors between the years 2011 and 
2013. The manufacturing sector was not seen as a viable means of diversification owing 
to some structural constraints imposed by an unfriendly international climate and 
decayed infrastructure (IMF,2012).  Despite the falling oil reserve, the GDP growth rate 
rose by 1.3 percent in 2012.This improvement was linked to a massive exportation of 
wood and forestry products which now account for about 25 percent of the GDP. The 
country is currently the largest wood exporter in Africa after Cameroun. 
The administration of monetary policy in Gabon has been controlled by the CEMAC 
(Communaute Economiqueet Monetaire de l’ AfriqueCentrale) or Central African 
Monetary Union. The union comprises of six member countries, namely: Republic of 
Central Africa, Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Cameroun and Chad. These 
countries practice a unified monetary system controlled by one central bank called the 
Bank of Central African States (BEAC). An interesting thing about the union is that 
they are all net oil exporters except the Central African Republic. In other words, oil is 
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the mainstay of these economies. The zone practices a fixed type of exchange rate with 
the aim of maintaining economic stability. Gabon like other countries is required to 
comply with the rigid exchange rate regime. Despite a rise in the aggregate money 
supply (M2) by 26.7 percent, inflation was close to zero in the country in 2011. 
Inflation was also expected to further fall by another 1.9 percent in 2012. Individual 
economies in the monetary zone adjust their internal monetary policy mechanisms to 
ensure economic stability in the face of the fixed exchange rate. Trends in loans have 
been largely driven by cash needs of households and firms against investment needs. 
This has contributed to the stunted growth of the manufacturing sector (ADB, 2007).  
Figure 4.5 Contributions of various sectors to GDP in Gabon in 2010 
 
Source: World Bank 2010 
As can be seem from Figure 4.5, oil contributes 50.7 percent, government services 
contribute 6.6 percent, other services 27.2 percent, agriculture and forestry 6 percent, 
mining and construction 4.2 percent, manufacturing 4.1 percent and water and 
electricity 1.2 percent to GDP (2010 estimates). 
Of all five countries considered, Egypt appears to be the only country that stands out in 










Africa, Egypt’s manufacturing sector still contributes more than the oil sector to the 
GDP. Apart from the manufacturing sector, other sectors’ contributions such as 
agriculture for example are also competitive. The remaining four countries, Nigeria, 
Algeria, Libya and Gabon share a common feature of a very under-developed 
manufacturing sector. Although their governments claim to be in the process of 
economic diversification, the effect of these efforts still remains to be seen. 
Another similarity is that the diversification efforts of the four countries is non-
manufacturing driven. Gabon anchored her diversification efforts on the extraction of 
manganese, whereas Algeria, other than oil, focuses on components of hydrocarbons 
and as a means of diversification, Nigeria is focusing on agriculture. The issue is that all 
their diversification efforts are natural resource oriented, and are going to bring about 
the production of primary or intermediate goods rather than finished goods. 
4.4.7 Monetary policy transmission mechanism, oil price and economic growth 
As earlier stated in the introduction, empirical studies on monetary policy transmission 
mechanisms are very scanty in developing countries compared to developed countries. 
Despite this we will examine some past empirical studies on the link between monetary 
policy transmission mechanisms and economic activities, especially those in the oil rich 
economies. A common feature in the literature is that they either consider the effect of 
oil price shocks on monetary policy mechanisms or oil price shock on economic 
growth. Few examined the impact of monetary policy shocks on economic growth as 
well.    
Olomola (2007) studied the impact of oil price shocks on selected macroeconomic 
variables in Nigeria. He focused on output, inflation, exchange rates and money supply. 
Using quarterly data in Nigeria he found out that the oil price significantly influences 
exchange rates in Nigeria and that the oil price shock may lead to wealth effects that 
cause the currency to appreciate, squeezing the tradable sector and leading to Dutch 
Disease. However, in a separate study Akpan (2009) used the Nigerian economy again 
and discovered that the oil price shock significantly influences inflation, real national 
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income and government expenditure. He made use of a vector auto regression (VAR) 
technique.  
The results obtained by the previous two authors on the Nigerian economy are almost 
similar to those of Bouchaour and Al-Zeaud (2012) on the Algerian economy. The 
study used a vector error-correction model VECM to investigate the impact of oil 
distortions on some monetary and macroeconomic variables in the Algerian economy. 
Their findings revealed that the oil price has an inverse relationship with exchange rates 
and a positive relationship with the inflation rate. Their impulse response analysis 
showed that currency depreciation is likely to promote the growth of real GDP. 
In the same vein, Mordi and Adebiyi (2010) investigated the asymmetric effects of oil 
prices on output and prices and the expected role of monetary policy in Nigeria. The 
study adopted a structural VAR (SVAR) and found that oil price shocks significantly 
affect money supply and the general price level. They also discovered that the Nigerian 
Naira depreciates in response to the oil price shocks. The same result was obtained by 
Jimenez-Rodriguez and Sanchez (2005) and Chen and Chen (2007). They noted that 
monetary policy should respond cautiously to the asymmetric effects of oil price shocks 
on output and price. 
Vector auto-regression was also adopted by Samba (2013) to examine the 
administration of monetary policy under CEMAC (Communaute 
EconomiqueetMonetaire de l’ Afrique Centrale). The study focused mainly on the 
interest rate as a monetary policy instrument and how it influences GDP and consumer 
price index. The study concluded that the interest rate has not been impacting positively 
on the output of the members countries. It also argued that there are differences in the 
responses of output to interest rate shocks. This depends on the ability of each country 
to utilize the internal variables like credit channels to influence their real sectors 
(Samba, 2013). 
Mahmud (2009) used a structural VAR to appraise the relationship between the 
monetary policy aggregates and oil price shocks in Nigeria. The study focused mainly 
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on the effects of oil price shocks on inflation rates, GDP per capita growth rate, 
exchange rates, interest rates, government expenditure, money supply and 
manufacturing output. The research findings revealed that the effect of oil price was 
transmitted through government expenditure and monetary policy variables to the 
manufacturing output and the real GDP growth rate.  This result is similar to the 
findings of Zafar (2004), who concluded from a study of Gabon that oil price shocks 
influence trade through monetary policy variables. He emphasized that oil price effects 
are reflected in the behaviour of the interest rate and money supply which later affects 
the volume of trade in the country. 
Among the few authors that studied the impact of oil shocks on macroeconomic 
variables are Ali and Harvie (2013). Perhaps, it is the only empirical study on the 
Libyan economy available to us. They focused on the macroeconomic adjustments and 
their relationship with oil related shocks in Libya. They used a dynamic macroeconomic 
model and discovered that the negative impact of oil related shocks can be reduced by a 
flexible nominal exchange rate system. They concluded that if Libya can adopt a 
flexible nominal exchange rate system, growth of the non-oil sector will be influenced 
positively by boosting the accumulation of imported capital stock, physical capital stock 
and human capital stock.   
Monetary policy and exchange rates were the focus of Saleem’s (2013) study. He 
investigated the relationship between a policy induced nominal interest rate and 
exchange rate in Egypt. The study was pure desk research which was based on the 
application of economic theories and comparison with other empirical studies to assess 
the situation in Egypt. He found out that while the developed economies might benefit 
from interest rate shocks through demand effects because of the larger steady state 
value of the demand deposits in these countries, the story might not be the same for the 
developing economies, especially oil exporting economies like Egypt. According to 
Saleem (2013), due to large fiscal deficits in the developing countries, the output effect 
will pose a serious threat to the production sector of these economies since firms rely 
more on bank credits. 
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 Considering all the literature discussed under this section, it is confirmed that research 
studies of the monetary policy transmission mechanism and its effects on manufacturing 
output are very scarce especially in the oil exporting countries. The manufacturing 
sector which has been described as a major sector that can aid the diversification efforts 
in the AOECs has not been touched by any of these reviewed empirical studies ( see 
Kayode, 2000).  
Again, monetary policy transmission mechanism has been described as framework that 
can be used to appraise the manufacturing sector and also develop policy framework 
that can improve the growth of the manufacturing sector in the AOECs (see for example 
Mohamed, 2011; Corden and Neary,1982; Lama and Medina, 2010). From all the 
empirical reviews none of the studies on AOECs or any other one of which we are 
aware include manufacturing sector in their monetary policy transmission mechanism 
instead, other macroeconomic variables such as inflation rate were given attention ( See 
Mamud, 2009).  
Based on the foregoing, and among others that have been stated in the introductory 
aspect of this study, the need for this research work is further necessitated. Findings 
from this research work are expected to contribute to the existing literatures by 
providing insight into the behaviour of manufacturing sector in the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism and also lead to policy alternatives that positively influence the 
growth of the manufacturing sectors in the AOECs 
 
4.5                                                 Methodology 
4.5.1 Introduction 
The main objective of this Chapter is to investigate the relationship between oil price 
shocks and manufacturing sector growth within the framework of the monetary policy 
transmission process in AOECs, focusing on the Nigerian, Algerian, Libyan, Egyptian 
and Gabonese economies using a Structural VAR model. Generally, VAR models are 
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seen as independent large scale macro econometric models that do not rely on 
unrealistic assumptions (Elbourne, 2007). VAR analysis was pioneered by Sims (1980), 
who used Choleski decomposition to get impulse responses. However, the Choleski 
decomposition has been described as being prone to incredible causal ordering if the 
researcher is interested in looking at more than just monetary shocks (see Bernanke, 
1986; Elbourne, 2007). The structural VAR (SVAR), on the other hand, provides 
economic information for the rationale behind the restrictions that help in identifying 
both monetary policy shocks and other shocks. Again, the study is interested in 
examining the short-term and medium-term behaviour of the variables since there is 
near consensus that monetary policy can only influence output significantly in the short-
run (see Gul, Mughal and Rahim,2012; Sidrauski, 1967).   
Since the five countries under study share a common characteristic of being net oil 
exporters in Africa, we cannot ignore the influence of both oil resources and oil price 
shocks apart from the monetary policy shocks, hence the suitability of the SVAR 
approach for this study. Another justification for choosing the SVAR is the argument 
that not all variables respond instantaneously to shocks as provided by VARs.  Evidence 
from past research has shown that many variables exhibit delays in their response to 
shocks due to financial deepening and the level of integration with the global economy. 
The structure of the matrix in SVAR has made provision for this (see Ngalawa and 
Viegi, 2011). In addition, the Choleski decomposition in a VAR uses partial 
identification which can only identify one of the underlying structural shocks. However, 
SVAR has been designed to distinguish between those variables that respond 
contemporaneously to a particular shock and those that respond with a lag. (Elbourne, 
2007). 
According to Kim and Roubini (2000), SVARs have been designed to deal with all the 
puzzles that have affected the recent literature on the effects of monetary policy on 
economic activities. The SVAR model adopted for this study is designed to allow for 
the assessment of both monetary policy shocks and oil shocks on the manufacturing 
sector growth of the five countries. 
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4.5.2 The Model 
Construction of our VAR model follows the conventional method where the 
primitive/structural model is specified thus: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝐴1𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝐴2𝑦𝑡−2+,……… .+𝐴𝑝𝑦𝑡−𝑝 + 𝜇𝑡                                                        (4.1) 
where: 
𝑦𝑡 represents an (nx1) vector containing n endogenous variables, 
𝐴𝑖  ∀(i={1, 2,….p} are (n x n) matrices coefficients, 
And  𝜇𝑡 is an (n x 1) vector containing error terms. 
Though the error is 𝜇𝑡~𝑖𝑖𝑑 𝑁(0, Ω) but errors possess a tendency of correlating 
contemporaneously in all the equations. 
There are pn2parameters in the A matrices. Equation 4.1 can be rewritten using the lag 
operator L which is selected through𝐿𝑘𝑥𝑡 = 𝑥𝑡−𝑘. where x is a group of exogenous 
variables and k is the lag length. The equation becomes: 





2 − ⋯− 𝐴𝑝𝐿
𝑝. 
𝐴0= I (identity matrix).It is required thatA(L) lies outside the unit circle for stationarity 
to be ensured. 
Variance Decomposition and Impulse Response Functions 
Analysis of the VAR will be carried out using variance decomposition and impulse 
response functions. Both variance decomposition and impulse response functions are 
computed by re-specifying our autoregressive (AR) function. The two of them evolve 
through the process described as follows: 
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𝐴(𝐿)𝜇𝑡 = 𝑦𝑡                                                                                                                (4.3)  
𝑦𝑡 represents a stationary stochastic process in the system and the lag operator is L, 𝜇𝑡 is 
a white noise error term. The theory also requires that root det(1-A(z))=0 should have a 
modular greater than 1.In this case, det(1-A(z)) is invertible. The interpretation of our 
VAR is based on the vector moving average (MA) presented in the following form: 
𝑦𝑡 = ∅𝑡 + 𝜎(𝐿)𝜇𝑡𝐸(𝜇𝑡) = 0                                                                                       (4.4) 
𝐸(𝜇𝑡𝜇𝑡−𝑘) = 𝑄, |𝑘| = 0                                                                                              (4.5) 
𝐸(𝜇𝑡𝜇𝑡−𝑘) = 𝑄, |𝑘| ≠ 0                                                                                              (4.6) 
Where Q represents the covariance matrix sample, ∅𝑡is predictable perfectly while the 
matrix of coefficients 𝜎(𝐿) using lag 0 is the identity matrix. 
Equation 4.4 can be normalized to generate the impulse response functions and at the 
same time forecast the error decomposition. Nonetheless the variance decomposition 
adopted is equal to the MA. 
4.5.3    Model Identification 
The nature of SVAR requires imposition of enough restrictions so as to identify the 
orthogonal structural components of the error terms that are present in the shocks.  Note 
that this is at variance to the standard recursive Cholesky orthogonalisation. The non-
recursive orthogonalisation of the error terms produced through this process is used for 
the impulse response functions and variance decomposition. 
For clarity, assume that 𝑦𝑡is comprised of vector of endogenous variables. For example, 
say kth element of endogenous variables in our model where ∑𝐸[𝑣𝑡?́?𝑡] is the residual 
of the covariance matrix. Therefore, our identification procedure follows:  
𝐴𝑣𝑡 = 𝐵𝜇𝑡                                                                                                                    (4.7) 
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Where 𝑣𝑡 and 𝜇𝑡  are vectors with lag length k, 𝑣𝑡 is the observed residual and 𝜇𝑡 
represents the unobservable structural innovations. A and B are k x k matrices which are 
to be estimated. However, innovation 𝜇𝑡 is assumed to be orthogonal in nature. Hence 
the covariance is an identity matrix𝐸[𝜇𝑡𝜇𝑡𝑡]=I. Imposition of restrictions on A and B is 
made possible due to the orthogonal assumption of 𝜇𝑡. hence we have: 
𝐴 ∑ ?́?=𝐵?́?                                                                                                                    (4.8) 
The link between the reduced form and the structural form of the VAR model is 
presented as follows: 
𝐵(𝐿) = 𝐵0 + 𝐵
+(𝐿)                                                                                                  (4.9) 
𝐴(𝐿) = −𝐵0
−1𝐵+(𝐿)                                                                                                (4.10) 
∑ =́𝐵0
−1𝐴𝐵0
−1                                                                                                           (4.11) 
Equation 6.9 is the structural form divided into contemporaneous correlations i.e𝐵0 and 
𝐵+(𝐿). The former represents correlations at lag zero while the later represents 
correlations at all strictly positive lags. Equation 4.10 separates each reduced form 
coefficient into its structural counterpart 𝐵0, identified through the reduced 
form,∑ =́𝐸[𝜇𝑡𝜇𝑡𝑡] , and the diagonal covariance matrix of the structural form, 𝐴 =
𝐸[𝑣𝑡?́?𝑡] as shown in 4.11. 
Furthermore, due to the vulnerability of long run restrictions to serious misspecification 
problems, we use a contemporaneous restriction on the𝐵0 matrix to identify the shocks 
as shown in equation 4.12 since this study is interested in short-run and medium term 
















































1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
𝐵21
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
𝐵31





















0 0 0 0 𝐵85
0 𝐵86












































            (4.12) 
 
There are eight variables in the SVAR model namely oil price (poil) which is the 
exogenous variable.It occupies row 1 and it puts external pressure on the economy. 
Endogenous variables are arranged as follows: oil resources growth rate (oilgr); interest 
rates (intr); money supply growth rate (msgr); inflation rate (inf); exchange rate (exr); 
manufacturing output growth (mgr); and GDP growth rate (gdpgr). The role assigned to 
each variable is explained in the flow chart in figure 4.6 
The oil price is viewed as the external shock to the entire system, meaning that it affects 
the monetary policy transmission mechanism MTM. The oil output growth rate is 
included in the MTM based on the controversy that often in oil exporting countries 
economic policies receive shock from the global oil price through the individual 
country’s oil output levels. Berument, etal (2004) in his study of Oman and UAE found 
that oil price shocks affect economic policies of these countries through their output 
levels. He argued that since these countries are heavily dependent on oil, the influence 
of oil prices on output is translated to economic wealth which dictates the behaviour of 
economic policies. 
On the other hand, Jemenez and Rodriguez (2005) noted that most oil exporting 
countries run very open and liberal economies which make their economic policies 
highly susceptible to external shocks. They argued that as these countries are heavily 
dependent on oil, fluctuations in the global price of oil affect their economic policies 
without necessarily passing through their output levels.   
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The MTM comprises of the monetary policy instruments (MPIs) and the policy 
variables. The MPIs are interest rates and money supply growth rates. They are the 
operating targets (see Mahmud, 2009; Elborne, 2007). While the intermediate targets 
are the policy variables, namely inflation rate and exchange rate. They are viewed as an 
internal policy shock to the system (see Ushie, Adeniyi and Akongwale, 2012; Mordi 
and Adebiyi, 2010; Ngalawa and Viegi, 2011).  The policy goals used are 
manufacturing output growth and GDP growth rate. Note that the manufacturing output 
growth is calculated as a percentage of GDP. The ordering of the variables follows 
Pesaran and Shin (1998) in order to overcome arbitrary ordering and likelihood of 
contemporaneous correlation. 
The flow chart for the system is explained in figure 6.1. The MTM is the monetary 
policy transmission mechanism which involves the operating targets; the MPIs which 
are the interest rates and the money supply growth rates. It also includes the policy 
variables which are the intermediate targets, that is inflation rates and exchange rates. 
Policy goals include manufacturing output growth and GDP growth rate.  
The flow chart shows a schematic diagram of the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism (MTM). Firstly, there are the direct effect of the oil price shock on all the 
components in the model, which are oil growth rate, MTM, and outputs. Secondly, the 
diagram shows how the oil price shock passes through each of the components as they 
are arranged. Thirdly, we focus on the direct influence of the shocks in the MTM on the 
monetary policy goals; and finally we analyse how shocks in the MTM affect the 


















4.5.4 The Data 
Data used in this study are in quarterly frequency from 1980Q1 to 2010Q4. As shown 
from the model, eight variables are used in explaining the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism with particular attention to manufacturing output in the five economies. 
Data on all the variables are sourced from the World Bank data base except the data on 
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oil price and growth rate of oil output that are sourced from the data base of the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). It should be noted that the 
growth rate of the variables like money supply, GDP, manufacturing output and oil 
output are used as this presents a clearer and more realistic perspective of examining the 
variables in their real values (see Olomola, 2007). 
 
 4.6                                          RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.6.1   Non Stationarity. 
This study follows the work of Uhlig(2005),Peersman and Smet(2002),Vonnak(2005), 
Clements and Hendry(1995),Fève and Guay(2006), and Ibrahim and Amin(2005) 
among others, where levels VAR are used. The studies have argued that this approach 
will prevent loss of vital information about the data sets which might occur in the 
course of differencing. It has also been argued that the inclusion of lagged lengths of the 
variables in the 𝑉𝐴𝑅 will enable the residual to be stationary even with a non-stationary 
series that is𝐼(1)  (see Berkelmans, 2005). Many studies in recent times have also 
followed the same procedure (see, among others, Ngalawa and Viegi, 2011; Elboure, 
2007; Mordi and Adebiyi, 2010; Mahmud, 2009). 
4.6.2 Lag Length Selection and Normality test 
The reduced form equation is estimated with 2 lags length for all variables as suggested 
by the Akaike Information Criteria. This is a more general model which has been used 
in SVAR estimation by a number of researchers. The choice of 2-lag length by this 
study offers accurate and a more robust dynamic model without necessarily shortening 
the estimation sample too much; and allows for no serial correlation in the residuals (see 
Elboure, 2007). A normality test is conducted in order to determine the suitability of the 
model to be estimated. In other words, the test clears the model of violations of 
conditions of achieving consistent and efficient estimates. The results of the normality 
test are presented for the five countries on Tables 4.2 to 4.6 
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Table 4.2  Normality test (Nigeria) 
com Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera 
 skew Chi-sq df Prob Kurtosis Chi-sq Df Prob Jqbera df prob 
1 -68335.0  9.50E+10 1 0.00  1.34E+08  9.08E+16 1 0.00  9.08E+16 2 0.00 
2  3603.5  2.64E+08 1 0.00  4372244.  9.72E+13 1 0.00 9.72E+13 2 0.00 
3 -549.85  6147634. 1 0.00  53388.31  1.45E+10 1 0.00 1.45E+10 2 0.00 
4  2188.1  97353430 1 0.00  223244.1  2.53E+11 1 0.00 2.53E+11 2 0.00 
5  7847.8  1.25E+09 1 0.00  29746314  4.50E+15 1 0.00 4.50E+15 2 0.00 
6  22349.8  1.02E+12 1 0.00  79643963  3.22E+16 1 0.00 3.22E+16 2 0.00 
7 -46513.4  4.40E+10 1 0.00  44163175  9.91E+15 1 0.00 9.91E+15 2 0.00 
8  5566.7  6.30E+08 1 0.00  617200.4  1.94E+12 1 0.00 1.94E+12 2 0.00 
Joint  1.16E+12 8 0.00   1.38E+17 8 0.00 1.38E+17 16 0.00 
 
Table 4.3 Normality test (Algeria) 
com Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera 
 Skew Chi-sq df Prob Kurtosis Chi-sq Df Prob Jqbera df prob 
1  10290.39  2.15E+09 1 0.00  1.07E+08  5.79E+16 1 0.00  5.79E+16 2 0.00 
2  1125.011  25734867 1 0.00  232784.9  2.75E+11 1 0.00  2.75E+11 2 0.00 
3  38.56227  30236.66 1 0.00  15238.59  1.18E+09 1 0.00  1.18E+09 2 0.00 
4  6562.192  8.76E+08 1 0.00  790238.8  3.17E+12 1 0.00  3.18E+12 2 0.00 
5 -899.7360  16460339 1 0.00  249782.5  3.17E+11 1 0.00  3.17E+11 2 0.00 
6  683.9072  9510492. 1 0.00  176285.8  1.58E+11 1 0.00  1.58E+11 2 0.00 
7  801.4894  13061833 1 0.00  215793.2  2.37E+11 1 0.00  2.37E+11 2 0.00 
8  36.36973  26896.07 1 0.00  25601.11  3.33E+09 1 0.00  3.33E+09 2 0.00 
Joint  3.09E+09 8 0.00  5.79E+16 8 0.00  5.79E+16 16 0.00 
 
Table 4.4 Normality test (Gabon) 
Com Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera 
 skew Chi-sq df Prob Kurtosis Chi-sq Df prob jqbera df prob 
1 -79392.85  1.28E+11 1 0.00  1.72E+08  1.50E+17 1 0.00  1.50E+17 2 0.00 
2  3680.995  2.76E+08 1 0.00  6670904.  2.26E+14 1 0.00  2.26E+14 2 0.00 
3  247.6872  1247429. 1 0.00  20079.77  2.05E+09 1 0.00  2.05E+09 2 0.00 
4  1274.166  33011159 1 0.00  163601.3  1.36E+11 1 0.00  1.36E+11 2 0.00 
5  182470.1  6.77E+11 1 0.00  87943774  3.93E+16 1 0.00  3.93E+16 2 0.00 
6  11557245  2.72E+15 1 0.00  2.25E+10  2.57E+21 1 0.00  2.57E+21 2 0.00 
7  1800.646  65927265 1 0.00  19592251  1.95E+15 1 0.00  1.95E+15 2 0.00 
8  15379.49  4.81E+09 1 0.00  7485136.  2.85E+14 1 0.00  2.85E+14 2 0.00 







Table 4.5 Normality test (Libya) 
Com Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera 
 skew Chi-sq df Prob Kurtosis Chi-sq Df prob jqbera df prob 
1 -143611.6  3.85E+11 1 0.00  1.54E+08  1.10E+17 1 0.00  1.10E+17 2 0.00 
2 -
69690950  9.07E+16 
1 0.00 




3 -151.9811  431167.4 1 0.00  15600.28  1.14E+09 1 0.00  1.14E+09 2 0.00 
4  7516.226  1.05E+09 1 0.00  1740352.  1.41E+13 1 0.00  1.41E+13 2 0.00 
5  121.6304  276153.8 1 0.00  65911.19  2.03E+10 1 0.00  2.03E+10 2 0.00 
6 -79928.28  1.19E+11 1 0.00  42230125  8.32E+15 1 0.00  8.32E+15 2 0.00 
7 -146259.3  3.99E+11 1 0.00  1.93E+08  1.74E+17 1 0.00  1.74E+17 2 0.00 
8  11766.44  2.58E+09 1 0.00  4373136.  8.92E+13 1 0.00  8.92E+13 2 0.00 
Joint  9.07E+16 8 0.00  5.77E+23 8 0.00 5.77E+23 16 0.00 
 
Table 4.6 Normality test (Egypt) 
Com Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera 
 skew Chi-sq df Prob Kurtosis Chi-sq Df pro
b 
Jqbera df Prob 
1 -153324.9  4.78E+11 1 0.00  1.43E+08  1.04E+17 1 0.00  1.04E+17 2 0.00 
2 -1284.028  33524147 1 0.00  3750054.  7.15E+13 1 0.00  7.15E+13 2 0.00 
3 -10575.37  2.27E+09 1 0.00  2609265.  3.46E+13 1 0.00  3.46E+13 2 0.00 
4  1185.155  28560054 1 0.00  205251.0  2.14E+11 1 0.00  2.14E+11 2 0.00 
5  2462.394  1.23E+08 1 0.00  321017.0  5.24E+11 1 0.00  5.24E+11 2 0.00 
6 -12.82418  3344.013 1 0.00  10459.33  5.56E+08 1 0.00  5.56E+08 2 0.00 
7 -558.2397  6336509. 1 0.00  533670.6  1.45E+12 1 0.00  1.45E+12 2 0.00 
8  379.7349  2932037. 1 0.00  19937.34  2.02E+09 1 0.00  2.02E+09 2 0.00 
Joint   4.80E+11 8 0.00  1.04E+17 8 0.00 1.04E+17 16 0.00 
 
Tables 4.2 to 4.6 show that the normality test is conducted on the basis of the three 
known tests, that is skewness, kurtosis and Jarque-Bera. For the five countries the 
results show that all the variables in the model passed the normality test, both 
individually and jointly. This is shown by the probability values which indicate that 
they all passed the test at 1 percent level of significance. The implication of this is that 
the residuals of the model for the five countries are normally distributed.  
4.6.3 Structural VAR estimation results for Nigeria 
Impulse response analysis of the monetary policy transmission mechanism is discussed 
in three cases. First we consider the responses of all the endogenous variables to a shock 
from oil prices; second, we examine the impact of oil output growth rate shocks on all 
variables of interest; and third we analyse other shocks in the monetary policy 
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transmission mechanism (MTM). Note, that in the third case, we concentrate on interest 
rate shocks, money supply growth rate shocks, inflation rate shocks and the exchange 
rate shocks. We focus on the Nigerian economy first.    
4.6.3.1 Impulse response function analysis on Nigeria 
Figure 4.7 shows impulse responses of monetary policy instruments, the intermediate 
monetary variables as well as manufacturing output growth and GDP growth rate to a 
one standard deviation oil price shock. The shock causes a steady fall in oil output in 
the first two periods before picking up gradually. This is realistic since the growth rate 
of oil output is used. Mahmud (2009) attributed this to a slow movement in oil 
production growth rate in catching up with the increase in global oil demand which 
probably caused the initial rise in the price of oil. Interest rate fall in response to this 
and consequently the money supply growth rate increases leading to a steady rise in the 
inflation rate.  
The exchange rate response to an oil price shock is negative and significant especially 
from the second period. That is the exchange rate falls steadily although it appears to be 
picking up gradually as the period progresses. The resultant appreciation in the value of 
the local currency is similar to the result of studies by Olomola, (2006),Riman, Akpan 
and Offiong (2013) and Mamhud (2009) where they found that in Nigeria, an oil price 
shock usually causes appreciation in the value of Naira initially, but it depreciates later. 
Similarly, Burment (2004) found that in the study of countries like Oman and UAE 
which are net oil exporting countries, currency appreciates. Jimenez-Rodriguez and 
Sanchez (2005), and Chen and Chen (2007) have also found that an oil price shock 












Currency appreciation leads to an initial steady fall in the manufacturing output before 
picking up later as the currency begins to depreciate. The mechanism through which 
this works is that currency depreciation discourages imports and promotes exports.  
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hence a steady growth of the manufacturing output is noted. However, GDP growth rate 
reacts similarly since manufacturing sector output is a component of the GDP. 






Impulse responses of selected variables to a shock from the oil output growth rate are 
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following the shock. This is the same response it shows to an oil price shock. The 
money supply growth rate also rises steadily but contrary to expectation, the inflation 
rate falls for at least the first three quarters before it picks up. The implication of this is 
that the kind of inflation rate generated by the oil output shock might not be a monetary 
phenomenon.  
The position of Friedman (1965) who maintains that “inflation is always and 
everywhere a monetary phenomenon” is therefore rejected just as it has been criticized 
by many researchers. They argue that inflation might not be a monetary phenomenon all 
the time. For instance increases in prices that occur as a result of a decrease in output 
can aggravate the inflation rate. They further argue that inflation can be a monetary 
phenomenon only if output is stable, which is not realistic (see Nathan, 2012; Aziz, 
2013). In other words, in the absence of price rigidities, whenever there is a decrease in 
output, it can lead to an increase in prices which can trigger inflation. The reaction of 
exchange rates to the shock shows that the currency appreciates briefly and later begins 
to depreciate. Manufacturing output picks up slowly and peaks in the sixth period 
before it falls gradually. The GDP growth rate, just like Figure 4.7, also follows the 
same pattern of response of the manufacturing growth rate.  
From the above, it appears that the kind of inflation associated with oil output growth 
shock is more of a structural than monetary phenomenon, which was the case in the oil 
price shock. In spite of this, the resultant effect on the manufacturing output has not 
been positive with output rising sluggishly whenever the inflation rate is falling and 
falling gradually when the inflation rate starts rising. The same trend of response has 
been demonstrated by the GDP growth rate (see Riman, Akpan and Offiong, 
2013;Mordi and Adebiyi, 2010; Bouchaour and Al-Zeaud, 2012). 
Unlike what is observed in the two previous figures, Figure 4.9 explains the impulse 
responses of selected variables to an interest rate shock depicting a very sharp 
contemporaneous response from all the variables including the manufacturing output 
growth rate. It appears that the interest rate has sharp spiral effects on the transmission 
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mechanism of monetary policy. A one standard deviation shock to the interest rate 
causes a very sharp negative response of money supply, which falls sharply. Similar to 
the oil output growth shock effect on inflation rate, the inflation rate also rises, but very 
sharply this time. 






Initially the exchange rate responds negatively, but picks up sharply later. The interest 
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significant. This confirms that currency appreciation is a disincentive to manufacturing 
output growth in Nigeria. The sharp fall in the exchange rate, which means that the 
value of the Naira appreciates sharply might have resulted in the sharp fall noticed in 
the reaction of the manufacturing output to the shock from the interest rate. The GDP, 
as observed in the previous figures also follows the same pattern of response as 
manufacturing output growth. 
The implication of the results in Figure 4.9 is that interest rates appear to be a very 
important factor in the monetary policy transmission mechanism. This is shown from 
the contemporaneous sharp responses from all the variables. The negative response of 
the manufacturing output growth to an interest rate shock is more pronounced than what 
is observed in the oil output growth and the oil price shocks. 
The behaviour of the selected variables including manufacturing output growth 
following shocks from money supply is illustrated in Figure 4.10. It is clear that a 
money supply shock leads to a sharp response of the variables, although not as sharp as 
in the case of an interest rate shock. We find here almost the reverse of what we found 
in the interest rate shock.  The money supply growth rate shock causes interest rates to 
fall. Inflation rates fall as well. However, the exchange rate rises sharply (meaning that 
the currency depreciates). The money supply shock causes a positive response of the 
manufacturing growth rate. In other words, the depreciation in currency due to the 
shock in money supply leads to a gradual growth of the manufacturing output and it 
continues to rise steadily towards the eleventh period. 
It is worth noting here that the inflation rate falls in response to a money supply growth 
rate shock. The fall in inflation rate appears to show that inflation at this instance might 
be as a result of increase in output. This is a pointer to the fact that inflation might not 
be all the time a monetary phenomenon as posited by Friedman. To corroborate this, a 
steady rise is noticed in the manufacturing sector growth. If we compare this to the 
situation under interest rate shock where inflation rises, the resultant effect on the 
manufacturing sector is a fall in output. Therefore, it appears that an increase in the 
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inflation rate is a disincentive to manufacturing output growth.  The same situation is 
also noticed in Ushie, Adrniyi and Akongwale (2012),Olomola(2006),Akpan(2009) and 
Mamhud(2009). 






However, it can be inferred from the interaction in the monetary transmission 






















































output in Nigeria adversely, while a shock emanating from the money supply growth 
rate has a significant positive effect on the manufacturing sector until the eighth period.  
Impulse responses of the variables to an inflation shock are presented in Figure 4.11. 
There appears to be sharp responses from all the variables as well. The interest rate rises 
and money supply falls; the exchange rate falls and manufacturing output growth falls 
steadily. The GDP growth rate also falls steadily but later rises gradually. The 
manufacturing output fall might not be unconnected to the appreciation in the value of 
the currency.  
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This, again, confirms that a currency appreciation will lead to a fall in output growth of 
the manufacturing sector. The result also indicates that the rate of inflation is not 
favourable to growth in manufacturing output in Nigeria. On the whole, an inflation 
shock appears to be a very important shock in the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism in Nigeria, and the influence on the manufacturing sector is not positive. It 
appears that the low inflation policy of the CBN has been very weak in tackling 
incidents of frequently high inflation rates usually noticed in Nigeria. 
Impulse responses to an exchange rate shock are presented in Figure 4.12. Note that a 
one standard deviation shock in the exchange rate is synonymous to currency 
depreciation. Interest rates react sluggishly to the shock but they nonetheless increase, 
although the response is insignificant. The impact of the shock on money supply is 
negative. The shock causes money supply to fall steadily, which might be a result of the 
steady rise in the interest rate seen earlier. The inflation rate appears to be falling in the 
beginning and later rises steadily, but the influence on the manufacturing output is not 
pronounced though it shows a seemingly upward (rising) response. None of these 
responses is significant with the exception of GDP growth rate, which becomes 
significant in the 10th period. Thus, the exchange rate shock shows no significant effect 
on manufacturing output growth. 
This is in line with what has been observed so far, that whenever a currency depreciates, 
the effect manufacturing output growth responds positively. An appreciation of the 
exchange rate has been viewed by some researchers as having an adverse effect on the 
industrial sector. According to Olomola (2007), a currency appreciation has the 
tendency to squeeze out the tradable sector, aggravating the problem of Dutch Disease 













Next, we analyse the variance decomposition of the shocks. Variance decomposition 
explains the percentage or unit response of each variable in our model to the different 
structural shocks. In other words we try to explain the contribution of various structural 
shocks on oil output growth rate, interest rate, money supply growth rate, inflation rate, 
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4.6.3.2 Variance decomposition analysis on Nigeria 
The structural VAR variance decomposition for Nigeria is presented in Table 4.7. 
Table 4.7: Variance decomposition of interest rate (Nigeria) 
















 3  0.883139  0.016926  97.57888  0.940918  0.002666  0.048572  0.008403  0.520500 
 6  0.739789  0.094220  96.27396  2.552845  0.002222  0.096670  0.035502  0.204789 
 9  0.716581  0.157071  95.91015  2.695411  0.006166  0.136436  0.063236  0.314950 
 12  0.757282  0.185565  96.02373  2.367827  0.009211  0.164676  0.072702  0.419003 
 
Table 4.7 shows the contribution of each shock to interest rate changes. The Table 
shows that except for money supply growth rate, which is another monetary policy 
instrument that contributes about 0.94 units, the price of oil contributes shock of 0.88 
unit to interest rate changes. The oil output growth shock does not contribute any 
significant shock to fluctuations in interest rate. This is an indication that oil price shock 
has a direct effect on interest rates without passing through the oil output growth rate. 
Inflation appears to have contributed the lowest percentage to interest rate changes. We 
conclude, therefore, that interest rates are very responsive to oil price shocks in Nigeria. 
Table 4.8: Variance decomposition of money supply growth rate (Nigeria) 

















 3  0.535260  0.004388  12.03762  87.27367  0.019953  0.025656  0.099906  0.003552 
 6  0.156251  0.002532  42.22200  57.16062  0.059279  0.068004  0.245606  0.085709 
 9  0.196944  0.020434  66.15114  32.94691  0.073777  0.095567  0.217681  0.297551 
 12  0.453564  0.073099  77.70602  20.89453  0.073042  0.121385  0.167609  0.510754 
 
As noted in Table 4.8, the contribution of different shocks to money supply growth rate 
(see Table 4.8) reveals that the oil price shock, apart from an interest rate shock, which 
is a monetary policy instrument, has the highest percentage contribution to the money 
supply growth rate. This is maintained for all the four periods shown on the Table. This 
is a pointer to the finding that money supply growth responds to oil price changes in 
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Nigeria. Again, the oil output growth rate shock seems not to have any significant 
influence on the behaviour of money supply. 
Table 4.9: Variance decomposition of inflation rates (Nigeria) 

















 3  1.109146  0.922942  1.429209  16.85416  72.09112  1.675197  0.001891  5.916341 
 6  0.889970  5.304519  7.753942  27.31903  38.89006  1.767592  0.049555  18.02534 
 9  0.512949  6.372189  23.90038  24.78931  24.24223  1.397244  0.195932  18.58977 
 12  0.391131  5.392751  38.72105  21.04617  17.95055  1.125237  0.252344  15.12076 
 
Inflation is both an asset price and a monetary policy intermediate target. It, therefore, 
responds substantially to virtually all the shocks. Shocks to the monetary policy 
intermediate targets, that is interest rates and the money supply growth rate, appear to 
explain most of the variations in inflation rates.  
Table 4.10: Variance decomposition of exchange rate (Nigeria) 

















 3  1.514537  1.419183  10.72038  4.980498  0.773494  78.28305  1.143999  1.164867 
 6  4.579294  1.466473  15.50820  26.98432  1.030755  47.33960  0.706468  2.384897 
 9  7.449211  0.865589  12.71493  40.76961  1.800569  34.71960  0.353753  1.326738 
 12  10.44611  0.605665  9.304812  42.23153  3.180375  32.65451  0.239103  1.337897 
 
The oil price shock again plays an important role in explaining exchange rate variations. 
Since oil is priced in foreign currency, its shock contributes a large proportion to 
exchange rate fluctuations. In the same vein, interest rate and money supply growth rate 
shocks also contribute significantly to exchange rate variations. As expected, a GDP 






Table 4.11: Variance decomposition of manufacturing output growth (Nigeria) 

















 3  2.526945  1.446064  0.326550  1.633574  0.995286  0.547589  92.40905  0.114939 
 6  2.763763  5.279617  32.85794  1.498172  0.603085  0.301960  48.96858  7.726886 
 9  1.195773  2.960102  67.55929  1.105370  0.268691  0.152748  21.04847  5.709552 
 12  0.839729  2.074700  76.34862  1.824919  0.185623  0.105112  14.34127  4.280030 
 
Table 4.11 shows the response of manufacturing output to the various structural shocks. 
Four major shocks appear to have a very large impact on manufacturing output growth, 
viz: price of oil, oil output growth rate, interest rate, money supply growth rate and 
GDP growth rate shocks. The trend of effect of the shocks on manufacturing output 
growth rate shows that the price of oil has the highest contribution initially in the first 
period, but the contribution reduces in subsequent periods. While the impact of the 
shock of the monetary policy instruments increases in the ensuing period proceeds, the 
oil price shock is gradually transmitted through the monetary policy instrument to the 
manufacturing output growth rate. In other words, a fall in the contribution of the oil 
price shock and an increase in the contributions of both interest rate and money supply 
shocks in the later periods is a clear indication that an oil price shock is transmitted 
through the monetary variables to manufacturing output growth (see Mordi and 
Adebiyi, 2010). 
4.6.3.3. Inferences and Comparisons with other empirical studies (Nigeria) 
Findings from both the impulse response functions and variance decomposition analysis 
have shown diverse ways through which monetary policy influences the performance of 
the manufacturing sector in Nigeria. Firstly, the study has shown that an oil price shock 
generates an increase in money supply that leads to an increase in inflation. However, 
the effect brings about an inverse relationship between exchange rates and 
manufacturing output growth. When the currency appreciates, it leads to a fall in the 
manufacturing sector growth rate. It should be noted that the nature of inflation that 
occur as a result of the oil price shock appears to be a monetary phenomenon since it 
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reflects the spiral effects of the oil price shock through a gradual fall in interest rates 
which leads to an increase in money supply that later culminates in a rise in the inflation 
rate. 
It can be deduced from these findings that an oil output growth rate shock does not 
influence monetary policy instruments (MPIs) as does an oil price shock. This refutes 
the position of Berument and Dincer (2004) who maintain that an oil price shock passes 
through the oil output to affect economic policies. It is quite revealing in the case of 
Nigeria that the effect of oil price shock is felt directly on the whole monetary policy 
transmission mechanism without necessarily passing through the oil output growth rate 
of Nigeria.    
The results across various impulse response analyses have indicated that currency 
depreciation as a result of a fall in exchange rates, has been leading to a steady increase 
in manufacturing output growth in Nigeria, while currency appreciation weakens the 
manufacturing sector. This is in line with the findings of Mordi and Adebiyi (2009), 
Mahmud (2010), Ushie, Adeniyi and Akongwale (2012).  Currency appreciation has 
been shown tohavea negative effect on domestic output. According to Olomola (2007) 
any shock that produces a rise in exchange rates will have the tendency to squeeze out 
the tradable goods sector and consequently have an adverse effect on the growth of the 
manufacturing sector in Nigeria.  It should be noted that all the shocks that produce a 
fall in exchange rate (currency appreciation), also lead to a steady fall in the 
manufacturing growth rate and vice versa. For instance, as the exchange rate falls 
sharply (i.e the currency appreciates) following an interest rate shock, manufacturing 
output growth also falls considerably. 
It is also apparent from the analysis that the pressure on the price level that occurs as a 
result of other shocks, except the oil price shock, produces a kind of inflation that is 
more of structural than monetary in nature. The effect of a rise in money supply growth 
rate as a result of a fall in interest rates fails to reflect on inflation. The implication here 
is that inflation might not be a monetary phenomenon. Therefore, structural reasons like 
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the general price level and instability in output might have led to the nature of the 
inflation rate common to all other shocks, except the oil price shock. However, it is 
clear that any shock on inflation rate has been adversely affecting manufacturing output 
growth. For instance a shock from money supply produces a falling inflation rate, but 
manufacturing output growth rises in response to the same shock; a shock from interest 
rates produces a rise in inflation but a fall in manufacturing output growth. The variance 
decomposition analysis also appears to show support for this behaviour. The response 
of manufacturing output to an inflation shock is among the highest. It is even higher 
than interest rates in the first quarter, although the contribution falls in subsequent 
periods.  
Both money supply and interest rate shocks have been shown to have the highest 
contribution to manufacturing growth rate as the period progresses. An oil price shock 
has only a very high initial contribution to the manufacturing output growth, that is in 
the first period. The contribution of the shock, however, falls in the ensuing periods, 
while that of monetary instruments picks up gradually. Hence, it appears that as the 
periods that follow, the oil price shock to manufacturing output is transmitted through 
the monetary variables and this has led to a rise in the contribution of both interest rate 
and money supply shocks while the contribution of oil price shocks has fallen. This is in 
line with the findings of Mahmud (2009), who concluded that the second effect of the 
price of oil on different sectors in the Nigerian economy is transmitted through the 
monetary policy system. 
The study has found that the effect of oil price shocks in the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism is profound, besides the monetary policy instruments 
themselves. For instance 53 percent of the variations in money supply growth rate are 
accounted for by oil price while 88 percent of the fluctuations in interest rates are 
attributed to the same oil price shocks. The implication is that oil price shocks appears 
to be a very important factor that affects the monetary policy transmission mechanism 
in Nigeria.   This supports our earlier position which is also in line with previous 
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empirical studies; that oil price shocks affect the manufacturing sector through the 
monetary policy transmission process. 
On comparative grounds, it can be inferred from the impulse response analysis that 
interest rate shocks are most likely to have a negative effect on manufacturing output 
while money supply shocks appear to have a positive effect on the growth of 
manufacturing output in Nigeria. However, variance decomposition results have shown 
that manufacturing output growth responds considerably to the two monetary policy 
operating target shocks, that is money supply shock and interest rate shock. 
4.6.4 Analysis of structural VAR estimation results for Algeria 
4.6.4.1 Impulse response function analysis for Algeria 
Figure 4.13 shows responses of all the variables in the model to a one standard 
deviation oil price shock. The shock leads to a fall in oil output growth rate which might 
not be unconnected to the increase in demand for oil in the international market, which 
may have led to the initial oil price increase. The implication of this is that the rate of 
growth in production is slow to catch up with the increase in demand. Furthermore, the 
shock causes interest rates to fall initially, at least for the first four periods, and later to 
start rising. The shock, however, has contrary effects on money supply. When interest 
rates are low money supply is rising and as interest rates begins to rise, money supply 
starts falling.  
The implication of the foregoing discussion is that the effect of oil prices on the two 
monetary policy instruments follows the standard economic theory which postulates an 
inverse relationship between money supply and interest rates. Expectedly, the oil price 
shocks push the inflation rate up. But the decline in the money supply may be a 
response by the monetary authorities to decrease the effect of the inflation. Bouchaour 
and Al-Zeaud (2012) also obtained a similar result and concluded that the inflation that 
arises as a result of an oil price shock can be categorized as imported inflation. The 
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exchange rate shows a very sluggish positive response to the oil price shock while the 
manufacturing sector growth also exhibits the same response and in the same direction.    





The slow response of the exchange rate might not be unconnected to the type of 
exchange rate policy practiced in Algeria, which is termed controlled flexible exchange 
rate, where the monetary authorities intervene constantly with the exchange rate system 
to prevent excessive undervaluation of the currency (see Bouchaour and Al-Zeaud, 
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response of the exchange rate to external shocks. However, it appears that this has not 
been having a positive influence on the manufacturing sector of the economy, going by 
the sluggish downward trend noticed. This also slightly affects the GDP growth rate. 







Figure 4.14 shows the responses to an oil output growth rate shock. The effect of the oil 
growth rate shock on interest rates is similar to that of the oil price shock. Again, as the 
interest rate begins to fall money supply rises. Inflation rate and money supply also 
respond to the oil output growth shock with an increase. Currency appears to appreciate 
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pattern too. The implication again here is that currency appreciation is a disincentive for 
manufacturing growth rate. 







Unlike the two previous analyses, it seems as if all variables display significant 
responses to an interest rate shock as shown in Figure 4.15. Money supply increases 
sharply as a result of the interest rate shock. The inflation rate however falls in response 
to the shock, again confirming that inflation in Algeria might not be as a result of 
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and manufacturing output to decline initially up to the fourth period before picking up 
gradually. The currency appreciation might have been the cause of the initial fall in 
manufacturing output. However, it rises later as a result of the control of inflation which 
falls sharply. Expectedly, the GDP growth rate also follows the same pattern of growth.  
This revelation is a pointer towards the fact that interest rate policy is likely to have a 
significant influence on output growth of the manufacturing sector in Algeria. 
According to Berument (2007), when studying the monetary transmission mechanism in 
an oil rich country, if interest rate policy is used to curtail a rise in  inflation rate (Taylor 
Principle), it will have a significant positive effect on real output. The implication of 
this finding and the foregoing discussion is that interest rates can influence output of the 
manufacturing sector in Algeria through the exchange rate and inflation rate as the 
medium of transmission ( intermediate targets). 
The first thing noticed in Figure 4.16 is that the absence of the sharp and significant 
responses from all the variables as observed under the interest rate shock. There appears 
not to be very clear responses from the variables to a money supply shock in Algeria. 
The inflation rate responds slowly in a decreasing form and later picks up gradually. 
The exchange rate appears neutral as the zero line margin overshadows the impulse 
response graph from exchange rate. However, it appears that both manufacturing sector 
growth and exchange rate fail to respond to money supply shock. 
The inflation shock as shown in Figure 4.17 appears to have no effects on the variables 
except manufacturing output growth and the GDP growth rate. Interest rates do not 
respond at all. Money supply responds with a decline that becomes significant in the 
tenth period. This might not be unconnected to the incessant interference by the 
monetary authorities in Algeria to stabilize price and exchange rate. Often the central 












of external reserves of the country to augment any imbalance noticed (Bouchaour and 
Al-Zeaud 2012). This interference has been preventing monetary policy instruments 
from demonstrating appropriate and natural responses to shocks from inflation rate and 






























































However, it should be noted from the impulse response graph that unlike other variables 
in the graph, manufacturing output growth appears to demonstrate a very conspicuous 
response to the inflation shock. There is an indication that the shock makes the output of 
the manufacturing sector in Algeria fall gradually. Apart from manufacturing output, it 
can also be seen that GDP growth rate is another variable that demonstrates a clear 
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showing that inflation rate in Algeria is an impediment to the growth of GDP, especially 
resulting from a decline in the manufacturing output growth. 







As expected, the responses of the variables are not in a distinctive rise or fall pattern to 
an exchange rate shock as shown in Figure 4.18. Despite this, manufacturing output 
displays a sluggish albeit insignificant downward trend following the exchange rate 
shock, while the monetary policy instruments and inflation rate hardly show a 
noticeable pattern of movement in response to the shock. However, the fact that the 
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response to the currency depreciation caused by the exchange rate shock. Although it 
falls gradually later, this might not be unconnected to the intervention of the monetary 
authority to control the shock. It again confirms that currency depreciation might 
promote output of the manufacturing sector (see Mordi and Adebiyi,2009; Mahmud, 
2010; Ushie, Adeniyi and Akongwale,2012; Olomola, 2006).  
4.6.4.2 Variance decomposition analysis on Algeria  
We now focus on components of the monetary policy transmission mechanism. With 
variance decomposition, we explain the responses of these variables to each shock 
identified in the Algerian economy. In other words we set out here to investigate the 
contribution of each shock to the components of monetary policy transmission 
mechanism. 
Table 4.12: Variance Decomposition of interest rates (Algeria) 

















 3  0.936829  0.017356  98.69360  0.001520  0.012655  0.019942  0.001708  0.316393 
 6  0.835934  0.011856  97.58076  0.002400  0.021771  0.277225  0.210049  1.060003 
 9  0.739469  0.009643  94.30725  0.004277  0.024733  0.718717  0.788827  3.407084 
 12  0.661947  0.018976  90.95664  0.011230  0.025352  1.055934  1.280472  5.989451 
 
Table 4.12 confirms the dominant role of the oil price in determining the level of 
interest rates in Algeria. Out of all the shocks, the oil price shock has the greatest 
influence on changes in interest rates. The oil price contributes about 93 percent of the 
changes in interest rates in the first period only. The contribution decreases in 
subsequent periods, while that of GDP increases. Money supply, inflation rate and 
exchange rate, which are all components of the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism, do not contribute significantly to the changes in interest rates.. Again, we 
noticed that the oil output growth shock does not contribute much to the interest rate 
fluctuations in Algeria. This is confirmation that the shock from the oil price appears to 
influence the interest rate without passing through the oil output growth rate. 
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Table 4.13: Variance Decomposition of money supply (Algeria) 

















 3  3.575931  0.317982  9.624737  85.17430  0.111178  0.247669  0.744989  0.203216 
 6  5.564502  1.746828  46.86021  43.49735  0.032267  0.666155  1.581269  0.051423 
 9  5.442392  2.980515  63.45253  26.12216  0.126233  0.478793  1.364032  0.033344 
 12  5.000503  3.410883  70.33137  18.94270  0.316203  0.306221  1.039257  0.652857 
 
Oil price continues to affirm its influence in the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism in Algeria as shown in Table 4.13. Again, apart from interest rate which is a 
monetary policy instrument, oil price shock contributes the highest percentage to the 
variations in money supply  
Table 4.14: Variance Decomposition of Inflation rate (Algeria) 

















 3  0.516769  1.069329  20.58701  0.865833  69.24148  0.757319  0.248144  6.714122 
 6  0.970810  2.838451  41.98115  0.871760  27.53939  0.416223  0.710831  24.67139 
 9  1.261831  2.868420  47.83664  0.950501  17.16261  0.365950  0.418090  29.13596 
 12  1.420550  2.601777  50.56804  0.863324  14.48438  0.438649  0.479145  29.14413 
 
The impulse response analyses have shown that inflation has some linkages with other 
variables in the monetary policy mechanism especially interest rates. The same 
observation is made in Table 4.14.  Apart from interest and GDP growth rates, oil price 
and oil output growth rates are another important factor that influences inflation rates in 
Algeria. Money supply as a component of monetary policy does not affect the inflation 
rate in Algeria as much as the oil price does. This is consistent with our earlier finding 






Table 4.15: Variance Decomposition of exchange rate (Algeria) 

















 3  0.742382  0.844015  1.889646  0.011991  0.397429  92.43763  0.239517  3.437389 
 6  0.460013  1.340992  17.58272  0.012474  0.156851  71.62539  0.253684  8.567877 
 9  0.193791  1.020606  39.53477  0.017257  0.106281  48.18137  0.195773  10.75015 
 12  0.158075  0.694539  53.57782  0.022548  0.107686  33.63627  0.114981  11.68808 
 
Table 4.15 shows that an oil price shock has a high influence on exchange rate 
fluctuations in the first period, but the influence weakens as the ensuing period. This is 
as a result of adjustments in the exchange rate to cope with any oil price regime the 
economy is facing. Once, the exchange rate is adjusted to cope with the new oil price 
regime, that influence is absorbed. The interest rate continues to be the most dominant 
monetary policy operating instrument in Algeria and interest rate shock has the highest 
contribution to changes in the exchange rate in Algerian. The GDP growth rate and the 
oil output growth rate are also very strong shocks that contribute to exchange rate 
variations. 
Table 4.16: Variance decomposition of manufacturing output growth (Algeria) 

















 3  0.309415  2.190588  0.574823  0.273215  1.731715  0.239293  87.96335  6.717605 
 6  0.234693  2.739144  1.727245  0.687814  7.235354  0.397010  60.73537  26.24337 
 9  0.200103  4.183053  16.10652  2.426450  9.273727  0.736962  32.22488  34.84830 
 12  0.119686  5.857290  28.02267  2.741843  7.731906  0.590879  19.13293  35.80279 
 
Manufacturing output growth is our variable of primary interest. Table 4.16 quantifies 
the contribution of different shocks in the system to variations in manufacturing output 
growth. The table indicates that the contribution of oil price shocks to changes in 
manufacturing output growth diminishes in ensuing periods, while that of the monetary 
policy instruments shocks increase. Interest rate shocks again play a pronounced role in 
explaining variations in the level of output in Algeria’s manufacturing sector. In the 
same vein inflation rate is another important shock that affects the manufacturing 
sector. This was also shown in the impulse response analysis. GDP growth rate and oil 
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output growth rate are also found to have a great influence on the variations in 
manufacturing output. The implication of this result is that the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism (MTM) in Algeria conveys the shock from the oil price to 
manufacturing output. This is because the contribution of an oil price shock to 
fluctuations in manufacturing output reduces as the period progresses, while the 
contribution of the MPIs shocks rises (see for example Bouchaour and Al-Zeaud, 2012). 
4.6.4.3 Inferences and comparisons with previous empirical studies (Algeria) 
As earlier stated, related literatures on monetary policy and economic activities in the 
Algerian economy is very scanty. Little research has been done on oil shocks, monetary 
policy and output in Algeria. Therefore, from the available literature we shall make 
comparisons in terms of similarities and differences with the findings of this study. 
This study has confirmed the effect of oil prices on manufacturing output growth. It has 
been shown that this effect can be traced through the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism (MTM). The variance decomposition analysis shows that as the contribution 
of an oil price shock to the manufacturing output growth falls that of monetary policy 
instruments’ shocks continue to rise. The same results were obtained by Bouchaour and 
Al-Zeaud(2012). 
It also appears that the oil price shock affects back into the MTM directly without 
passing through the oil output growth. This confirms that the impact of oil output 
growth does not have as much influence on the variables in the MTM as does the oil 
price shock. The MPIs’ shocks also have a greater contribution to the behaviour of 
manufacturing output than oil output growth shock in the MTM. 
The effect of inflation rates on the manufacturing sector in Algeria appears to be 
significant. However, the nature of inflation in Algeria appears not to be predominantly 
a monetary phenomenon. Our study results corroborate the findings of previous 
empirical studies that inflation in Algeria is mostly imported inflation as a result of oil 
price shocks. Output also appears to be another important factor that explains the rate of 
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inflation in Algeria. The variance decomposition analysis shows that the contribution of 
GDP growth rate (output) to variations in inflation rate is very high. This is in 
agreement to the finding of Aziz (2010), who observed that output, instead of money 
supply, account for  a large part of fluctuations in inflation rates due to the effect it has 
on price. This further supports the view that inflation, especially in the oil exporting 
countries, might not necessarily be a monetary phenomenon but an effect of structural 
rigidities in the economy. 
 However, Algerian monetary authorities frequently manipulate monetary policy to 
cope with inflation pressure, but the result has not always been favourable to the 
manufacturing sector of the economy. The impulse response analysis also confirms that 
as inflation rises manufacturing output growth falls. 
Nevertheless, the relationship between exchange rate and manufacturing sector growth 
has been very sluggish. It is, however, apparent that currency depreciation promotes the 
growth of the manufacturing sector, although the impact is small. In other words over-
valuation of a currency is inimical to the growth of the manufacturing sector. The 
variance decomposition shows that the exchange rate might not be a very important 
shock in explaining fluctuations in the performance of the manufacturing sector in 
Algeria. This is due to the incessant control and monitoring of the exchange rate by the 
Algerian monetary authorities through a dedicated exchange rate targeting policy. 
Between the two monetary policy instruments, interest rates appear to be the stronger 
tool of monetary policy in Algeria. By comparison, the impact of money supply on 
other variables in the monetary transmission mechanism is larger than that of interest 
rates. The impulse response analysis and variance decomposition are in agreement on 
this finding. 
Finally, the large impact of interest rates on the performance of the manufacturing 
sector makes it the best tool to be used to stimulate the growth of the manufacturing 
sector in Algeria. 
136 
 
4.6.5 Structural VAR estimation results for Gabon 
As earlier stated, Gabon is one of the small net oil exporting countries in Africa, yet oil 
remains the mainstay of the economy constituting about 50percent to GDP and almost 
85percent of total exports. Gabon is among the small oil producing countries in Africa 
such as Equatorial Guinea, Sudan, and Cameroun. The country is included in our 
analysis of monetary policy and manufacturing to investigate if there is any deviation 
from the results obtained in the analysis of large oil exporters like Nigeria and Algeria. 
4.6.5.1 Impulse response function analysis on Gabon 
The sequence of analysis follows the same pattern as in the case of Nigerian and 
Algerian economies. We begin with the effect of oil price shocks on the system. Figure 
4.19 shows the responses of selected variables in the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism to a one standard deviation oil price shock. As observed in the analysis of 
Nigeria and Algeria, a similar response of oil output growth rate to an oil price shock is 
also noticed.  
The oil output first falls before it picks up sharply. Interest rates do not show a clear 
response to the oil price shock but the response is insignificant. The effect of the shock 
shows that the growth rate of money supply falls initially, becoming significant after six 
periods. Later, the money supply growth rate picks up gradually. The oil price shock 
triggers a sharp rise in the rate of inflation, which becomes significant in the seventh 
period. This shows that inflation might not be a result of changes in money supply. In 















This might be a result of the actions of the monetary authorities in stabilizing the 
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The shock from the oil output growth rate in Gabon and the responses from selected 
variables in the monetary policy transmission mechanism are shown in Figure 4.20. The 
shock causes interest rates to rise and money supply growth rate to rise initially and 
latter fall. The inflation rate rises while manufacturing output growth decreases in 
response to the oil output growth shock. It should be noted that the real exchange rate 
also falls, although the response is insignificant. The currency appreciation might have 
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falls gradually, beginning about the fifth period. The implication of this is that the 
Gabonese economy is highly susceptible to the negative effect of oil output growth. 
World Bank (2012) emphasized that oil production shock in Gabon has been having a 
detrimental effect on growth in recent times which is attributed to dwindling oil 
reserves in the country. This has been making it difficult for the country to cope 
immediately with any increase in the global demand for oil.  






The interest rate shock has a major impact on the economy of Gabon as shown in Figure 
4.21. Gabon is a member of a unified monetary zone called CEMAC (communaute 
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Cameroun, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Equatorial Guinea 
and Gabon. All these countries, except Central African Republic, are net oil exporters. 
These countries are under one monetary system and a common central bank called 
BEAC. Whenever there is an increase in interest rates, it makes the Gabonese currency 
depreciate in real value (see Zafar, 2004; IMF, 2010; World Bank, 2012). The 
implication as noticed in the impulse response function is that an interest rate shock 
leads to a fall in money supply growth rate, inflation falls and manufacturing output 
growth rises initially at least up to the fourth period before falling. This might not be 
unconnected to the action of the monetary authority its effort to avoid the real exchange 
rate depreciation and will cause manufacturing output to fall as the period progresses. 
GDP growth rate also falls initially before picking up, in response to the shock.  
These results further justify the findings from Nigeria and Algeria that a currency 
appreciation is possibly going to have a detrimental effect on output growth of the 
manufacturing sector in an oil exporting country.  However, currency depreciation will 
have a positive effect on manufacturing output. On the whole, interest rate shock 
appears not to have any positive effect on the manufacturing output in Gabon. 
We also examine the impulse response to a money supply growth rate shock (see Figure 
4.22). The responses are dictated by the fixed exchange rate system in Gabon. A money 
supply shock characterised by an increase in money supply might not have a positive 
influence on the manufacturing growth rate as a result of the pegged exchange rate. 
Manufacturing output growth rate initially rises until the third period; then it starts 
falling, a process that goes on until the ninth period. Thereafter, it starts picking up. 
This is an indication that expansionary monetary policy is not very effective in 
promoting growth under fixed exchange rates. The overvaluation resulting from the 
pegged exchange rate system does not seem to have a good result on the manufacturing 
output growth. The real exchange rate response which shows that the currency 
appreciates has a negative impact on the manufacturing output growth by causing it to 
fall sharply. Generally, the response of manufacturing output growth shows that it 
initially increases, then falls before rising again. But for most of the periods 
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manufacturing output is falling. Precisely out of the 12 periods, the manufacturing 
output falls between the second period and the tenth period. This fall can be associated 
with the currency that appreciates. 






However, Gabon has benefited from the stable exchange rate in terms of internal 
economic stability; but the negative impact has been in the area of international trading 
as it discourages importation of goods used in the domestic manufacturing industry 
(Zafar, 2004). According to the World Bank (2010) the external reserve is used to 
maintain the fixed exchange rate. The monetary policy instruments in Gabon are usually 



















































Since the exchange rate is pegged, most often the economic stabilization effort works at 
variance to the growth of the non-oil sector, therefore limiting the effectiveness of 
monetary policy instruments in promoting the output growth. 






The major limitation of the fixed exchange rate regime in Gabon is the inability of the 
Gabonese economy to cope with any external shock (IMF, 2010). Nevertheless the 
inflation rate is controlled through monetary policy instruments. In response to an 
inflation shock, Figure 4.23 shows that interest rates fall and money supply rises. To 
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fall. The corresponding effect on the manufacturing sector indicates that as soon as 
interest rates start rising and money supply falls, manufacturing output growth starts 
falling. Therefore, it follows the same trend explained in Figure 7.34 that as the 
monetary policy tries to control the economic instability it affects the manufacturing 
sector of Gabon negatively. Again, the shock causes the real exchange rate to fall 
steadily with the resultant appreciation in currency possibly being responsible for the 
steady fall in the manufacturing output until the seventh period before it starts picking 
up. This adjustment to the corresponding rise in the real exchange rate is in the seventh 
period. 
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The impulse responses as shown in Figure 4.24 indicate that the variables in the system 
are hardly affected by any shock from the exchange rate. This is because the exchange 
rate in Gabon is fixed and hence may not constitute any significant influence on the 
monetary policy transmission mechanism since external reserves are always used as a 
buffer to sustain the fixed exchange rate.   
4.6.5.2 Variance decomposition analysis on Gabon 
In this section, we explore the contribution of various shocks to the behaviour of 
monetary policy variables and manufacturing output growth. We begin with the 
monetary policy instruments. 
Table 4.17: Variance decomposition of interest rates (Gabon) 

















 3  1.115667  0.158539  97.36436  0.194595  0.064858  0.037551  0.064453  0.999973 
 6  1.050368  0.739324  96.68273  0.139356  0.235326  0.075228  0.295775  0.781894 
 9  0.939868  1.334849  95.67908  0.501452  0.308630  0.095282  0.578975  0.561864 
 12  0.884717  1.752597  94.99554  0.664352  0.318499  0.105867  0.823813  0.454620 
 
Table 4.17 shows that the response of interest rate to an oil price shock is the highest. 
This confirms the position of various studies that monetary policy instruments are 
affected by oil price fluctuations in the Gabonese economy. Any external shock is 
augmented through an adjustment of monetary policy instruments so as to maintain 
domestic economic instability (see Zafar, 2004). As observed in both Nigerian and 
Algerian economies, interest rates are more responsive to oil price shocks than oil 
output growth shocks. This confirms that in Gabon, the effect of oil price shocks to the 






Table 4.18: Variance Decomposition of money supply growth rate (Gabon) 

















 3  1.287367  0.000751  0.250237  98.33664  0.091993  0.005325  0.023287  0.004404 
 6  2.016468  0.011618  0.156453  97.51665  0.184666  0.007516  0.104806  0.001822 
 9  2.576253  0.053567  0.150710  96.87343  0.149715  0.005805  0.189023  0.001503 
 12  2.770539  0.073474  0.872658  95.81687  0.209671  0.008014  0.246073  0.002702 
 
The results found in the response of interest rates to an oil price shock are also observed 
here. Money supply is mostly affected by oil price shocks, according to Table 4.18. 
Even GDP growth rate and interest rate shocks do not explain a large part of the 
behaviour of money supply growth rate. It should also be noted that the contribution of 
oil output growth shock to the variations of money supply is very low. 
Table 4.19: Variance decomposition of inflation rate (Gabon) 

















 3  0.092216  0.878739  0.305303  0.563120  95.06802  0.792750  0.521942  1.777908 
 6  1.606521  0.566152  9.327458  54.70956  30.64856  0.259949  0.279272  2.602526 
 9  3.126410  1.151951  15.14862  72.39876  7.351189  0.062891  0.092039  0.668140 
 12  3.940007  1.668772  16.58802  72.67836  4.512416  0.046683  0.076170  0.489574 
 
The response of inflation rate to shocks from the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism is shown in Table 4.19. Although the oil price shock does not contribute the 
highest shock to inflation rate fluctuations, it has an increasing contribution as the 
period progresses. Despite this, the finding confirms our earlier results under impulse 
response analysis that inflation changes are predominantly driven by monetary policy 
instruments in the Gabonese economy. The contributions of interest rates and monetary 
policy shocks are the highest. This is an indication that the pace of inflation in the 






Table 4.20: Variance decomposition of exchange rate (Gabon) 

















 3  2.704449  1.700820  79.19261  4.498067  3.580680  6.747723  1.515976  0.059678 
 6  1.207263  0.436361  89.34446  2.985810  2.561660  1.936645  1.153484  0.374320 
 9  0.576559  0.147385  86.51077  8.365292  1.420279  0.970746  0.967886  1.041088 
 12  0.404418  0.105673  87.47833  8.544124  0.798729  0.598482  0.870649  1.199597 
 
Since a fixed exchange rate is practiced in Gabon, any shock received by the exchange 
rate is passed to the monetary policy instruments and the inflation rate. In other words, 
any negative effects that come from the exchange rate shock are augmented by the 
external reserve and through the components of the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism; and stability in the domestic economy is maintained. This assertion is 
deduced from what we observe in Table 4.20 where interest rate, money supply and 
inflation rate shock make the highest contribution to exchange rate fluctuations. This 
explains why the response of the exchange rate to these variables is the highest. 
Table 4.21: Variance decomposition of manufacturing output growth (Gabon) 

















 3  2.888955  0.210253  27.09687  14.82686  6.714051  0.164277  48.07132  0.027410 
 6  2.035597  0.315008  18.09457  46.13403  13.88379  0.387522  19.04165  0.107826 
 9  3.270043  0.150579  8.134385  79.59973  4.128187  0.131444  4.543552  0.042081 
 12  4.041589  0.358769  7.516940  82.12962  2.744974  0.086899  3.093599  0.027614 
 
The results, as shown in Table 4.21, are consistent with what we obtained under 
impulse response analysis. The interest rate appears to be the variable affecting 
manufacturing output growth the most. This is followed by money supply growth rate. 
It should be noted, however, that from the impulse response analysis, The exchange rate 
shock appears to be the weakest of the shocks explaining variations in manufacturing 
output, probably because it is fixed. Although the oil price shock has an increasing 
contribution to fluctuations in manufacturing output growth, its impact is not as high as 
that of monetary policy instruments and inflation rate shocks.  
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4.6.5.3 Inferences and comparison with other empirical studies (Gabon) 
There is scarcity of literature on research related to monetary policy and manufacturing 
sector growth in Gabon. Only one or two studies have investigated issues relating to oil 
price shocks and monetary policy in the Gabonese economy. 
It is apparent from our findings that the behaviour of monetary policy transmission 
mechanisms in a fixed exchange rate regime is different from that of a flexible 
exchange rate regime. Any external shock to the exchange rate is absolved by the 
external reserves while the monetary policy instruments are used to maintain internal 
economic stability. That is, the monetary policy instruments are adjusted to achieve 
domestic economic stability in terms of controling inflation. Often, this action makes 
MPIs ineffective in promoting growth as observed in the impulse response analysis of 
money supply where expansionary monetary policy fails to stimulate the growth of the 
manufacturing sector. In the flexible exchange rate system, the exchange rate and 
monetary policy instruments play an active role in maintaining economic stability. For 
instance, in Nigeria and Algeria, expansionary monetary policy leads to a steady 
increase in manufacturing output 
In line with our findings in both the Nigerian and Algerian economies, the response of 
MPIs to an oil output growth rate shock is also very low in Gabon. This further justifies 
refuting the claims of Berument etal., (2009) that oil price shocks pass through the oil 
output of oil exporting countries to influence economic policies. 
Due to the restrictions imposed by the fixed exchange rate system, authorities are 
concerned about using monetary policy to maintain economic stability domestically 
more than to promote manufacturing output growth in Gabon. This is evident in the fact 
that the automatic adjustment of the monetary policy mechanism in maintaining 
economic stability usually runs contrary to conditions that would have enhanced the 
growth of the manufacturing sector. 
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In Gabon, an oil price shock remains an important shock in the monetary transmission 
mechanism despite the fixed exchange rate system in practice. The loss of flexibility as 
a result of the fixed exchange rate system has made the manufacturing sector in Gabon 
highly susceptible to external shocks. The monetary policy instruments find it difficult 
to stimulate the manufacturing sector in this situation since they are meant to absorb 
economic instability that might have resulted from the rigidity of the exchange rate 
(Zafar, 2004). 
In addition, it appears that inflation in Gabon is not as a result of money supply 
increase, as evidenced by both the impulse response and variance decomposition 
analysis that show that an increase in money supply does not necessarily lead to 
inflation. This shows that inflation in Gabon is most likely a structural phenomenon and 
not a monetary issue. As earlier explained, the low inflation policy is achieved through 
the use of MPIs and this is followed strictly by the Gabonese monetary authority since 
the fixed exchange rate has limited the effectiveness of the MPIs in promoting output 
growth of the manufacturing sector.  
Findings from our previous analyses have also shown that the oil output growth rate 
shock has an adverse impact on manufacturing output growth in Gabon. Gabonese oil 
production has found it difficult to cope with sudden pressure from an increased 
demand in oil. This exposes the monetary policy transmission mechanism to the adverse 
effect of the oil output growth rate shock. The major reason for this has been the 








4.6.6 Structural VAR estimation results for Libya 
4.6.6.1 Impulse response function analysis on Libya 
Like other big net oil exporters, Libya’s impulse response functions show a strong 
influence of oil prices on the system. Our analysis of the impulse response functions on 
the Libyan economy also starts from the oil price shocks which is the exogenous 
variable in the model.  Figure 4.25 shows the response of all variables to the oil price 
shock. 
The impulse response functions in Figure 4.25 shows similar patterns of responses 
noticed in most of the previous countries analysed. The oil price shock as usual has a 
negative effect on the oil output growth rate, although the effect is insignificant. Interest 
rates fall after a brief initial rise and money supply growth rate also follows in the same 
direction so that it falls initially and later rises.  
However, the initial fall in the money supply does not seem to affect the inflation rate as 
it rises steadily showing that inflation here might not be money supply motivated. The 
exchange rate, which is fixed during periods under study, did not show any significant 
movement but maintained almost a straight line movement along the origin. The 
manufacturing growth rate fell steadily. This again confirms another scenario of inverse 
relationship between inflation rate and the manufacturing output growth rate. The GDP 
growth rate also fell steadily and picked up gradually. Generally the oil price shock 
effect, through the monetary policy mechanism on the manufacturing output growth, 
seems not to be positive in the Libyan economy as well. It is important to note that all 
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Impulse responses to the oil output growth shock is shown in Figure 4.26. The interest 
rate shows a less conspicuous falling trend while money supply also moves in the same 
direction but eventually starts rising. 






However, the inflation rate seems to be neutral in its response. On the whole, none of 
the variables show a significant response to oil output growth shock. The manufacturing 
growth rate shows a more conspicuous downward movement and until period six when 
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replicated by the GDP growth rate. Again the oil output growth shock seems not to have 
any significant positive impact on the growth of the manufacturing sector.  






As observed in the case studies of other oil exporting countries previously analysed, 
most variables in the model respond significantly to an interest rate shock. The same is 
observed in Figure 4.27. The responses from all variables are sharp, thus confirming the 
importance of interest rates in the system. The shock causes an initial rise of money 
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rate to fall sharply. The real exchange rate rises notably in response, partly because of 
Libya’s fixed exchange rate. However, the manufacturing output growth shows a very 
brief initial rise in response to the depreciation in the real value of the Libyan Dinar 
before declining sharply. This might not be unconnected with the fact that the monetary 
authority intervenes to maintain a fixed exchange rate causing the currency to 
appreciate again and consequently lead to a fall in manufacturing output. This also 
confirms that a currency appreciation will have a negative effect on the growth of the 
manufacturing sector in Libya.  Before falling steadily, the GDP growth rate has a more 
sustained upward movement than the manufacturing growth rate. 
Figure 4.28 shows impulse responses of all variables to a money supply growth rate 
shock. As observed in the analysis of some countries earlier, it appears that generally 
the influence of money supply growth rate on most variables in the model is not 
significant. The implication of this is that the results fail to demonstrate any notable 
pattern of movement of the variables in response to a money supply growth rate shock. 
Despite this, manufacturing growth rate shows some slight upward movement, which 
shows a very marginal rise in the manufacturing output growth in response to the 
money supply growth rate shock. However, the response from the GDP growth rate is 
not conspicuous. The results obtained in the previous impulse response analyses seem 
to be repeating themselves here. This is particularly on the relative influence of money 
supply and interest rates on the variables in the system. Comparatively, evidence from 
the situation seen in Figure 4.27 also confirms that interest rates are most likely to 
influence the variables in the system more than money supply.  
The response of the manufacturing growth rate to money supply growth rate shock has 
been positive for most of the impulse response functions for all the previous countries, 











However, it cannot be ruled out that the shock from money supply appears to be having 

































































Most of the oil producing countries appear to be concerned with controlling inflation in 
their economies. Libya is another country that has a very strict inflation rate policy. The 
monetary authorities in Libya attempt to control inflation, which partly explains why 
increases in private and government expenditure do not always influence the inflation 
rate (Ali and Harvie, 2013). This situation is observed in Figure 4.29 where the 
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However the effect of the inflation shock still shows a slight negative influence on 
manufacturing output growth. The falling movement becomes more conspicuous in 
period six. This confirms the negative influence of inflation shock on the growth of the 
manufacturing sector in Libya. 






The conspicuous responses of all variables in the model to an exchange rate shock as 
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According to Ali and Harvie (2013) the unrealistic pegging of the exchange rate in 
Libya has led to changes in the exchange rate five times within the last three decades. It 
was changed in 1980, 1985, 1990, 1999 and 2001. The changes became imperative as a 
result of a lack of competitiveness with other currencies in the foreign exchange market. 
This resulted in adverse effects on economic activity and created disturbances, causing 
economic instability whenever the exchange rate was adjusted (ADB 2012).  
 Manufacturing output responds by an initial rise as a result of the depreciation in the 
real value of the Libyan dinar. As the monetary authorities take action to maintain the 
fixed exchange rate, the depreciation is curtailed with the result that manufacturing 
output falls. That is, manufacturing output falls later as soon as the exchange rate is 
pegged again after adjustment. The same pattern of relationship is shown by the GDP 
growth rate. 
4.6.6.2 Variance decomposition analysis result on Libya 
Table 4.22: Variance decomposition of interest rates (Libya) 

















 3  1.183792  0.013720  96.15540  0.004331  0.003808  1.692284  0.016598  0.930062 
 6  1.424414  0.071582  88.59660  0.019396  0.053204  8.909521  0.091547  0.833732 
 9  1.555554  0.127297  81.32898  0.030932  0.113047  15.91612  0.167415  0.760660 
 12  1.618177  0.154952  77.68739  0.036435  0.141775  19.42529  0.206948  0.729027 
 
Table 4.22 shows the contributions of each shock in the model to the fluctuations in 
interest rates in Libya. As we noticed in our previous discussions, the oil price shock 
plays an important role in affecting interest rate variations in Libya. The contribution of 
the shock to interest rate fluctuations is very high compared to that of other shocks in 
the system, apart from exchange rates. However, the contribution of the exchange rate 
shock to interest rate fluctuations is a clear departure from what we have witnessed in 
most of the analyses done previously. Exchange rates here appear to be a key factor in 
influencing the rates of interest in Libya. The implication might not be unconnected 
with what has been discussed earlier. Libya is noted for practicing an unrealistic 
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pegging of its exchange rate. This has been affecting macroeconomic stability of the 
economy (ADB, 2010). In addition, the oil output growth rate shock seems not to have 
any significant influence on the behaviour on interest rates. Again, this refutes the claim 
that oil price shocks pass through oil output to affect economic policy in oil exporting 
countries.   
Just as we have observed in previous countries analysed, the contribution of the oil 
output growth rate shock to interest rate fluctuations is very weak. This further 
strengthens our position that shocks from the oil price are not likely to pass through the 
oil output growth rate to influence the MTM. 
Table 4.23: Variance decomposition of money supply (Libya) 

















 3  1.845489  0.630708  17.51214  2.300668  0.550180  76.39681  0.596379  0.167620 
 6  1.764798  0.653582  16.38847  0.867256  0.353093  79.19227  0.619149  0.161388 
 9  1.699479  0.679802  13.63002  0.682134  0.290562  82.23978  0.635800  0.142424 
 12  1.615468  0.694206  12.31713  0.664122  0.270165  83.68099  0.629818  0.128100 
 
The Libyan economy is offering another dimension to the role of exchange rates in the 
model. The exchange rate has a very weak role in most of the previous analyses but 
appears to be the shock that influences most variables in the MTM the most in Libya. 
Table 4.23 indicates that the exchange rate shock makes the highest contribution to 
money supply growth rate variations followed by the interest rate shock and oil price 
shock in that order.  
The reason again might not be unconnected with what has been explained previously. 
The unrealistic fixed exchange rate practiced in Libya constitutes a crucial disturbance 
to the overall economy as a whole. The monetary authority in Libya is always falling 
back on the monetary policy instruments to support the unrealistically fixed rate of 
exchange. This causes problems in the entire monetary policy transmission mechanism. 
The same outcome was noticed in Gabon where a fixed exchange rate is also practiced. 
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Just as we observed under the variance decomposition on interest rates, the contribution 
of oil output shock to the behaviour of money supply is also very low.  
Table 4.24: Variance decomposition of inflation rate (Libya) 

















 3  0.966507  0.005636  61.11702  0.635934  36.19676  0.600223  0.004208  0.473710 
 6  1.019812  0.031536  92.60114  0.106298  2.297842  3.110816  0.008727  0.823834 
 9  0.948129  0.037144  93.63641  0.059180  0.681754  3.787703  0.014345  0.835335 
 12  0.953705  0.031941  94.35862  0.053028  0.404822  3.343034  0.016623  0.838230 
 
Table 4.24 shows the contributions of each shock to fluctuations in inflation rates. The 
results show that the interest rate shock contributes the most to variations in the 
inflation rate, which is similar to the results obtained in the previous analysis. Again this 
underscores the importance of interest rates in the model. The dominance of the 
exchange rate shock among the shocks continues. It is second to the interest rate shock 
in its contribution to inflation rate variations. This finding is also a clear departure from 
our previous results. The oil price shock accounts for a very high proportion of the 
fluctuations in inflation rates after exchange rates and it appears that the effect of oil 
prices on inflation rate fluctuations is absorbed by the exchange rate and interest rates, 
thereby reducing the effect of the oil price shock and increasing the effect of the other 
two shocks. 
It also appears that the exchange rate creates a powerful disturbance when it is fixed, 
culminating in the incessant unstable behaviour of the monetary policy instruments. The 
same thing happens in the case of Gabon where a fixed exchange rate is practiced. 
Table 4.25: Variance decomposition of exchange rate (Libya) 

















 3  0.714311  0.783647  0.074215  0.040341  0.770807  96.65316  0.962738  0.000778 
 6  0.809505  0.776112  0.903281  0.047550  0.755791  95.73998  0.957266  0.010512 
 9  0.924902  0.755445  3.341308  0.053184  0.724440  93.22913  0.933972  0.037621 




A symbiotic relationship is noted between the monetary policy instruments, namely, 
interest rates and exchange rates. In the analysis of the contributions of various shocks 
to interest rates in Table 4.25, it was the exchange rate that had the highest contribution. 
Now, the highest contribution to exchange rate fluctuations is from interest rate shocks. 
This shows that in Libya, the interest rate and exchange rate have a considerable effect 
on each other. Although, not initially, but as the period progresses the oil price shocks 
however has a relatively high contribution to changes in the exchange rate. 
This result is similar to what has been found for other countries analysed in the previous 
sections. However, the relationship between interest rates and exchange rates iare 
stronger under fixed exchange rate regimes than it is under the flexible exchange rate 
regime. 
Table 4.26: Variance decomposition of manufacturing output growth (Libya) 

















 3  0.712950  0.190408  36.53174  0.208016  0.978220  16.60568  42.41003  2.362961 
 6  0.477003  0.772451  20.51692  0.372742  0.874647  64.67463  10.94096  1.370644 
 9  0.368704  0.688843  28.59296  0.350095  0.930008  59.95133  8.062153  1.055906 
 12  0.641346  0.466397  50.74537  0.289891  0.628813  40.80708  5.402371  1.018731 
 
It is observed from the beginning of the variance decomposition analysis of the Libyan 
economy, that the dominance of an oil price shock is relatively lower than that of an 
exchange rate shock. Again, the exchange rate shock constitutes the largest disturbance 
to the manufacturing output growth. Therefore, the behaviour of manufacturing output 
growth in Libya is mostly determined by the exchange rate shock and not the MPIs 
shocks as observed in the study of other countries especially Nigeria and Algeria. 
The shock from the oil price appears to be weakened by the fixed exchange rate in 
operation in Libya. This makes the exchange rate shock to account for the highest 




4.6.6.3 Inferences and comparisons with other empirical studies (Libya) 
Related literature on the Libyan economy is relatively scarce with the work of Ali and 
Harvie (2013) appearing to be the only study available. Firstly, this study confirms that 
oil prices have a great influence on the monetary policy transmission mechanism in 
Libya. This is similar to the findings of Ali and Harvie (2013). Again, as we have seen 
in most of the analyses done on other countries, oil output growth rate declines in 
response to an oil price shock, and the shock does not contribute significantly to the 
behaviour of the MPIs.  
Secondly, the Libyan economy appears to have a very distinctive feature which is 
different to other economies studied in the AOECs. This feature lies in the role of the 
exchange rate in the monetary policy transmission mechanism and its relationship with 
an oil price shock. In Libya, the exchange rate appears to have a very strong influence 
on the behaviour of the variables in the monetary policy transmission mechanism with 
the shock from the exchange rate having the highest influence on the output of the 
country. This is a result of the unrealistic exchange rate policy in operation in the 
country during the period under review. The fixed exchange rate practiced by the 
country within the past three decades has undergone different phases. In other words the 
pegging of the Libyan Dinar to the USD has been adjusted more than four times within 
the last three decades, causing disturbances to the domestic economic activities in the 
country (Ali and Harvie, 2013).The pegging would be adjusted whenever the monetary 
authorities in Libya noticed that the currency had lost competitiveness in the foreign 
exchange market. Most often these adjustments affect both the external reserve and 
monetary policy instruments in order to set another fixed nominal exchange rate. This 
had happened in 1980, 1986, 1990, 1999 and 2001 (IMF 2003). 
It was shown in the analysis that the response of the manufacturing output growth to the 
exchange rate shock has not been positive. In other words, a shock from the exchange 
rate negatively influences manufacturing output. These findings are similar to those of 
Ali and Harvie (2013) where they concluded that flexible exchange rates will likely 
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benefit the private sector in the Libyan economy more so than the fixed nominal 
exchange rate policy. They argue that a flexible nominal exchange rate will lead to an 
increase in domestic production in the real sector of the economy through an 
accumulation of human and physical capital stocks via importation of goods and 
services.  
The interest rate has also been shown to play a very important role in the monetary 
policy transmission mechanism in the Libyan economy. As with other countries, we 
noticed a sharp contemporaneous response from all variables in the model to the shock 
from the interest rate. Again, comparatively, the effect of the interest rate appears to be 
more dominant in the monetary policy transmission mechanism than money supply. 
However, similar to what we obtained in the Gabonese economy, the effect of the 
interest rate shock on the manufacturing sector has not been positive. An expansionary 
monetary policy also appears not to be having a conspicuous positive impact on 
manufacturing output growth. These findings are in line with Ali (2013), who found 
that interest rates might not play any significant positive role in economic activity in 
Libya. 
The effect of inflation shock on the monetary policy transmission mechanism (MTM) 
has been nearly neutral. In other words inflation rate shock appears to have no 
pronounced effect on the MTM in Libya. Nevertheless, from all the shocks considered, 
it was noted that inflation in Libya is not likely to be a monetary phenomenon, 
indicating that output and prices are the most likely cause of inflation in the country. 
Accordingly, inflation may likely be a structural phenomenon in Libya (see IMF, 2010; 
ADB, 2012). In addition, despite the lack of any conspicuous response to the inflation 
rate shock, it is noted in the analysis that whenever there is a slight increase in inflation, 
manufacturing output falls and vice versa. The IMF (2010) stresses that the priority 
given to the control of inflation in Libya by the monetary authority has led to the low 
inflation rate usually observed despite increases in government expenditure.    
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The behaviour of manufacturing output behaviour in the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism in Libya is dictated by the exchange rate. The study discovered that changes 
in the manufacturing output were mostly affected by exchange rate shocks. Again, 
previous analyses of other countries show that the shock from the oil price is passed 
through the interest rate and money supply growth rate to the manufacturing output 
growth rate. However, this seems not to be the case in Libya. Findings from our 
analysis have shown that the effect of the oil price shock is likely to have been passed 
through the exchange rate to the manufacturing output growth rate. This has affected the 
manufacturing sector output in Libya negatively (see Ali, 2013; Ali and Harvie, 2013). 
Generally, variables in the monetary policy transmission mechanism in Libya do not 
appear to have a favourable effect on manufacturing output. This might not be 
unconnected to the influence of the fixed exchange rate regime. It appears that the fixed 
exchange rate has incapacitated the two monetary policy instruments, namely interest 
rates and money supply, from influencing manufacturing output positively. The 
expansionary monetary policy fails to have a notable positive impact on output growth 
of the manufacturing sector. It should be noted that this is the same result obtained in 
the study of Gabon, which also practices a fixed exchange rate system.  
 
4.6.7   Structural VAR result analysis for Egypt 
Egypt is unique among the net oil exporters, in that the economy is more diversified 
than the others. The dominance of the oil sector is not as well pronounced as has been 
seen in the other countries analysed. Despite being an oil exporter, oil in Egypt 
contributed only 15 percent of the total GDP in 2011 and before the revolution. 






4.6.7.1 Impulse response function analysis on Egypt 
We commence by analysing responses of the monetary policy instruments and the 
manufacturing sector to oil price shocks.  Figure 4.31 shows the behaviour of variables 
in the model to a one standard deviation shock in the oil price. Generally, the responses 
of the variables to oil price shock are not significant. 
The oil price shock has a unique influence on oil output growth. Unlike other 
economies analysed, the oil output growth in Egypt responds positively to the oil price 
shock. The response is nonetheless insignificant. Generally, the responses from other 
variables indicate that they show mild responses to the oil price shock. Egypt is the only 
country apart from Gabon, where the oil price shock leads to a positive response of 
manufacturing output growth. This is an indication that the manufacturing sector in 
Egypt appears is very strong and not driven by fluctuations from the international oil 
market. It was noted from the oil price shock that contrary to what has been observed in 
previous analyses, oil output growth rises indicating that Egypt’s oil output can cope 
with sudden increases in global demands for oil. 
When compared to other economies examined in this study, the economy of Egypt is 
less dependent on oil, and implies a reduced adverse effect that might emanate from the 
oil price shock. From the previous discussion of the Egyptian economy, it was observed 
that contributions from manufacturing and other non-oil sectors to the country’s GDP 
are sometimes higher than contributions from the oil sector. This has somehow 
insulated the economy, especially the industrial sector, from fluctuations in the 














The responses from other variables have not been very pronounced. The impulse 
responses from other variables indicate that they are all insignificant. Therefore, oil 
price shock might not have any significant impact on the monetary policy transmission 
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Figure 4.32 shows the responses of all the variables to oil output growth rate shock are 
insignificant. Notwithstanding, the shock causes interest rates to rise steadily initially 
and later fall; and an inverse relationship is noted with money supply growth rate. 
Again, the oil output growth shock makes the manufacturing output growth rate also 
rise steadily. In the two shocks we have analysed for Egypt we find that the trend of a 
rise in manufacturing output growth in response to an oil price shock still continues, 
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appreciation. The GDP growth rate follows the pattern of response displayed by the 
manufacturing output growth to the oil output growth rate shock.  






The sharp responses from variables in the model to an interest rate shock observed in 
the previous analyses are not seen in Figure 4.33, which describes the impulse response 
functions to an interest rate shock in Egypt. The responses from the variables in the 
model are all insignificant. We, nonetheless, observe that there is a slight fall in the 
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steady fall as does the manufacturing sector growth. This again confirms the inverse 
relationship between interest rates and the output of the manufacturing sector. 
 Both money supply growth rate and inflation rate fail to show a definite pattern of 
movement. Again this is contrary to what was noticed in the previous analyses. It 
appears that the negative effect of an interest rate shock is more dominant in an 
economy that is heavily dependent on oil. 






Figure 4.34 shows impulse responses of variables to a one standard deviation shock in a 


























































steadily after remaining neutral for the first five periods. The exchange rate response 
remains positive, though insignificant, while the manufacturing output growth falls 
steadily in response to the shock from the money supply growth rate. GDP is also 
neutral although it appears to fall slowly from the second period. The money supply 
growth rate shock also causes the inflation rate to rise.  






This shows that inflation in Egypt is most likely to be a monetary phenomenon, 
although this cannot be stated with certainty following the insignificance of the impulse 
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output growth. This implies that when money supply is accompanied by a rise in the 
inflation rate in Egypt, the effect on the manufacturing sector output will be negative. 
Another reason that can be adduced for the negative response to the money supply 
shock might not be unconnected to Saleem’s(2013) belief that an increase in money 
supply growth rate to the Egyptian economy triggers competition among various non-
oil sectors in the economy. Construction and agriculture are examples of vibrant non-oil 
sectors separate from the manufacturing industry. Since there many productive 
activities money supply can be channelled to, it may not have significant impact on 
manufacturing sector. 
Inflation trends in Egypt have been effectively managed by the Central Bank of Egypt 
(CBE) over the years. The effect of this on economic activities has not been positive, 
although not pronounced due to priority given to the target set for inflation rate by the 
CBE. Virtually, all variables appear positive except the exchange rate that is negative in 
the impulse response analysis.  There is no obvious direction in the movement of 
manufacturing output growth. The GDP growth rate also remains positive.  
Figure 4.36 presents the impulse response functions to an exchange rate shock. We 
observe sharp impulse responses from all variables to the shock. In previous analyses, 
sharp impulse responses similar to these were recorded when analysing an interest rate 
shock. The implication is it appears that an oil exporting country that is less dependent 
on oil is possibly going to be affected by an exchange rate shock more than an interest 
rate shock and vice versa. 
Although Egypt practices a controlled floating exchange rate system, the effect of the 
exchange rate regime appears to be stronger on the economy because oil is not the only 











The export sector in Egypt is not dominated by the oil sector. The largest percentage of 
foreign exchange earnings come from the non-oil sector which is driven by 
manufacturing, construction and agriculture. Alwad (2010:p,12) states that “the diverse 
nature of export in Egypt makes it highly susceptible to fluctuations in the foreign 
exchange market”. 
It can be seen that the shock makes the interest rate fall and later rise while money 
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beginning and later falls resulting in inverse behaviour from the manufacturing output 
growth; that is it falls briefly and rises sharply later in response to the currency 
depreciation. The inflation that occurs here appears to be a monetary phenomenon as it 
follows the pattern of response of money supply to the exchange rate shock. When the 
money supply rises, inflation also rises and when money supply begins to fall inflation 
also starts falling.  
4.6.7.2 Variance decomposition analysis on Egypt  
Table 4.27: Variance decomposition of interest rate (Egypt) 

















 3  0.472949  0.818358  3.944936  0.000878  1.151935  92.60982  0.850918  0.150209 
 6  0.606193  0.877096  1.257450  0.001981  1.220712  95.10284  0.823581  0.110143 
 7  0.610369  0.883609  1.244819  0.006206  1.237927  95.10137  0.808583  0.107113 
 9  0.611672  0.882437  1.249028  0.028903  1.238229  95.05317  0.823389  0.113168 
 12  0.634803  0.865764  1.202530  0.116068  1.216488  94.97989  0.851280  0.133172 
 
Table 4.27 explains the contribution of each shock to the behaviour of interest rates as a 
monetary policy instrument. As observed in the impulse response analysis, the 
exchange rate shock contributes the highest percentage to the fluctuations in interest 
rates. This was not the situation in the study of Nigeria and Algeria. Inflation shock 
accounts for the second highest contribution to interest rate fluctuations. 
The implication of this is that interest rate behaviour in Egypt is mostly a response to 
exchange rate movements as against the oil price noticed in the in Nigeria, Algeria, 
Libya and Gabon. However, the inflation rate also appears to be playing a significant 
role in dictating the behaviour of interest rates in the Egyptian economy. Contrary to 
what has been noticed in previous analyses, the contribution to interest rate fluctuations 





Table 4.28: Variance decomposition of money supply growth rate (Egypt) 

















 3  2.882352  0.002558  0.123209  53.00414  1.217218  38.90868  0.061724  3.800115 
 6  4.058707  0.204024  0.229515  57.18929  1.757792  23.99649  0.238932  12.32525 
 9  3.426626  0.779179  0.089283  60.43908  1.646193  14.40817  1.878193  17.33329 
 12  1.834615  1.106545  0.096916  43.98007  1.062448  34.42860  3.035066  14.45575 
 
The dominance of the exchange rate in the monetary policy transmission mechanism in 
Egypt is also observed with the large influence it has on the money supply growth rate. 
Table 4.28 again shows that the exchange rate shock contributes the highest percentage 
to the fluctuations of money supply growth rate in Egypt. This means that the pattern of 
behaviour exhibited by the money supply is mostly determined by the exchange rate. It 
should be noted here that the price of oil plays an important role in determining the 
money supply growth, but not as high as the exchange rate. 
The effect of the oil price shock on the money supply as a monetary policy instrument is 
more pronounced than that of the interest rate. Inflation rate shock also contribute large 
shock to the money supply behaviour. This is an indication that the effect of the oil 
price on output of the manufacturing sector is likely to pass through the exchange rate 
and inflation rate.  In addition, in line with our previous findings, the oil price shock 
contributes more than the oil output growth shock to fluctuations in money supply.   
The result also shows that there is a strong linkage between money supply and GDP 
growth rate. It indicates that GDP fluctuations can have a very strong effect on the 
money supply growth rate in Egypt.   
Table 4.29: Variance decomposition of inflation rate (Egypt) 

















 3  0.026666  0.016867  0.308461  0.947655  76.87957  18.77488  2.348216  0.697681 
 6  1.396478  1.121560  1.106616  1.148199  59.90568  25.73016  9.127256  0.464052 
 9  1.217637  1.492078  0.440852  4.027084  20.18283  69.01982  2.902696  0.716999 





Table 4.29 shows that the inflation pattern in Egypt is mostly dictated by the exchange 
rate shock. The exchange rate shock accounts for the largest proportion of the 
fluctuations in inflation rates in Egypt. Money supply is another variable in the 
monetary policy transmission mechanism that plays a very important role in 
determining the level of inflation in Egypt. This affirms that inflation in Egypt is likely 
to be a monetary phenomenon. A strong linkage is also established between fluctuations 
in manufacturing output growth and inflation rate.  
The conclusion from the table is that the inflation rate in Egypt is mostly driven by 
shocks from the exchange rate and money supply growth rate. Unlike other countries 
studied in the previous sections, the dominance of the interest rate in determining 
inflation rates is weak in Egypt.  
Table 4.30: Variance decomposition of exchange rate (Egypt) 

















 3  0.707791  0.778798  0.077022  0.027127  0.798941  96.62677  0.976718  0.006834 
 6  0.715545  0.784927  0.132836  0.020220  0.817789  96.51526  0.990439  0.022986 
 9  0.713860  0.793649  0.154404  0.014230  0.830373  96.44662  1.005692  0.041175 
 12  0.707037  0.801226  0.160558  0.009597  0.836684  96.40000  1.025730  0.059164 
 
Oil price, oil output growth rate, as well as manufacturing output growth account for a 
relatively large proportion of the variations in exchange rates in Egypt. As indicated 
previously in our explanation, the Egyptian economy has a very strong non-oil sector 
which generates substantial export earnings. Again, oil output is also traded in foreign 
currency which explains the strong linkages with the exchange rate. This is shown in 
Table 4.30 where oil output and oil price shocks make the highest contribution to 
fluctuations in the exchange rate. Output from the manufacturing sector is also an 
important shock influencing the behaviour of the exchange rates in Egypt. 
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After, these two shocks, inflation rate shocks also appear to be another strong 
determinant of exchange rates in Egypt.   It should be noted that the two monetary 
policy instruments do not have a significant influence on the behaviour of exchange 
rates in Egypt.  
Table 4.31: Variance decomposition of manufacturing growth (Egypt) 

















 3  0.405075  0.266771  0.805301  0.235182  0.132586  77.95759  19.05568  1.141806 
 6  0.798552  0.394174  0.505786  0.319176  0.466422  90.63480  6.189068  0.692018 
 9  1.063597  0.376468  0.413912  0.985100  0.721682  91.65815  4.290301  0.490791 
 12  1.274926  0.359240  0.391845  2.846497  0.913037  89.24534  4.037134  0.931984 
 
Following the results obtained in the analysis of impulse response functions, 
manufacturing output growth rate is mostly influenced by the exchange rate shock. The 
results in Table 4.31 corroborate what has been observed so far about the dominance of 
the exchange rate in the monetary policy transmission mechanism and its effect on the 
manufacturing output in Egypt. The exchange rate shock appears to have overshadowed 
the contribution of all other shocks to manufacturing output fluctuations, making the 
behaviour of the manufacturing sector highly subject to the exchange rate shock. 
The oil price shock also affects the manufacturing sector but the influence goes through 
the exchange rate which also confirms what has been observed in the previous analyses. 
A very important conclusion that can be drawn from the variance decomposition 
analysis on Egypt is the finding that the exchange rate is the most important factor that 
influences the structure of the monetary policy transmission mechanism in the country. 







4.6.7.3 Inferences and comparisons with other empirical studies (Egypt) 
A number of studies have been carried out on the relationship between oil price, 
monetary policy and economic activity in Egypt. However, none of them has assessed 
the behaviour of the manufacturing sector in the relationship. Saleem (2013), Mabrouk 
and Hassan (2012) have analysed monetary policy and economic activity in the context 
of oil price shocks. These two studies form our major reference literature from which 
our inferences will are drawn. Reports of the African Development Bank (2011) and 
IMF (2012) will be useful as a basis of the comparative discussion. 
Firstly, a major inference that can be drawn from our analysis on the Egyptian economy 
is that oil price shocks have a very limited effect on the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism. It should be noted that this is a departure from what has been observed in 
the study of Nigeria, Algeria, Libya and Gabon. This is an indication that the 
dominance of the oil sector noticed in the economies assessed previously is not evident 
in the Egyptian economy. This is similar to the findings of Mabrouk and Hassan (2012) 
who concluded that since the non-oil sector is more dominant in the Egyptian economy, 
oil shocks have relatively little effect on the economy when compared to other oil 
exporting economies in Africa. 
Secondly, the response of the oil output growth to the shock from oil price, which 
usually makes the oil output of the countries examined earlier to fall, is not the same in 
the Egyptian economy. The oil price shock fails to have an initial negative impact on 
the growth rate of oil output as Egypt unlike other AOECs is not heavily dependent on 
oil. Therefore, the country does not find it difficult to cope with any oil price shocks. In 
addition, since the oil price shock doesn’t have a significant influence on the MTM and 
output, the impact of the shock from oil output growth rate is also weak in the system. 
This also follows on what has been obtained in the countries that have been studied 
previously.   
The study also finds that previously the exchange rate is a major disturbance to the 
monetary policy transmission mechanism in Egypt. Both the impulse response analysis 
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and variance decomposition have shown that the exchange rate is a dominant shock that 
influences the behaviour of monetary policy instruments. The shocks from the exchange 
rate are the major factors that explain the behaviour of the two monetary policy 
instruments in Egypt. The controlled floating exchange rate system in operation in 
Egypt has been dictating the pace of the economy for the past three decades (see 
Saleem, 2013). 
After the exchange rate, inflation rate is another major factor that the monetary 
authorities respond to through monetary policy instruments in Egypt. Inflation rate 
shocks have a very strong linkage with the money supply and interest rates but the 
relationship with money supply appears to be stronger than with interest rates. This 
makes the nature of inflation in Egypt different from what we found in most of the 
AOECs examined. The type of inflation in Egypt appears to be more of a monetary than 
structural phenomenon. The implication is that money supply growth rates in the 
Egyptian economy may be inflationary. It is apparent from the impulse response 
analysis that an increase in money supply often leads to an increase in inflation rates 
and vice versa. 
Findings from this study have shown that the exchange rate is a very important factor 
determining the pace of economic activities in Egypt. The sharp responses from all 
variables in the system to the exchange rate shock in the impulse response analysis are 
pointers to this fact. The controlled nominal exchange rate regime in operation in Egypt 
has a strong effect on the behaviour of the macroeconomic variables including monetary 
policy instruments (see Saleem, 2013; Mabrouk and Hassan, 2012). It appears that the 
reason for this is the fact that the economy is relatively more diversified than other 
AOECs. According to Saleem (2013) Egypt, apart from oil, exports many non-oil 
products ranging from manufacturing and agricultural products making the structure 
and nature of exports in the economy more diversified. The more diversified the nature 
of export, the more the influence of the exchange rate on the performance of the 
economy (see ADB, 2011; IMF, 2012). This means that unlike other AOECs, the 
exchange rate affects a variety of products apart from oil in Egypt. 
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The manufacturing sector in Egypt is relatively large and more vibrant than the 
manufacturing sector of other AOECs. This characteristic makes the response of the 
sector to external shocks different from other AOECs. The oil price shock, which is one 
of the major shocks affecting output growth of the manufacturing sector in Nigeria, 
Algeria and Libya does not have such an effect on the output of the manufacturing 
sector in Egypt. From the earlier discussion, it is obvious that the sector is mostly 
affected by the exchange rate and inflation rate. Since manufacture export is a major 
portion of the total export volume in Egypt, the influence of the exchange rate on the 
sector is understandable. This is a clear departure from what has been observed in other 
countries where they do not have sufficient manufactured goods for domestic 
consumption. Of importance here is that the direct impact of monetary policy 
instruments on manufacturing output growth, especially interest rates as observed in 
other AOECs, is not present in Egypt. This effect might have been largely transmitted to 
the manufacturing sector through the exchange rate. 
4.6.8   Tabular comparative analysis of findings from the five AOECs 
Tables 4.32 to 4.35 summarize and compare the findings from the sample of countries 
included in this study. The tables are divided into four, based on the major sub divisions 
in the model, namely, oil, monetary policy instruments (MPIs), policy variables and the 
monetary policy goals. 
Table 4.32: Comparison of oil price and oil output growth rate shocks 
Countries Oil price shocks Oil output growth 
rate shocks 
Inferences 
Nigeria Sharp responses from 
all variables.Oil output 
falls, interest rates fall, 
money supply rises, 
currency appreciates 
and manufacturing 
output falls initially but 
Sharp responses from 
all variables; follows the 
same pattern as in oil 
price shocks; and 
manufacturing output 
rises briefly and later 
falls sharply. They 
MPIs are the medium 





later rises sluggishly 
and remains negative. 
The shocks make a 
large contribution to 
variations in MPIs and 
manufacturing output. 
contribute little to 
variations in MPIs 
Algeria Sharp and distinctive 
responses from the 
variables. Oil output 
growth rate falls, 
interest rates fall but 
rise later, money supply 
falls sharply and 
inflation rises. 
Exchange rate 
sluggishly falls and 
manufacturing output as 
well as GDP growth 
rate falls steadily. The 
shocks make a large 
contribution to 
fluctuations in MPIs. 
Sharp and conspicuous 
responses from all the 
variables causing 
interest rates to fall, 
money supply to rise, 
inflation to increase and 
exchange ratesto fall 
and later to rise slowly. 
The manufacturing 
output and GDP growth 
rate fall sharply. The 
shock accounts for a 
small proportion of the 
variations in MPIs, 
especially interest rate. 
Growth rate of output 
also responds negatively 
to oil price shocks just 
as observed in the case 
of Nigeria. The oil price 
has a higher effect on 
MPIs and influences the 
manufacturing sector 
through them. Generally 
manufacturing output 
appears to be negatively 
affected. 
Libya Sharp and conspicuous 
responses from all 
variables except the 
exchange rate. Oil 
output growth rate falls. 
Interest rates fall and 
money supply rises; 
inflation rises; and the 
manufacturing output 
falls. Oil price and 
exchange rate shocks 
makes the highest 
contribution to 
There are no distinctive 
responses from the 
variables. 
Manufacturing output 
falls though not 
conspicuously. The 
shock has very little 
influence on the MPIs 
Generally, oil price is a 
very important shock 
affecting manufacturing 
output. The fixed 
exchange rate system 
makes the exchange rate 
another dominant factor 
that influences the MPIs 
in Libya. The general 
effects of the two 
shocks do not have 




variations in MPIs  
Egypt No sharp or distinctive 
responses from the 
variables. All 
movements are very 
close to the origin and 
insignificant. The oil 
output rises steadily. 
Interest rates rise, 
money supply falls, 
exchange rate falls and 
manufacturing output 
rises steadily. The 
shocks make a small 
contribution to 
variations in most 
variables except money 
supply. The shocks 
generally do not 
influence the MPIs 
much. 
The shocks share the 
same influence on the 
variables in the model 
as the oil price shocks. 
However, some of the 
variables show 
distinctive responses to 
it. Interest rates appear 
to rise and fall, money 
supply moves in the 
opposite direction and 
inflation rates start 
picking up in the middle 
of the sample period. 
Exchange rates fall and 
manufacturing output 
growth falls steadily.   
The influence of oil 
price shocks is very 
limited. The oil output 
appears to have more 
influence than oil prices 
but it is also not 
significant. Generally, 
the behaviour of the 
manufacturing output 
has been positive under 
oil price shocks. This 
shows that the oil price 
shocks are not likely to 
be affecting the 
manufacturing output 
negatively. 
Gabon Sharp and very definite 
responses from all the 
variables in the system. 
Oil output falls initially 
and picks up later, 
interest rates fall, 
money supply falls, 
inflation rates rise 
steadily, real exchange 
rates fall and later rises 
and manufacturing 
output picks up. Oil 
price shocks makes the 
highest contribution to 
Sharp but not distinctive 
responses from the 
variables. Interest rates 
rise, money supply falls, 
real exchange rate 
appears to be relatively 
stable, and 
manufacturing output 
rises and falls but the 
responses are not 
distinctive. The Shocks 
account for a small 
proportion of the 
fluctuations in MPIs and 
An oil price shock has a 
pronounced effect on 
the behaviour of the 
MPIs and generally 
affects the whole MTM. 
It appears that the effect 
on the manufacturing 
output passes through 
the MPIs. Generally the 




variations in MPIs, 
inflation rates, exchange 
rate and the 




Table 4.33: Comparison of monetary policy instruments (MPI) shocks 
Countries Interest rate shock Money supply growth rate 
shock 
Inferences 
Nigeria Very sharp responses 
from all the variables. 
Money supply falls, 
inflation rises and 
manufacturing output 
falls. The shock makes 
the highest contribution 
to money supply and 
manufacturing output 
fluctuations. 
Sharp responses from all variables. 
Inflation falls, exchange rates rise 
(currency depreciates) and 
manufacturing output rises steadily. 
The shock accounts for a large 
proportion of variations in inflation 
and exchange rates. 
It is observed that the two MPIs 
are important tools for 
controlling output of the 
manufacturing sector but are 
often affected by oil price 
shocks. Money supply shocks 
appear to have a positive effect 
on manufacturing output. 
Algeria Very sharp and 
distinctive response from 
the variables in the 
model. Money supply 
rises while inflation and 
exchange rates fall. 
Manufacturing output 
falls and later rises 
sharply. GDP growth 
rate also follows the 
same path. The shock 
contributes the most to 
variations of all variables 
There are no sharp and distinctive 
responses from all variables but 
inflation rates appear to fall initially 
and rise steadily later. The exchange 
rate did not show a conspicuous 
pattern of movement, manufacturing 
output appears to fall steadily and 
GDP growth rate takes a downturn. 
The shock makes a relatively small 
contribution to variations of moat 
variables in the model.  
The MPIs appear to make large 
contributions to the fluctuations 
of output levels in Algeria. 
Interest rates especially appear 
to be a stronger tool in 




in the model. 
Libya Sharp and distinct 
responses from all 
variables. Money supply 
rises briefly and later 
falls sharply, inflation 
rate falls, the real 
exchange rate rises and 
manufacturing output 
rises initially and later 
falls sharply. GDP 
growth rate also follows 
the same pattern of 
movement. Jointly with 
the exchange rate, it 
contributes the highest to 
the variations in money 
supply growth rate and 
inflation rate  
Not very distinctive responses as most 
of the variables are insignificant. A 
little rise in the manufacturing output 
is noticed, nonetheless. The shock 
makes a small contribution to the 
variations of the variables in the 
model including manufacturing 
output. 
It can be inferred from the 
findings that interest rates and 
exchange rates are dominant 
factors affecting manufacturing 
output. Money supply seems 
not to be playing any significant 
role in the determination of the 
behaviour of the variables 
including inflation rates. 
Currency depreciation appears 
to have a positive impact on 
output of the manufacturing 
sector. Generally, the MPIs’ 
shocks do not have a positive 
impact on manufacturing 
output. 
Egypt There are no distinctive 
sharp responses from the 
variables. There are no 
clear responses from the 
variables; they are all 
insignificant. However, 
it appears that the 
exchange rate rises and 
manufacturing output 
only rises slowly when 
the exchange rate falls. 
The shock does not make 
any significant 
contribution to the 
variations in 
manufacturing output 
The responses here are clearer than 
those from an interest rate shock. 
Inflation rises and manufacturing 
output falls steadily after an initial 
rise. The shock from money supply 
appears not to have a positive 
influence on the output growth of the 
manufacturing sector. It contributes a 
large proportion to the fluctuations of 
inflation rates and manufacturing 
output growth. 
On comparative grounds it 
appears that money supply as a 
tool of monetary policy is more 
effective than interest rates.  
MPIs, especially money supply, 
have a significant effect on 




and other variables in the 
system.  
Gabon Sharp and definite 
responses from the 
variables. Money supply 
rises steadily and 
inflation falls. The real 
exchange rate rises 
sharply, while the 
manufacturing output 
rises initially and later 
falls sharply, a path that 
is also followed by GDP 
growth rate. The shock 
makes a large 
contribution to variations 
in money supply, 
inflation rates, exchange 
rates and manufacturing 
output. 
Sharp and definite responses from all 
variables. Interest rates fall, inflation 
rates fall, exchange rates fall, 
manufacturing output rises briefly and 
later falls sharply and GDP growth 
rate falls sharply. The shock makes a 
large contribution to fluctuations in 
interest rates, exchange rates, inflation 
rates and manufacturing output.  
Generally, the MPIs’ shocks 
have a great influence on the 
MTM.. It appears that the effect 
of the oil price shock passes 
through the MPIs to the 
manufacturing output as well as 
GDP growth rate. However, the 
impact of MPIs’ shocks is not 
positive on manufacturing 
output.  Expansionary monetary 
policy appears not to be 
effective in promoting output 
 
Table 4.34: Comparison of policy variables shocks 
Countries Inflation rate shock Exchange rate shock Inferences 
Nigeria Sharp responses from all 
variable. Interest rates rise 
and money supply falls, 
exchange rates fall and 
manufacturing output falls. 
The shock makes a large 
contribution to the variations 
in  exchange rates. 
There are no distinctive 
responses from any of the 
variables. Interest rates rise 
sluggishly, money supply 
falls steadily and the effect on 
manufacturing output as well 
as GDP growth rate is not 
significantly positive. The 
shock makes an insignificant 
contribution to fluctuations of 
It is observed that 
inflation rates are likely 
to affect manufacturing 
output more than 
exchange rates. The 
nature of inflation in 
Nigeria is both 




the MPIs  
Algeria There are no distinctive 
responses from the variables. 
However, manufacturing 
output shows a negative 
response to the shock. The 
shock generally makes a 
small contribution to the 
variations of the variables in 
the system except 
manufacturing output, where 
the contribution of the shock 
is relatively high. 
The responses of the 
variables are relatively mild. 
Mostly, they all (including 
manufacturing output) react 
negatively to the shock. The 
shock makes a small 
contribution to fluctuations in 
the variables of the model 
It appears that both 
inflation and exchange 
rate polices in Algeria 
are effective because 
they do not constitute 
too much disturbance to 
the system. However, 
they don’t seem to have 
a positive influence on 
the manufacturing 
output growth. In 
addition, most of the 
inflation rate behaviour 
indicates that inflation 
in Algeria is likely to be 
caused by structural 
rigidities of the 
economy. 
Libya No conspicuous dimension of 
responses from the variables. 
The impulse response 
functions of almost all the 
variables are insignificant, 
although it appears that 
manufacturing output 
responds negatively to the 
inflation rate shock. The 
shock makes a small 
contribution to fluctuations in 
the variables of the model. 
Sharp and distinctive 
responses from most 
variables. The shock causes 
both interest rates and money 
supply to rise sharply. 
Inflation rates also rise. 
Manufacturing output rises 
initially and later begins to 
fall sharply. GDP growth rate 
also follows the same pattern. 
The shock contributes the 
highest proportion of the 
variations in  MPIs as well as 
the manufacturing growth 
rate. 
The exchange rate 
shock appears to pose a 
significant disturbance 
in the Libya economy. It 
is one of the variables 
that dictate the 
operations of the MTM. 
It has a very significant 
effect on manufacturing 
output, although the 
effect appears not to be 
generally positive. We 
also observe that 
inflation in Libya is 




Egypt Impulse responses from the 
variables in the model do not 
show any definite direction. 
They are mostly insignificant. 
We nonetheless observe a 
slight fall in exchange rates, 
which make the 
manufacturing output rise 
steadily. The inflation shock 
affects the MPIs but the 
impact is small compared to 
that of the exchange rate 
shock. The inflation shock 
has a strong linkage with 
money supply 
Very sharp responses from all 
the variables. It causes 
interest rates to rise after an 
initial fall, money supply 
follows in the opposite 
direction, inflation rate fall 
and manufacturing output 
growth rate falls initially and 
later rises sharply as a result 
of the currency depreciation. 
The GDP growth rate falls 
sharply. The shock makes the 
highest contribution to 
fluctuations in all variables in 
the MTM.  
The exchange rate 
shock is a major shock 
to the MTM and the 
behaviour of 
manufacturing output in 
Egypt. However, it does 
not have a favourable 
impact on the growth of 
the manufacturing 
sector. It follows the 
usual pattern that 
overvaluation of 
currency may be 
inimical to the growth 
of the manufacturing 
sector. Inflation also 
appears to be a 
monetary phenomenon 
Gabon Not very distinct responses. 
However, the inflation shock 
does affect output growth of 
the manufacturing sector 
negatively. The shock makes 
a relatively large contribution 
to variations in  exchange rate 
variations (in comparison to 
MPI and oil price shocks) and 
a small contribution to 
variations in the MPIs. 
There are no sharp or 
distinctive responses from the 
variables. The exchange rate 
shock accounts for a very 
small proportion of the 
fluctuations in the MPIs and 
other variables in the model, 
since the country has adpted a 
fixed exchange rate regime.  
The fixed nominal 
exchange rate practice 
reduces the influence of 
its shock on the MPIs 
and the outputs. Despite 
this, the inflation shock 
appears to be stronger 
and it is mostly 
structural in nature. 
 
Table 4.35: Comparison of the output behaviours 
Countries Manufacturing output 
growth 
GDP growth rate Inferences 
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Nigeria Generally manufacturing output  
is mostly influenced by the MPIs 
and oil price shocks. However, 
expansionary monetary policy 
has a significant positive impact 
on manufacturing output. 
For the most part of the 
analysis it follows the 
same pattern of behaviour 
as manufacturing output 
growth. It is mostly 
influenced by MPIs and 
oil output growth rate. 
The implication of the 
results for the Nigerian 
economy is that the 
manufacturing output is 
highly susceptible to oil 
price fluctuations. The 
sector can also be 
influenced by the MPIs. 
However, there is 
evidence that money 
supply can promote the 
growth of the 
manufacturing sector. 
Algeria Mostly influenced by interest 
rates, inflation rates and oil price 
shocks. Both inflation and oil 
price manufacturing output 
growth negatively. The MPIs 
shocks have a positive impact on 
the output growth of the 
manufacturing sector. 
In most of the analysis, 
the pattern of behaviour 
of GDP growth rate in 
response to all shocks is 
almost the same except in 
a few cases. It is mostly 
influenced by the oil 
output growth rate and 
inflation rates. 
Both manufacturing 
output growth and GDP 
growth rate follow the 
same pattern of 
behaviour. Both are 
mostly affected by oil 
prices, oil output, 
inflation and interest 
rates. Expansionary 
monetary policy also 
has a positive impact on 
the growth of 
manufacturing output. 
Libya Interest rates, exchange rates and 
oil price shocks are major factors 
determining the behaviour of 
manufacturing output. Generally, 
the behaviour of manufacturing 
output has not been positive. It 
only showed a brief positive 
response to exchange rate shocks 
before falling sharply. 
The variable has been 
following the pattern of 
behaviour of 
manufacturing output. It 
is mostly affected by 
exchange rate and oil 
output growth. However, 
at times it has a more 
sustained positive 
The two output 
measures are highly 
influenced by interest 
rates, exchange rates 
and oil price shocks. 
Often, interest rates, 
exchange rates and oil 
price shocks  do not 
have a positive 
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Manufacturing output growth 
responds negatively to the MPIs 
shocks. 




influence on them. 
Notwithstanding this, 
manufacturing output is 
negatively affected by 
the MPIs shocks. 
Expansionary monetary 
policy does not seem to 
promote output growth  
Egypt Manufacturing output has been 
mostly affected by the exchange 
rate shock. Generally, on 
comparative grounds, the 
behaviour of manufacturing 
output is more positive than 
negative in all the shocks 
considered. Its behavious, 
however,  is also influenced by 
money supply and inflation rates. 
GDP growth rate has 
followed the pattern of 
behaviour exhibited by 
manufacturing output. 
There has been no 
distinct difference in the 
reaction of either to 
different shocks. 
It can be deduced from 
these findings that 
output which includes 
both manufacturing and 
GDP growth rate is 
mostly influenced by the 
exchange rate. The 
MPIs, especially money 
supply appear to be 
another factor that 
drives output growth in 
the economy.  
Gabon Manufacturing output growth has 
not been positive in all the 
impulse responses considered. 
Notwithstanding, MPIs and oil 
price shocks are the most 
important shocks affecting the 
growth of the manufacturing 
sector. Manufacturing output 
growth has been generally 
sluggish. The MPIs’ shocks do 
not have a positive impact on this 
variable. 
GDP growth rate displays 
almost a similar pattern 
of behaviour like 
manufacturing output 
growth except in a few 
instances where it reacts 
positively while 
manufacturing output 
responds otherwise. The 
variable is negatively 
influenced by the MPIs, 
oil prices and oil output 
growth rate. 
The MPIs and oil prices 
are dominant factors 
affecting output 
generally in Gabon. Oil 
output growth also 
affects GDP growth 
rate. Manufacturing 
output has not fared well 
under most of the 
shocks examined. It is 
also observed that 
expansionary monetary 
policy does not promote 




4.6.8.1    Discussions of the tables 
Nigeria, Algeria and Libya are the largest net oil exporters in Africa and they can be 
used as case studies for oil exporting countries in Africa. Notwithstanding, this study 
opines that their behaviour to oil price shocks might be different from other countries 
who do not produce as much oil as these three do. Therefore we included Gabon, a 
smaller net oil exporter in Africa. We also included Egypt, which falls in the middle 
stratum of net oil exporters in Africa. The interesting aspect of the study is that all the 
small net oil exporting countries, that is those exporting below 500,000 barrels of oil per 
day (OPEC, 2010), belong to the same monetary zone, the Central African Economic 
and Monetary Union (CEMAC) (CommunauteEconomiqueet Monetairede l’ 
AfriqueCentrale). Members of CEMAC include Chad, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, 
Cameroun and Congo. These countries practice a unified monetary system controlled by 
one central bank and oil contributes more than 50 percent of their GDP. Therefore this 
underscores the suitability of Gabon as a representative of the small net oil exporters in 
Africa. 
Firstly, in Table 4.32, we summarised the impulse response analysis regarding the 
reaction of the monetary policy instruments (MPIs), the manufacturing sector and other 
variables to oil price shocks in the monetary policy transmission mechanism (MTM). It 
appears that except for Egypt all the five countries share similar experiences. The oil 
price shock depresses oil output growth rate. The latter later gradually recovers. In 
Nigeria, Algeria, Libya and Gabon, the oil price shock has a significant effect on the 
behaviour of the MPIs, but comparatively, the shock affects interest rate more than 
money supply. However, the influence of oil price shocks on the MPIs in the monetary 
policy transmission mechanism (MTM), causes manufacturing output growth to 
respond sluggishly to the shock or sometimes negatively. Egypt does not share this kind 
of response because it has a relatively developed manufacturing sector which lessens 
dependence on oil as a major source of revenue. In 2007, the manufacturing sector 
contributed 17percent to GDP, while the oil sector contributed 15.5percent (see World 
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Bank, 2010). It appears that the more developed the manufacturing sector of an oil 
exporting country is,the less the effect of oil price shock on it. 
An oil price shock does not substantially influence the behaviour of the MPIs much in 
the MTM in Egypt as with other countries. This has to do with the fact that the economy 
is more diversified than other AOECs. According to Mordi and Adebiyi (2010) 
macroeconomic variables are less prone to the disturbance of oil price shocks when an 
oil exporting country is diversified. This also shows that the more diversified an oil 
exporting country is, the less the influence of an oil price shock on the MPIs and the 
entire MTM. Therefore, interest rates and money supply in these countries, apart from 
Egypt, are more prone to fluctuations in the global oil price. 
Oil output growth shocks fail to have a significant effect on the MPIs. In all the 
countries studied, the contribution of the oil price shocks to the behaviour of the MPIs is 
much higher than that of oil output growth rate shock. This contradicts Berumentet. al., 
(2004), who maintains that the effect of the oil price shock on economic policies in an 
oil exporting country is transmitted through the quantity of oil output supplied to the 
global oil market. Therefore, there is an indication that for the AOECs, the oil price 
shock has a direct effect on their economic policies without necessarily passing through 
their oil output growth rate.  
Secondly, we examine the effectiveness of the MPIs and their influence on the 
manufacturing output of the AOECs. As indicated in Table 4.33, virtually all the five 
countries’ MPIs are dominant in affecting the nature of the MTM and dictating the 
behaviour of manufacturing output. Comparatively, interest rate shocks appear to have 
more influence in the MTMs of Nigeria, Algeria, Libya and Gabon. In Egypt, on the 
other hand, money supply appears to have more influence on manufacturing output than 
interest rate in the MTM.  
Thirdly, the role of inflation in all the countries appears to be the same. Inflation mostly 
shows an inverse relationship throughout with the growth of manufacturing output. 
Table 4.34 reveals that this study supports the economic theory that inflation may 
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adversely affect production. The effect of an inflation shock is not generally 
pronounced on the MPIs and the manufacturing output in the countries where a fixed 
exchange rate is practiced, especially Libya and Gabon. Algeria also falls in this 
category though it practices a controlled floating exchange rate. It is common in the 
three countries that the effect of inflation shock is put under check because they have a 
very strong inflation monetary policy. Since they practise rigid exchange rate system, 
the Central Banks of these countries are more concerned with achieving low inflation 
rates.  
It was noted in past empirical studies that even when government expenditure increases 
in these countries, it does not affect the inflation rate (see ADB 2010; IMF 2012). The 
nature of inflation observed in these three countries is more structural than monetary. 
The type of inflation that occurs is as a result of imbalances between output and prices, 
or imported inflation, but not as a result of an increase in money supply.  
Nigeria and Egypt share almost a similar pattern of inflation. Inflation appears to have a 
relatively high effect on output and MPIs in the two countries. This might not be 
unconnected with the controlled floating exchange rate regime in operation in these two 
countries. Their own floating exchange rate does not stipulate minimum or maximum 
ranges, as the case of Algeria where a controlled flexible exchange rate is practiced. The 
inflation in the two countries is more of monetary than structural in nature. 
The role of an exchange rate shock in the MTM and its influence on manufacturing 
sector growth as shown in Table 4.34 is diverse across the countries. It is observed in 
this study that the two factors that determine the influence of an exchange rate shock are 
developments in the manufacturing sector and exchange rate policy in practice. An 
exchange rate shock appears to have a minimal effect on MPIs and manufacturing 
output in Nigeria and Algeria, countries that practice a controlled floating exchange 
rate. The manufacturing sector in both countries is underdeveloped. Since the exchange 
rate is floating, MPIs are easily manipulated and adjust to changes with ease hence it is 
least affected by exchange rate shock. In addition, since they do not export many 
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manufactured goods, the exchange rate is not likely to have a large effect on the output 
of the manufacturing sectors of the two countries. 
The effect of an exchange rate shock on both MPIs and the growth of manufacturing 
output in Libya is very strong. This might not be unconnected with the fixed exchange 
rate system in practice in the country. Findings reported in Table 4.34 indicate that 
generally, the exchange rate has a very high impact on the nature of the MTM. The 
reason for this might not be unconnected with the fixed exchange rate system in practice 
which is often subjected to changes. The fixed nominal exchange rate has been pegged 
more than four different times within the last three decades in 1980, 1985, 1990, 1999 
and 2001(see Ali and Harvie, 2013). This pegging has affected the behaviour of the 
MPIs and output of the manufacturing sector. In Gabon, an exchange rate shock has 
little influence on the MTM, and manufacturing output in particular. The real exchange 
rate in the country is mostly affected by the MPIs. Gabon’s monetary authorities usually 
fall back on the country’s external reserves to maintain its nominal exchange rate and 
use MPIs to achieve domestic economic stability.  
Therefore Gabon still maintains the fixed nominal exchange rate without changing the 
peg. This is in contrast to Libya where the exchange rate is pegged at a different rate 
whenever it loses competition in the foreign exchange market. However, it appears that 
MPIs are affected more under the fixed nominal exchange rate system than under the 
floating exchange rate system, rendering them powerless in promoting output growth of 
the manufacturing sector in fixed exchange rate practicing countries. 
In addition, for most part of the study, it is noted that whenever an oil price shock 
causes an exchange rate to appreciate, it leads to a fall in the growth of manufacturing 
output. This is another confirmation of the existence of Dutch Disease in the AOECs. It 
is observed that the increase in the oil price leads to an increase in the money stock and 
consequently pushes up domestic prices of the manufactured goods and other 
tradable/consumable goods, causing the currency to appreciate. This leads to a fall in 
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output of the manufacturing sector (exchange rate effect of Dutch Disease)(see 
Bhattacharya and Ghura,2006). 
Egypt’s economy is more diversified than other AOECs, where aoart from oil 
manufacturing output constitutes a major foreign exchange earning source. 
Accordingly, there is a relatively high impact of the exchange rate on output and the 
MPIs. Total exports from Egypt are composed of agricultural, manufacturing and oil 
products. With many goods being traded in the international market, a greater effect is 
felt following an exchange rate shock than in other countries practicing a controlled 
floating exchange rate. 
Finally, Table 4.35 compares the behaviour of output in the five economies. It is 
common to all the five countries that manufacturing output growth is affected by at least 
one of the MPIs’ shocks (interest rate shock or money supply growth rate shock). In 
addition, oil price shock constitutes a major shock influencing the pattern of 
manufacturing output growth in four out of the five countries, namely Nigeria, Algeria, 
Libya and Gabon. It should be noted that these are the countries where the economies 
depend primarily on oil. Egypt’s manufacturing output growth is not significantly 
influenced by oil price shocks but by money supply and exchange rates. The exchange 
rate also plays an important role in determining the direction of manufacturing output 
for both Libya and Egypt.  
In addition, the MPIs appear to have a positive effect on output in the countries that 
practice a floating exchange rate. The results further show that an expansionary 
monetary policy does not have a positive impact on manufacturing output in Gabon and 
Libya, which are the two countries that practice a fixed exchange rate. This is in line 
with the Mundel-Fleming model and other studies that have demonstrated that MPIs are 
ineffective in stimulating output in a fixed exchange rate system (see Yiqing, 2006; 




4.7   Conclusions 
With the exception of Egypt, it can be concluded from this study that the oil price has a 
large impact on the oil output growth of these countries. It is observed that the oil price 
shocks have a negative effect on the manufacturing sector of the AOECs. In the same 
vein, the study has also confirmed the effect of oil price shocks on the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism in the AOECs. The monetary policy instruments (MPIs) i.e 
both interest rates and money supply, are strongly affected by the shock from oil prices, 
as are inflation and exchange rates. 
Generally, it is common to all countries examined that oil price shocks lead to currency 
appreciation. This is very conspicuous in Nigeria, Algeria, Gabon and Libya. In all 
these countries, the oil price shocks lead to an exchange rate fall, which is synonymous 
with currency appreciation. In all, the resultant effect on manufacturing output has been 
negative. 
The study has also refuted the claim of Berument etal., (2009) that the oil price shock 
affects economic policies of oil rich countries through the output they contribute or 
supply to the global oil market. It is evident from the findings of this study that the oil 
price affects the monetary policy transmission mechanism directly without passing 
through the oil output growth rate as claimed by Berument etal., (2004). This might not 
be unconnected with the fact that most of the AOECs are relatively open and as such, 
they are highly susceptible to external shocks without the need of any intermediary to 
transmit the effect of the shock to the economy. 
The study has also established the effectiveness of the MPIs in the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism. Both interest rates and money supply are found to be effective 
tools of monetary policy in that they can be used to influence output growth of the 
manufacturing sector. It is evident that the effects of an oil price shock are transmitted 
to manufacturing output through the monetary policy instruments (MPIs). However, 
interest rate shocks appear to have a negative effect on the manufacturing output 
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growth, while a money supply shock appears to have a positive effect, especially in the 
other four countries, with the exception of Egypt. 
This study has also supported the need for an improvement in investments in the 
manufacturing sector as a panacea for the negative effect of the oil price shocks (see 
Ismail 2010). Egypt, which is the only country among the AOECs with a relatively high 
investment in the manufacturing sector, is the only country that is not negatively 
affected by oil price shocks. In other words, the more capital intensive the 
manufacturing sector is, the more the output and the more the sector is insulated against 
the oil price shocks. 
The study further finds that inflation often acts as a disincentive to output growth in the 
AOECs. For the most part of the analysis, manufacturing output and inflation rate move 
in opposing directions. It is also observed that the inflation in the AOECs that practice a 
fixed exchange rate is more of a structural than a monetary phenomenon. That is, 
inflation in these countries is largely as a result of imbalances between price and output 
or it is imported. According to Ali and Harvie (2013), a fixed nominal exchange rate 
often leads to high domestic price levels in the short run (rise in inflation) and 
appreciation of the real exchange rate. This implies a bad climate for the manufacturing 
sector in which to thrive. In the countries that practice a flexible exchange rate their 
nature of inflation is more monetary than structural, although Nigeria shows a mixture 
of both.  
It is also evident from the study that the effect of an inflation shock on the monetary 
policy instruments, manufacturing output and economic activities are not very 
pronounced in AOECs where a fixed exchange rate is practiced. This suggests that these 
countries usually have very effective inflation policies. 
It can be concluded from the findings in this study that monetary policy instruments 
(MPIs) are more affected by exchange rate shock under a fixed exchange rate regime 
than under a flexible exchange rate regime. Due to the way they are affected in the fixed 
exchange rate countries, they are almost inactive in promoting output growth. Exchange 
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rates tend to have a stronger effect on other variables in the monetary policy 
transmission mechanisms in the countries where a fixed exchange rate is practiced than 
where a floating exchange rate is practiced. In other words, these findings have 
contributed to the growing consensus that monetary policy instruments (MPIs) are more 
effective in the countries that practice a flexible exchange rate.  In addition, any country 
among the AOECs with a more diversified export market is likely to be more affected 
by exchange rate shocks than the ones with a narrow export base.  
The study has also contributed to the growing literature that currency depreciation is 
likely to promote domestic output more than a currency appreciation in an oil exporting 
country. A fall in the exchange rate, that is a currency appreciation, for most part of the 
analysis in this study has led to a fall in manufacturing output growth and GDP growth 
rate. It can also be concluded from the findings in our study that an over-valued 
currency is an impediment to the growth of the manufacturing sector in the AOECs. 
This might have informed the conclusion of Olomola (2006), who maintains that 
currency appreciation in Nigeria, is capable of squeezing out the tradable sector. 
Manufacturing output growth and the growth rate of GDP have not fared well in most 
of the countries analysed due to the negative effect of the oil price shocks. It appears 
that the manufacturing sector is vulnerable to external shocks under a fixed exchange 
rate system more than under a floating exchange rate system. That is, manufacturing 
output growth is negatively affected under a fixed exchange rate more than under a 
flexible exchange rate system. The implication of this is that a fixed exchange rate 
exposes AOECs real sectors to external shock.  
Findings of this study also support studies that have used GDP growth rate as a proxy 
for economic performance. GDP growth for the largest part of the findings in this study 
moves in the same direction as manufacturing output growth. There is consensus in the 
literature that there is a strong linkage between the development of a country and the 
vibrancy of the manufacturing sector. 
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Finally, it can be concluded that the relationship between oil price shocks and 
manufacturing output in the (MTM) in AOECs depends on the following: 
(i) The system of exchange rate in the country; 
(ii) The breadth of the export base or level of economic diversification of the 
country; 
(iii) The nature of inflation in the country; 



















Summary, Policy implications and Recommendations 
5.1   Summary 
The study investigates monetary policy and the manufacturing sector of AOECs. Some 
of the major justifications for the study include the need to understand the poor state of 
the manufacturing sector in AOECs and to contribute to the literature by assessing the 
level and the cause of the decline in manufacturing output, and discuss ways in which 
these countries can solve this problem. Considering the fact that these are oil rich 
economies, it is apparent that they are prone to the Dutch Disease problem. One of the 
ways by which the status of the manufacturing sector can be assessed in oil rich 
economies is to examine its relationship with the oil sector. This, among others, exposes 
the existence or otherwise of the Dutch Disease problem. There is near consensus that 
economic diversification is one of the solutions to this problem and the manufacturing 
sector has been tipped to be an important sector that can be used as an alternative 
mainstay of the AOECs. Accordingly, this study investigates the existence of Dutch 
Disease as it affects the manufacturing sector in the AOECs. 
In solving the problem of the manufacturing sector in the AOECs, the role of monetary 
policy has been questioned. Precisely, the relevance of monetary policy in promoting 
the growth of the manufacturing sector of a resource rich country has been discussed by 
Mohamed, 2011; Corden and Neary,1982; Lama and Medina, 2010 among others. The 
common conclusion from these studies is that assessment of the relationship between 
the manufacturing sector of these economies and the monetary policy will definitely 
lead to policy framework that will improve the contributions of monetary policy to the 
growth of manufacturing sector of a resource endowed countries like AOECs 
Again, the efficacy of monetary policy in promoting the growth of the manufacturing 
sector hinges on the effectiveness of the monetary policy transmission mechanism. The 
composition, structure and the vulnerability of variables in the transmission process of 
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monetary policy to various internal and external shocks also plays an important role in 
determining its efficiency in influencing growth of the manufacturing sector. As most 
studies agree, oil rich economies are most likely to be highly susceptible to both internal 
and external shocks, particularly oil price shocks. The current research also has as its 
major objective examination of output growth of the manufacturing sector in the 
AOECs within the framework of the monetary policy transmission mechanism. 
Assessment of the impact of the oil sector on the growth of the manufacturing sector in 
AOECs is carried out. This is achieved through the application of panel data analysis. 
Using an endogenous growth model with public good (see Barro and Lee,1993), a 
growth model is formulated. The model expresses manufacturing sector output growth 
rate as a function of oil revenue and capital formation while per capita income, real 
exchange rate and electricity generation are used as control variables. The study 
explores both the static panel models (fixed effects within regression and least square 
dummy variable (LSDV)), and dynamic panel models (that is generalised method of 
moments (GMM) and systemic generalised method of moments (SYS-GMM)). The 
research focuses on six major net oil exporters in Africa, namely Nigeria, Cameroun, 
Gabon (Sub-Saharan Africa), Egypt, Algeria, and Libya (non-Sub-Saharan Africa). 
Results from the panel data analysis show that in the fixed effects model none of the 
explanatory variables have a significant impact on the growth rate of the manufacturing 
sector. Although the oil revenue shows a negative relationship with the manufacturing 
sector growth rate, the coefficient is not statistically significant. The LSDV fixed 
effects’ results further indicate that some of the countries’ dummies are significant 
showing that there is a relative country-specific effect in the result. The fixed effects 
model is also statistically significant. 
The dynamic panel data analysis which is explored to obtain more efficient estimates 
indicates that for both the GMM and SYS-GMM, exchange rates and oil revenue show 
a significant relationship with growth of the manufacturing sector. The oil revenue in 
particular, shows a significant negative relationship confirming the existence of the 
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Dutch Disease problem in the AOECs. Capital formation shows a positive relationship 
but it is not significant; and the same relationship is exhibited by per-capita income and 
electricity generation. 
Considering the second major objective, the study assesses the relationship between 
monetary policy and manufacturing sector growth in the AOECs. The empirical 
literature on the subject shows that there are divergent views on the exact relationship 
that should exist between the two variables. While some schools of thought agree that 
there should be a long run relationship, others are of the opinion that the relationship 
between the two is just transitory. Findings of the study support the view that the 
relationship between manufacturing output and monetary policy might be more of a 
transitory nature. 
The model for the second objective is a variant of the endogenous growth model 
propounded by Romer (1996). The model expresses manufacturing sector growth of the 
AOECs as a function of monetary variables, namely monetary policy instruments 
(interest rates and money supply), policy variables (inflation and exchange rates) and a 
financial sector indicator (net domestic credit). Gross capital formation is used as a 
control variable. Based on data availability, nine net oil exporters in Africa are used, as 
follows: Nigeria, Algeria, Libya, Chad, Egypt, Cameroun, Gabon, Democratic Republic 
of Congo and Equatorial Guinea. Panel cointegration analysis (Westerlund, 2007) is 
applied to examine the existence of a long-run relationship between these variables and 
manufacturing sector growth of the AOECs. 
Results of the analysis show that there exists a very weak long-run relationship between 
the manufacturing sector growth and the explanatory variables, which include monetary 
variables and the capital formation. The analysis takes into consideration the likelihood 
of the existence of cross-sectional dependence among the cross-sectional units by using 
the robust P values. It is found that the existence of cointegration is very weak. Out of 
the four tests of cointegration developed by Persyn and Westerlund(2008), cointegration 
is confirmed from only one. The results ofthe fixed effects model show that none of the 
200 
 
explanatory variables is statistically significant in the long-run while money supply, 
exchange rate, capital formation and net domestic credit have a significant impact in the 
short-run. 
In addition the results also show that net domestic credit is inversely related to the 
growth of the manufacturing sector in the AOECs. However, exchange rates, money 
supply and capital formation exhibit a positive or direct relationship with manufacturing 
sector growth. The overall test of statistical significance shows that both static and 
dynamic panel models are statistically significant.   
The third broad objective of the study is the assessment of how manufacturing output 
growth is related to other variables in the monetary policy transmission mechanisms in 
various AOECs.  Findings from the empirical analysis support the existing literature 
that monetary policy is most likely to have a more significant impact on output in the 
short-run than in the long-run. In other words, there is almost a consensus that monetary 
policy tends to have a transitory effect rather than a permanent effect on output. 
Therefore, the second broad objective serves as a precursor for the third broad 
objective. 
Based on the foregoing, the major focus of the third objective is to examine how output 
growth of the manufacturing sector in the AOECs is related to other variables in the 
respective monetary policy transmission mechanisms. Another germane reason behind 
the assessment of this relationship is that despite the fact that these countries share 
common characteristics of being net oil exporters in Africa; the two previous broad 
objectives which made use of panel data analysis have clearly shown the existence of 
cross-sectional dependence among the cross-sectional units. This calls for an individual 
assessment of the countries in order to examine individual structural or institutional 
influences on the role of monetary policy in promoting the growth of their 
manufacturing sectors. 
Therefore, the third objective does not only focus on the short-run analysis but also 
examines individual countries’ specific characteristics since they belong to different 
201 
 
monetary zones and practice different forms of monetary policies. These range from 
different exchange rate regimes to different inflation policies. Taking cognisance of 
these, the study examines individual countries separately and discovers institutional and 
structural framework influences on the relationship between individual countries’ 
monetary policy transmission mechanisms and the output growth of their manufacturing 
sectors. 
Considering the various strata that these countries belong to in terms of oil production 
per day, Nigeria, Algeria, Libya, Egypt and Gabon are chosen for the purpose of the 
study. Reasons behind the selection of the five countries are stated in chapter four. After 
a brief overview of individual countries’ monetary systems and the status of their 
manufacturing sectors, a monetary policy transmission mechanism framework is built 
for the countries following existing literature. As we are interested in the short run 
analysis, structural vector auto-regression (SVAR) is chosen as the estimating 
technique. 
The variables in the SVAR model describe the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism which comprises of the monetary policy instruments, policy variables or 
intermediate targets and the output variables. Oil price and oil output growth rate are 
purely exogenous. Data on all the variables are sourced from the World Bank and the 
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). 
Preliminary analysis of the SVAR starts with the normality test to verify the suitability 
of the model for SVAR analysis before examining the impulse response functions as 
well as the variance decomposition. The country-based analysis starts with Nigeria and 
is followed by Algeria, Gabon, Libya and Egypt in that order. 
Findings on both Nigeria and Algeria are almost similar because they both practise a 
flexible exchange rate. The impulse response analysis on both countries shows that all 
variables in the MTM, including output, respond sharply to oil price shocks. It is also 
observed that oil price shocks account for a large proportion of the variations in the 
monetary policy instruments and both monetary policy shocks and oil price shocks 
202 
 
account for most of the variations in manufacturing output growth rate. However a 
slight difference between the results obtained on both countries is in the nature of 
inflation and exchange rate shocks. The responses of the variables in the model to both 
exchange and inflation rate shocks in Nigeria are sharper than in Algeria. Furthermore, 
inflation appears to be caused by structural rigidities in Algeria while in Nigeria, it 
appears to be a monetary phenomenon. In addition, the exchange rate is controlled in 
Algeria while a free floating system is in place in Nigeria. 
The impulse response functions and variance decomposition on Libya and Gabon are 
almost similar, probably because they both practice a fixed exchange rate system, 
although with some slight differences. Generally, oil price shocks constitute a major 
shock affecting most variables in the MTM, including manufacturing output. The real 
exchange rate shock makes the largest contribution to fluctuations in the monetary 
policy instruments in both countries. The influence of exchange rate shocks on output is 
more pronounced than that of interest rates and money supply shocks. In the variance 
decomposition analysis it appears that manufacturing output growth rate is responsive 
to real exchange rate shocks more than to both interest rate and money supply growth 
rate shocks. All these are more evident in the Libyan economy than in Gabon because 
of the pegging of the exchange rate in the former. 
Result of the analysis on Egypt are different in that oil price shocks fail to constitute a 
major disturbance to the variables in the MTM, which is contrary to findings from the 
other four countries examined. Although Egypt practices a flexible exchange rate 
system, it has a very developed non-oil sector when compared to other countries under 
examination. The behaviour of manufacturing output growth is not significantly 
influenced by oil price shocks. Furthermore, exchange rate shocks appear to account for 
the highest proportion of fluctuations in manufacturing output in Egypt. 
Lastly, the results in all the countries generally support the view that currency 
appreciation inhibits the growth of real output. It is common to all the countries 
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analysed that whenever a currency appreciates, it brings about a fall in manufacturing 
output, but when the currency depreciates the manufacturing output seems to rise. 
5.2 Policy Implications 
Apart from the identification of the Dutch Disease as a factor inhibiting the growth of 
the manufacturing sector, other variables included in the model, especially capital 
formation and electricity generation, fail to show a significant impact on the growth of 
the manufacturing sector. This is a pointer towards the fact that the manufacturing 
sector of the AOECs is short of adequate capital in order to compete with other 
productive sectors in the AOECs’.  Therefore, findings from the current study support 
the position of some previous authors who have concluded that the more capital 
intensive the manufacturing sector of an economy is, the less the sector is affected by 
the Dutch Disease problem (Ismail, 2010). The implication here is that the problem of 
the manufacturing sector in the AOECs is aggravated by a lack of positive synergy 
between the oil sector and the manufacturing sector. It is evident, therefore, that 
governments of the AOECs have failed to put back into the manufacturing sector the 
huge revenue made from oil to enable improvements in the level of investment of these 
sectors. 
Having, identified the level of the problem confronting the manufacturing sector in the 
AOECs, the second broad objective of the study is to examine the relationship between 
monetary policy and manufacturing output growth in the AOECs. This is with a view to 
assessing possible ways through which monetary policy can be used to revamp the 
ailing manufacturing sectors of the AOECs.  Some germane policy implications are also 
drawn from the findings. 
Firstly, a very weak long run relationship is confirmed between manufacturing sector 
output growth and monetary variables which include monetary policy instruments (i.e. 
interest rates and money supply), policy variables (inflation rate and exchange rate), a 
financial sector indicator (net domestic credit) and capital formation. This finding is 
further supported in the panel model’s estimation. The finding indicates that none of the 
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explanatory variables has a significant impact on the manufacturing sector’s output 
growth in the long-run model. However, money supply, exchange rate and net domestic 
credit all have a significant impact on the manufacturing output growth in the short-run 
model. The implication of this result is that monetary policy is most likely to have more 
of a transitory effect on manufacturing output in the AOECs. This implies that the 
existence of a very weak long-run relationship in the model might not be unconnected 
with the influence of the other variables present which are not monetary policy 
instruments in the model. 
Again, the result shows that there is a significant inverse relationship between net 
domestic credit and manufacturing sector output growth in the AOECs. The implication 
of this result is that an increase in net domestic credit might not lead to an increase in 
output of the manufacturing sector. This simply implies that the share of the 
manufacturing sector out of the net domestic credit in the economy might not be having 
the expected positive effect on the growth of the sector. Further findings on this reveal 
that most of the AOECs in their monetary policy framework practice selective credit 
control which is aimed at boosting credit supply to certain sectors of their economies. 
However, it was further discovered that most of the credit meant for the manufacturing 
sector is often diverted to other sectors where the financial institutions believe that loan 
recovery will be easier and more guaranteed. This tendency has aggravated the problem 
of a lack of adequate investment in the manufacturing sector of the AOECs. 
In addition, findings from the analysis of the second broad objective show that 
exchange rates exhibit a positive and significant relationship with manufacturing output. 
The implication of this result is that currency depreciation might promote growth of 
output of the manufacturing sector. This supports the existing literature that currency 
appreciation has the tendency to squeeze out the tradable sector of a developing 
economy (Olomola, 2007). However, the existence of a relationship of this nature in a 




The panel cointegration result also shows the presence of cross sectional dependence in 
the model. This implies that some of the countries investigated exhibit peculiar 
characteristics that might influence our results. This necessitated the use of robust P 
values in the cointegration test. This revelation indicates that apart from the fact that 
these countries have an important common characteristic of being major net oil 
exporters in Africa, they still possess some individual characteristics that might 
distinguish them from one another in terms of monetary policy administration and the 
status of their manufacturing sectors. It should be noted that the same result was 
obtained in the analysis of the first broad objective under the LSDV model where cross 
sectional unit differences were noticed. This further implies that the AOECs can also be 
assessed individually to get a better and more reliable result. This is what led to the 
third broad objective where the analysis was carried out based on individual countries.  
Based on the findings obtained from the analysis of the second broad objective, the 
third objective is based on individual country analysis of the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism, with particular interest on how monetary policy is transmitted 
to output growth of the manufacturing sector in the AOECs. The study finds that there 
is a weak long-run relationship between monetary policy and manufacturing output 
growth. Consequently, the analysis of the third objective is based on short-run analysis. 
In the last part of the study, oil price shocks have been shown to be a major shock 
affecting most variables in the monetary policy transmission mechanism including 
output in the AOECs. However, the severity of the effect varies from country to 
country. Egypt, which has a relatively more developed non-oil sector with greater 
investments in the manufacturing sector than the others, appears to be least affected by 
oil price shocks. The implication is that the manufacturing sector with a large quantity 
of investments might not be severely affected byan oil price shock. This was one of the 
conclusions in the first objective analysis where it was inferred from the results that the 




Contrary to the position of some studies that oil output growth serves as a medium of 
transmission for the effect of oil price shocks to the domestic economy, the findings 
from the SVAR analysis have shown that oil price shocks have a direct effect on 
variables, including output, in the monetary policy transmission mechanisms of the 
AOECs. This further justifies the severity of the effect of oil price shocks on 
manufacturing output of the AOECs. In addition, the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism (MTM) has been shown to be greatly influenced by oil price shocks. The 
implication of this is that one of the major inhibiting factors to the efficacy of monetary 
policy in the AOECs is the oil price shock. In other words, it appears that oil price 
shocks constitute a major impediment to the effectiveness of monetary policy in 
promoting growth of the manufacturing sector in AOECs. 
In addition, the system of exchange rates practiced by these countries has been shown to 
be a major determining factor in the effectiveness of monetary policy in the AOECs. In 
both the impulse response and variance decomposition analyses, it is confirmed that 
manufacturing output response to monetary policy instrument shocks is more 
pronounced in the countries practicing a flexible exchange rate than the ones practicing 
a fixed exchange rate. The implication of this is that a less rigid exchange rate system is 
likely to provide a better atmosphere for monetary policy to be more effective in 
promoting growth of the manufacturing sector in the AOECs. 
Inflation has been shown to be a hindrance to the growth of the manufacturing sector 
but the severity of this problem also varies from one country to the other. 
Manufacturing output has been shown to have a sharper response to an inflation shock 
in the countries with a flexible exchange rate system than in those with a rigid exchange 
rate system. The implication is that inflation is better controlled in the AOECs with a 
fixed exchange rate system. In these countries, the nature of inflation is often structural 
and not monetary. Therefore structural imbalances with respect to output and prices 
appear to be major causes of inflation in the fixed exchange rate AOECs, while money 




Unlike the findings of some studies that maintain that an oil price shock makes the 
currency of some oil exporting countries depreciate, it appears that in most AOECs, a 
positive oil price shock makes the local currency appreciate. Furthermore, as the 
currency appreciates the results from almost all the countries under study show that 
manufacturing output tends to fall. It is also noticed that any shock that produces a rise 
in exchange rate (currency depreciation) leads to a rise in manufacturing output. The 
implication of this is that findings from this research work are in support of the school 
of thought that maintains that currency depreciation boosts domestic output. It will be 
recalled that similar results were obtained in the second objective analysis where a 
significant positive relationship was confirmed between the exchange rate and 
manufacturing output growth. 
Both interest rates and money supply, which are the two monetary policy operating 
targets used in the analysis, constitute major determinants of the behaviour of the 
manufacturing output in the AOECs. While interest rate shocks often lead to a fall in 
manufacturing output, money supply growth rate shocks often lead to a rise in 
manufacturing output but the rise is usually not pronounced or sustained. The reason for 
this might not be unconnected with one of the findings in chapter three, that net 
domestic credit does not have a positive impact on the growth of the manufacturing 
sector. Since domestic credit constitutes an important part of the total money supply this 
will no doubt affect the effectiveness of expansionary monetary policy on the growth of 
the manufacturing sector in the AOECs. 
In addition, the effectiveness of the monetary policy instruments in promoting the 
growth of manufacturing output also depends on the system of exchange rates. For 
instance, in Libya where a fixed exchange rate is practiced, exchange rate shocks appear 
to be the most influential factor affecting manufacturing output. This also implies that 
exchange rate shocks are likely to have a more pronounced effect than monetary policy 
shocks in the fixed exchange rate systems in AOECs. 
208 
 
Finally, the exchange rate system, monetary policy system (monetary zone), current 
level of investment in the manufacturing sector and objectives of the local  monetary 
authorities all appear to be major factors that affect monetary policy relationship with 
the growth of the manufacturing sector in the AOECs. 
5.3 Policy Recommendations 
Based on the findings in this study, some course of action is imperative if 
manufacturing output in the AOECs is to be improved through monetary policy 
administration. The course of action recommended is as follows: 
(i) It has been observed that the exchange rate policy that favours the 
manufacturing sector in the AOECs is the type that does not encourage over-
valuation of a local currency. In other words currency appreciation appears 
to be a disincentive to manufacturing output growth in the AOECs. This is 
an indication that a monetary policy that will discourage currency 
appreciation might have a positive and significant impact on manufacturing 
growth at least in the short run. This type of exchange rate policy has the 
tendency to discourage importers and thus boost local content in the 
domestic output and consequently promote the growth of the manufacturing 
sector. On this note, the monetary authorities of the AOECs are advised to 
adopt an exchange rate policy that will not squeeze out the tradable sector 
through over-valuation of local currency. 
(ii) The study findings have shown that monetary policy instruments appear to 
thrive very well under a flexible exchange rate regime rather than a fixed 
exchange rate. In other words, monetary policy instruments are able to be 
used more effectively to achieve the aims of economic stability and output 
growth under a flexible exchange rate system rather than under a fixed 
exchange rate system. It is recommended that any AOECs that are interested 
in promoting the growth of their manufacturing sectors through monetary 
policy should embrace a flexible exchange rate system. 
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(iii) The study has also revealed that the nature of inflation in the AOECs differs 
from one country to another. For instance inflation in the countries that are 
practicing a flexible exchange rate is more of a monetary phenomenon, 
while that of the countries that practice a fixed exchange rate is more 
structural in nature. Therefore tackling the inflation problem, which has been 
shown to have a negative effect on the growth of the manufacturing sector, 
should be based on these two perspectives. For example countries like 
Libya, where a fixed exchange rate is practiced, should be more concerned 
about curbing inflation from a structural angle as research has shown that 
money supply might not be their major cause of inflation but rather 
imbalances between price and output. 
(iv) Minimizing the effects of oil price shocks has been shown to be dependent 
on the level of investment in the manufacturing sector (Egypt case). This 
implies that AOECs should look for ways of attracting investors into their 
manufacturing sectors. This can be done by creating an enabling 
environment for investment in terms of power supply and the prevention of 
political and environmental violence which can discourage investors. 
(v) From the study findings, it has been inferred that the inability of 
expansionary monetary policy to be effective in promoting the growth of the 
manufacturing sector in the AOECs might not be unconnected with credit 
diversion that is prevalent in some AOECs. This is because the selective 
credit control policy of the Central Banks in some AOECs is sometimes 
violated by commercial banks. This has led to credit diversion to sectors 
other than the sector the credits were originally destined for. This implies 
that there should be more commitment on the part of the monetary 
authorities in the AOECs in monitoring and controlling the implementation 
of selective credit control in the AOECs. 
(vi) The study also found that Egypt, which is the only country with a broad 
export base, is the least affected by the oil price shock. This suggests that the 
manufacturing sector of a country with a broad export base is likely to be 
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less susceptible to the adverse effects of oil price shocks. Based on the 
foregoing, it follows that the policy that will expand the export base of the 
AOECs will benefit their manufacturing sector and also minimize the effect 
on economic instability occasioned by oil price shocks. 
(vii) Results from this study have also shown that the growth rate of GDP often 
responds to shocks in the same way manufacturing output growth rate does. 
Therefore, to achieve sustainable economic growth, AOECs should 



















Acosta, P., Lartey, E., & Mandelman, F. (2009). Remittances and the Dutch Disease. 
Journal of international economics, 5,(79),102-116. 
Adegbite, S.,A. (2012). An evaluation of technology innovation on the performance of 
indigenous textile weaving firms in South Western Nigeria, Journal of Business and 
Management.  1, (1), 345-389. 
African Development Bank Group. (2010). Algeria economy outlook: Report of 
quarterly review, 3,(21), 24-31. 
African Development Bank Group. (2011). Egyptian economy outlook: Report of 
quarterly review, 5,(24), 34-39. 
African Development Bank Group. (2012). Libyan economy outlook: Report of 
quarterly review, 8,(27), 19-38. 
African Development Bank Group. (2007). The impact of high oil prices on African 
economies. Working Papers No.93, 1-6. 
Akpan, E., O. (2009). Oil price shocks and Nigeria’s macro economy. Paper presented 
at the Annual Conference on Economic Development in Africa, 22-24 March, Oxford. 
Ali, I.,S. (2013). Oil revenue and economic development case of Libyan economy. 
Unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Wollongong. 
Ali, I., & Harvie, C. (2013). Oil related shocks and macroeconomic adjustment under 
different nominal exchange rate policy in Libya. Proceedings of European Business 
Research Conference. Italy. 
Anderson, T., & Hsiao, C. (1982).Formulation and estimation of dynamic models using 
panel data. Journal of Econometrics, 18, (8), 47–82. 
Arellano, M., & Bond, S. (1991). Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte   
Carlo evidence and an application to employment equations. Review of Economic 
Studies, 58, (6), 277–297. 
212 
 
Argia, M., Andrea, T., Krishna, R., & Kieran, W. (2010). Policy analysis using 
DSGEModels: An Introduction. FRBNY Economic Policy Review, 7,(4),46-78 
Alege, P. (2009). A business cycle model for Nigeria. Paper presentation at the African 
Econometric Society Conference 2009 Abuja, Nigeria 
Alexey, K. (2011). Dutch Disease and monetary policy in oil-exporting economy. 
Unpublished masters dissertation, Central European University, United Kingdom. 
Alwad, M. (2010). The role of manufacturing in promoting sustainable economic 
growth in the GCC. Institute of Social and Economic Research Working Paper, No. 24, 
56-90. 
Amuzegar, A. (2001). OPEC as Omen.  Journal of Foreign Affairs, 77, (6), 95-129. 
Anthony, E., & Mustafa, I. (2011) Impact of financial sector reforms on non-oil export 
in Nigeria. Journal of Economics, 2,(2), 115-120. 
Auty, R., & Evia, J. (2001). A growth collapse with point resources: Bolivia”. Resource 
Abundance and Economic Development, 67, (5), 179–192. 
Awad, I. L. (2011) The monetary transmission mechanism in a small open economy: 
The case of Egypt. Journal of Economics and Business. 1, (16), 73-96. 
Aziz, Z., A. (2013). Islamic finance in a challenging economy: Moving forward 
opening address. 2nd ISRA Colloquium. Kuala Lumpur. 
Barro, R., & Lee, J. (1993). International comparisons of educational attainment. 
Journal of Monetary Economics, 32, (3),363-394). 
Becklemans, L. (2005). Credit and monetary policy: An Australian SVAR. Reserve 
Bank of Australia Research Discussion Paper Series, No. 1, 2-9.  
Bernanke, B. (1986). Alternative explanation of the money-income correlation. NBER 
Working Paper Series,  No. 1842, 1-62. 
Berument, H. (2009). Measuring monetary policy for a small open economy: Turkey, 
Journal of Macroeconomics 29,(7), 411-430. 
Berument, H., & Dincer, N. (2004). Effects of exchange rate risk on economic 
performance in Turkey. Applied Economics, 36, (23), 2429-2441. 
213 
 
Bhattacharya, R. & Ghura, D. (2006). Oil and growth in the republic of Congo. IMF 
Working Papers, No. 06/185, 34-67.  
Blanchard, O., & Gali, J. (2007). The macroeconomic effects of oil price shocks:  why 
are the 2000s so different from the 1970s?. Arab countries journal, 45, (56), 78-90. 
Blanchard, O., J., & Simon. J. (2001). The long and large decline in US output 
volatility. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, No.5, 135-164. 
Blundell, R., & Bond, S. (1998). Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic 
panel data models, Journal of Econometrics, 87, (9), 115–143. 
Bulmer-Thomas, V. (1994). The economic history of latin America since independence. 
Cambridge, London. 
Bouakez, H.,Rebei, N., & Vencatachellum, D. (2008). Optimal pass-through of oil 
prices in an economy with nominal rigidities. Working Paper, No. 08, 31-36. 
Bouchaour, C., & Al-Zeaud, H, A. (2012). Oil price distortion and their impact on 
Algerian macroeconomic variables. International Journal of Business management, 7,( 
18),  99-114. 
Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Statistical Bulletin. (2010). Edition. 
Chen, S.,S., & Chen, H.,C. (2007). Oil prices and real exchange rates. Energy 
Economics, 29, (6), 390-404. 
Christiano, L., & Martin, E. (1992). Current real business cycle theories and  aggregate 
labour market fluctuations. American Economic Review, 82, (50), 617-52. 
Cimadomo, J.(2002). The effects of systematic monetary policy on sectors: factor model 
analysis. Ecares Seminar Paper Series, No. 114, 23-27. 
Cipolini, A., Hall, S., & Nixon, J.(2011). The inter-relationship between monetary 
policy and endogenous technical progress. Bank of England Discussion Paper, No.11, 
82-99. 
Cleaveland, C., J., Costanza, R., Hall, C., A., & Kaufmann, R., K. (1984) Energy and 
the US economy: A biophysical perspective. Science, 225,(4), 890-897. 
214 
 
Clements, M., P., & Hendry, D., F. (1995). Forecasting in cointegrated systems. Journal 
of Applied Econometrics, 10,(5), 127–146. 
Corden, W., & Neary, J. (1982). Booming sector and de-industrialisation in a small 
open economy. Economic Journal,  92 (45), 825-848. 
De-Long, B.J., & Summers, L.H. (2012). Macroeconomic policy and long-run growth. 
Economic Review, 5,(21), 1138-54. 
Constanza, R., & Dlay, H., G. (1992). Natural capital and sustainable development. 
Conservation Biology, 6, (2), 37-46 
Dasgupta, P., E., & Heal, G., M. (1979). Economic theory and exhaustible resources. 
Cambridge University Press, Oxford. 
Demetriades, P.,O., & Fielding, D. (2010). Information, institutions and banking sector 
development in West Africa. Economic Inquiry, 6,(1), 1-18. 
Dib, A. (2006). Nominal rigidities and monetary policy in Canada. Journal of 
Macroeconomics, 28, (3), 303-325. 
 
Dickey, D., & Fuller, W. (1979). Distribution of the estimator for autoregressive time 
series with a unit root. Journal of  Statistical Association, 74, (23), 427-431. 
Ditimi, A., Nwosa, P.I. & Olaiya, S.A. (2011). An appraisal of monetary policy and its 
effects on the macroeconomic stabilization in Nigeria. Journal of Emerging trends in 
Economics and Management Sciences. 2, (20),  232-237. 
(Dixit, A.,& Stiglitz, J. (1977).Monopolistic competition and optimum product 
diversity. American Economic Review, 67,(5), 297-308. 
Dramani, J.,B., Francis, T., & Tewari, D.,D. (2012). Structural break electricity 
consumption and growth: evidence from Ghana. African Journal of Business 
Management, 6,(22),  6709-6720. 
Driver, R., & Westaway, P.(2004). Concepts of equilibrium exchange rate. Bank of 
England,  Working Paper No. 28, 14-17. 
215 
 
Égert, B., & Leonard, C.,S. (2007).Dutch Disease scare in Kazakhstan: Is it real? 
William Davidson Institute Working paper, No. 866, 4-30. 
Eksi, I.,H., Izgi, B.,B., & Senturk, M. (2011). Reconsidering the relationship between 
oil price and industrial production: Testing for cointegration in some of the OECD 
countries. Eurasian Journal of Business and Economics, 4, (8), 1-12. 
Elbourne, A. (2007). The UK housing market and the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism: An SVAR approach. Journal of Housing Economics, 17 (8) 65-87. 
Engel R., F., & Granger, C.,W. (1987). Co-integration and error correction: 
representation and testing. Econometrica,  55, ( 2), 251-276. 
Enoma, A., & Isedu, M. (2011). Impact of financial sector reforms on non-oil export in 
Nigeria. Journal of Economics, 2, (2), 115-120. 
Fedderke, J., W. & Vaze, P. (2001).The nature of South Africa's trade patterns by 
economic sector, and the extent of trade liberalisation during the Course of the 1990s." 
South African Journal of Economics, 69, (3), 436-473. 
Fève, P., & Guay, A. (2006). The response of hour to technology shock: SVAR 
approach. Money Credit bank , 5,(1), 958-1103. 
Fiess, M.,N., & Verner, D. (2003). Oil, agriculture and public sector: linking inter-
sector dynamics in Ecuador. World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No.3094. 
 
Fischer, S., & Modigliani, A.,F. (1978). Towards an understanding of the real effects 
and costs of inflation. Weltwirtschaftliches Archive, 2,(6), 810-32. 
Francois, L., & Mignon, V. (2008). Influence of oil price on economic activities and 
other macroeconomic and financial variables. CEPII Working Papers,  No. 2008-5, 12-
34. 
Franz, E. (2009). Dynamic panel data methods for cross-section panels. Vienna, 
Australia. 




Frimpong, P. (2012). Population health and economic growth: Panel cointegration 
analysis in Sub- Saharan Africa. Lund, Sweeden. 
Gali, J., & Monacelli, T. (2005). Monetary policy and exchange rate volatility in a small 
open economy. Review of Economic Studies, 72,(50), 707-734. 
Gawad, G.M., & Muaranalla, V., S. (2013). Foreign direct investment and its effect on 
oil, gas and refinery production and its exports. Journal of Economics and Sustainable 
Development. 4, (1), 2-13. 
Georgescu, R., G. (1976). Some implications of growth of mineral sector. The 
Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics, 20, (2), 71-91 
Gertler, M., & Karadi, P. (2011). A model of unconventional monetary policy. Journal 
of Monetary Economics, 58, (3), 17-34. 
Ghalayini, L. (2011). The Interaction between oil price and economic growth. Middle 
Eastern Finance and Economics, 13, (3), 23-36. 
Glynn, J., Perera, N & Verma, R. (2007). Unit root test and structural breaks: a survey 
with applications. Paper presented at the seminar for economics and social sciences, 
University of Wollongon. 
Gonzalo, F., & Jose, L. (2007). Forecasting the Spanish economy with an augmented 
VAR-DSGE  model. Economic Review , 3,(34), 456-478. 
Gijon, J., & De Bock, R. (2011). Will natural gas prices decouple from oil prices across 
the pond?  IMF  Working paper, WP/11/143, 78-89. 
Gujarati, S.,N. (2007). Basic Econometrics. McGraw-Hill, Singapore. 
Gul, H., Mughal, K., & Rahim, S. (2012). Linkage between & growth. Universal 
journal of Management and Social Sciences, 2,(5),45-65.  
Gylfason, T. (2001). Natural resources, education, and economic development. 
European Economic Review, 45, (78), 847–59. 
 
Hauser, C. (2010). Social capital formation and intra-familial correlation: A social panel 
perspective. Singapore Economic Review, 54,(3), 473-488. 
217 
 
Im, K.,S., Pesaran, M.,H. & Shin, Y. (2003).Testing for unit roots in heterogeneous 
panels. Journal of Econometrics, 115,(2), 53-74.  
Ibrahim, H.,M., & Amin, M., R. (2005). Exchange rate, monetary policy and 
manufacturing output in Malaysia. Journal of Economic Cooperation, 26,(3), 103-130. 
IMF. (2003). International Monetary Fund economic report: Africa focus . Special 
Issue, No.10, 17-34. 
IMF. (2005). International Monetary Fund economic report: Africa focus. Special 
Issue, No.17, 3-21. 
IMF. (2008). International Monetary Fund economic report: Africa focus. Special 
Issue, No.21, 3-32. 
IMF. (2010). International Monetary Fund economic report: Africa focus. Special 
Issue, No.47, 13-28. 
IMF. (2012). International Monetary Fund economic report: Africa focus. Special 
Issue, No.49, 1-29. 
Ismail, K. (2010). The structural manifestation of the ‘Dutch Disease’: The case of oil  
exporting countries. IMF, Working Paper No. 103, 3-28. 
Ishibashi, S. (2012). The segmentation of loan and interest rate by regional financial 
institutions: A panel cointegration analysis. International Journal of Business Research, 
8, (5), 3-17. 
Jabber, P. (1997). Political and economic reform in the Muslim World. Globicom, New 
York. 
Jana, K.,Giovanni, L., Leopold,V. & Thomas, W. (2006). Dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrum models as a tool for policy analysis. CES ifo Economic Studies Advance 
Access, 10,(56), 1093-1100 
Jaggers, K., & Monty,G. (2000). Polity IV project. Centre for International 
Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland, College Park. 
218 
 
Jimenez-Rodriguez, R., & Sanchez, M. (2005). Oil shocks and real GDP growth: 
Empirical evidence from OECD countries. Applied Economics. 37,(45), 210-228. 
Karl, T. (1997). The paradox of plenty: Oil booms and petro-states Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: California, USA. 
Kayode, A. (2000). Basic economic issues on Nigeria. Cental Bank of  Nigeria CBN 
economic Review No.23, 78-90 
Kim, S., & Roubini, N. (2000). Exchange rate anomalies in the industrial countries: A 
solution with structural VAR Approach. Journal of Monetary Economics, 45, (3), 561-
586. 
Kirdan, L.,Troy, M., & Christie, S. (2007). Open economy DSGE-VAR forecasting and 
policy analysis: Head to Head with RBNZ Published forecasts. Economic Department 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand Publication No. 01, 21-46. 
Lama, R., & Madina, P. (2010). Is Exchange rate stabilization an appropriate cure for 
the Dutch Disease?. IMF Working Paper, No.182, 23-29. 
Lartey, G., (2008). Capital inflows, Dutch Disease effects and monetary policy in a 
small open economy. Review of International Economics, 16,(5) 671-689. 
Lay, J., Mahmoud, T., O. (2005). The resource curse at work: A cross-country 
perspective with a focus on Africa, in: Basedau, Matthias; Mehler, Andreas (eds.) 
(2005): Resource Politics in sub-Saharan Africa, Hamburg: Hamburg African 
Studies/Etudes Africaines Hambourgeoises No. 13, 23-38. 
League of Arab States Reports. (2009). Oil and Arab countries economy. Paper 
presented at Arab Economic and Social Development summits, Kuwait. 
Lee, C., & Chang, C. (2005). Structural breaks, energy consumption, and economic 
growth revisited: evidence from Taiwan. Energy Economics, 27, (7), 857-872. 
Leeper, E., Sims, C., & Zha, T. (1996). What does monetary policy do? Brookings 
Paper on Economic Activity, No. 2, 1-78. 




Lucas, R., E. (1987). Models of business cycles. Basil Blackwell, Oxford. 
Mabrouk, A.,F., & Hassan, S., M. (2012). Evolution of monetary policy in Egypt: A 
critical review. The International Journal of Social sciences,  4,( 1), 12-23 
Maddalla, G., S. & Wu, S. (1999). A comparative test of unit root with panel data. 
Oxford bulletin of economics and statistic,  19, (9), 0305-9049. 
Mahmud, H. (2009). Oil price shocks and monetary policy aggregates in Nigeria: A 
structural VAR approach. Munich Personal RePEc Archive, No. 25908, 45-56 
Majid, A. (2008). The contribution of oil sector to Arab economic development. OFID 
Pamphlet Series , No. 23, 45-90 
Mark, G., & Peter, K. (2011).A model of unconventional monetary policy. Journal of 
Monetary Economics , 58., (23), 7-34. 
Mehrabadi, M., Nabiuny, E. & Moghadam, H. (2012). Survey of oil and non-oil export 
effects on economic growth in Iran.Greener Journal of Economics andAccountancy ,1, 
(1), 008-018. 
Mehrara, M., Sadr, M. & Farahani, S. (2008). Threshold effects in the relationship 
between oil revenues and growth in oil exporting countries. Proceedings of Annual 
London Conference on Money, Economy and Management, 3-4 July, Imperial College, 
London. 
Mitze, T. (2010).Within and between panel cointegration in the German regional 
output-trade-FDI nexus. ERSA summer school, 2010. 
Mohamed, T. (2011).Monetary policy and the Dutch Disease effects in a small open oil 
exporting economy. Paper presented at the 34th  International Conference on 
Environment and Natural Resource Management in Developing and Transitional 
Economies, Lyon  France 
Mordi, C.,N.,O., & Adebiyi, M.,A. (2010). The Asymmetric effects of oil price shocks 
on output and prices in Nigeria using a structural VAR model. Centarl Bank of Nigeria 
Economic and Financial Review. 48,(1), 1-32. 
220 
 
Mundell, R., A. (1963). Capital mobility and stabilization policy under fixed and 
flexible  exchange rates. The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, 29, 
(4), 475-485. 
Nathan, J.M. (2012). Comparative political studies. SAGE Journals, 5, (1), 12-19. 
Nenbee, S.,G., & Madume, J.,V. (2011). The impact of monetary policy on 
macroeconomic stability in Nigeria. International Journal of Economic Development 
Research and Investment, 2,(12), 34-67. 
Nelson, C., & Plosser, C. (1982). Trends and random walks in macroeconomic time 
series: Some evidence and implications. Journal of Monetary Economics, 10, (2), 139-
162. 
Ngalawa, H., & Viegi, N. (2011). Dynamic effects of monetary policy shocks in 
Malawi. South African Journal of Economics, 79, (3), 244-250. 
NVS (2009). Nigeria Village Square Viewpoints and articles compilation. No.3, 1-12. 
Nneka, B.,C. (2012). Investigating the performance of monetary policy on the 
manufacturing sector in Nigeria. Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review, 
2,(1), 34-46. 
Odularu, G.,G. (2008). Crude oil and the Nigerian economic performance. Oil and Gas 
Business paper No.45, 34-39 
Oladipo, S., & Fabayo, J. (2012). Global recession, oil sector and economic growth in 
Nigeria. Asian Transactions on Basic and Applied Sciences, 1, (6), 29-41. 
Olatiwola, K., & Okodua, H. (2009). Foreign direct investment, non-oil exports, and 
economic growth in Nigeria: A causality analysis. Paper presented at the 3rd 
International Conference on Economics and Humanities, Covenant University, Ota, 
Nigeria.  
Olomola, P. (2006). Oil wealth and economic growth in African oil exporting countries. 
AERC research paper, No. 170, 23-45. 
Onyeiwu, C. (2012). Monetary policy and economic growth of Nigeria. Journal of 
Economics and Sustainable Development, 2, (7), 12-32. 
221 
 
Oomes, N., & Kalecheva, K. (2007). Diagnosing Dutch-Disease: Does Russia have the 
Symptoms? IMF Working Paper No. 102, 14-32. 
OPEC. (2008). Annual statistical bulletin. Organisation of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC), Geneva, Switzerland. 
OPEC.(2006).  Fund for Industrial Development (OFID). Annual report No.7 
Papademos, L. (2003). The contribution of monetary policy to economic growth. 
European Central bank Conference Paper No 23, 67-89. 
Pedroni, P. (2000). Fully modified OLS for heterogeneous cointegrated panels. 
Advances in Econometrics, 15, (5), 93-130.  
Peersman, G., & Smet, F. (2002). The industry effects of monetary policy in the Euro-
Area. European Bank Working Paper No. 65, 34-56  
Pesaran, M., H., & Shin, Y. (1998). Generalized impulse response analysis in linear 
multivariate models, Economics Letters  58, (4), 17–29. 
Persyn, D., & Westerlund, J. (2008). Error-correction-based cointegration tests for panel 
data. The Stata Journal, 8,(2), 232-241.  
Ridwhan, M., De-groot, H., & Rietveld, P. (2011). The regional impact of monetary 
policy in Indonesia. Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper, No. 81, 23-45. 
Rima, H.,B., Akpan, E.,S., & Offiong, A.,I. (2013). Asymmetric effect of oil price 
shocks on exchange rate volatility and domestic investment in Nigeria. British Journal 
of Economics, 3, (4), 513-532. 
Rodrik, D. (2008). The real exchange rate and economic growth: Theory and Evidence, 
Kennedy School of Government Manuscript No. 5, 34-47 
Romer, P., (1996). Increasing returns and long-run growth. Journal of Political 
Economy, 94,(86), 1002-1037. 
222 
 
Roodman, D. (2006). How to do xtabond2: An introduction to “difference” and 
“system” GMM  in stata. Centre for Global Development, Working Paper No. 103, 78-
109. 
Rosser, A. (2006). The political economy of the resource curse: A literature survey. IDS 
Working Paper, No. 268, 56-79 
Sachs, J., &  Warner, A. (1995). Natural resource abundance and economic growth. 
NBER, Cambridge Working Paper, No. 5398,1062-1078. 
Sahinoz, S., & Cosar, E. (2010). Understanding sectoral growth cycles and impact of 
monetary policy in the Turkish manufacturing industry. Central Bank of Republic of 
Turkey Working Paper No. 13, 34-56. 
Saleem, N. (2013). The impact of policy changes in nominal interest rates on the 
exchange rate in Egypt.  Paper presented at the 35th seminar of Faculty of Economics 
and Political science, Cairo University. 
Samba, M.,C. (2013). Monetary policy effectiveness under the CEMAC area: Empirical 
evaluation. International Journal of Advances in Management and Economics, 2,( 4), 
55-64. 
Sami A., Kevin. K., & Geoffrey, W. (2007). Forecasting performance of an estimated 
DSGE model for the South African Economy.  Journal of Economics Literature, 42,(9), 
56-90. 
Sbordone, A.,M., Tambalotti, A., Rao, K., & Walsh, K. (2010). Policy analysis using 
DSGE models: An Introduction. FRBNY Economic Policy Review, 67,(7), 34-67. 
Smulders, S. (1999). Endogenous growth theory and the environment. Handbbok of 
Environment and Resources Economics, 4, 89-108. 
Sidrauski, M.(1967).Rational choice and patterns of growth in a monetary economy. 
American Economic Review, 57, (2), 534–544. 
Sims, C.,A. (1986). Are forecasting models usable for policy analysis? Quarterly review 
of Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 10, (1), 2-16. 
223 
 
Sims, C. (1980). Macroeconomics and Reality, Econometrica, Vol. 48, No. 1 (Jan., 
1980), 1-48 
Solow, R., M. (1997). Reply: Georgescu-Roegen versus Solow/Stiglitz. Ecological 
Economics, 22, (2), 267-268. 
Solow, R., M. (1974). Intergenarational equity and exhaustible resources. Review of 
Economic Studies, 32,(4), 29-46 
Sosunov, K., & Zamulin, O. (2006). Can oil price explain the real appreciation of 
Russia ruble in 1998-2005. CEFIR/NES Working Paper, No. 83, 3-36. 
Stauffer, M., E. (1984). Xtivreg2: Stata module to perform extended IV/2SLS, GMM and 
AC/HAC, LIML and k-class regression for panel data models. Retrived January, 6, 
2012, from http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s456501.html.  
Stern, D., I. (2003). Energy and economic growth. Ecological Economics, 42, (3), 201-
220) 
Stiglitz, J., E. (1974). Growth with exhaustible natural resources: The competitive 
economy. Review of Economic Studies, 33, (4), 139-152 
Stijns, J., P. (2002). An empirical test of the Dutch Disease hypothesis using a gravity 
model of trade. Department of Economics, university of California, Working Papers, 
No. 2, 21-27. 
Teka, Z. (2011). Backward linkages in the manufacturing sector in the oil and gas value 
chain.  
MMCP Discussion Paper No. 11, 45-78 
Tobin, J. (1965). Money and economic growth, Econometrica, 33, (4), 671-684. 
Todaro, M.,P., & Stephen, C., S. (2003). Economic Development 8th Edition, Addison-
Wesley, Boston. 
Torres-Reyna, O. (2010). Panel data analysis fixed and random effects. Princeton 
University Press. 
Uhlig, H. (2005). What are the effects of monetary policy on output? Results from an 
agnostic identification procedure. Journal of Monetary Economics, 52,(6), 381–419. 
224 
 
Ushie, V., Adeniyi, O., & Akongwale, S. (2012). Oil revenues, institutions and 
macroeconomic performance in Nigeria. CSEA Working Paper No.02, 67-89. 
Vonnak, B. (2005). Estimating the effects of Hungarian monetary policy within a 
structural VAR framework. Magyar Nemzeti Bank Working Paper Series, No., 1-37. 
Westerlund, J. (2007). Testing for error correction in panel data. Oxford Bulletin of 
Economics and Statistics, 69, (6), 709-748.  
World Bank. (2010). World Development Indicators. Retrieved August, 6, 2011, from 
athttp://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators 
World Bank .(2012). A review of monetary policy administration in Africa. World Bank 
Policy Research Paper, No. 2225 
World Industrial Development and Economic Research (WIDER).(2004). Economic 
Report on Africa’s Developing Countries. World Bank Policy Research Paper, No. 2119 
World Bank (2004).World Development Indicators. World Development Indicators. 
Retrieved August, 6, 2011, from athttp://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-
development-indicators 
World Bank Tables (2012). Washington, 2012, p. 190, Table 4.1. p. 187, Table 4f . 
Zafar, A. (2004) What happens when a country does not adjust to terms of trade shocks 




















2 4 6 8 10 12





2 4 6 8 10 12





2 4 6 8 10 12





2 4 6 8 10 12





2 4 6 8 10 12





2 4 6 8 10 12





2 4 6 8 10 12





2 4 6 8 10 12






2 4 6 8 10 12






2 4 6 8 10 12






2 4 6 8 10 12






2 4 6 8 10 12






2 4 6 8 10 12






2 4 6 8 10 12






2 4 6 8 10 12






2 4 6 8 10 12






2 4 6 8 10 12






2 4 6 8 10 12






2 4 6 8 10 12






2 4 6 8 10 12






2 4 6 8 10 12






2 4 6 8 10 12






2 4 6 8 10 12






2 4 6 8 10 12





2 4 6 8 10 12





2 4 6 8 10 12





2 4 6 8 10 12





2 4 6 8 10 12





2 4 6 8 10 12





2 4 6 8 10 12





2 4 6 8 10 12





2 4 6 8 10 12






2 4 6 8 10 12






2 4 6 8 10 12






2 4 6 8 10 12






2 4 6 8 10 12






2 4 6 8 10 12






2 4 6 8 10 12






2 4 6 8 10 12






2 4 6 8 10 12






2 4 6 8 10 12






2 4 6 8 10 12






2 4 6 8 10 12






2 4 6 8 10 12






2 4 6 8 10 12






2 4 6 8 10 12






2 4 6 8 10 12






2 4 6 8 10 12






2 4 6 8 10 12






2 4 6 8 10 12






2 4 6 8 10 12






2 4 6 8 10 12






2 4 6 8 10 12






2 4 6 8 10 12






2 4 6 8 10 12






2 4 6 8 10 12






2 4 6 8 10 12






2 4 6 8 10 12






2 4 6 8 10 12






2 4 6 8 10 12






2 4 6 8 10 12






2 4 6 8 10 12






2 4 6 8 10 12






2 4 6 8 10 12
Response of GDPGR to Shock8
Response to Structural One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
226 
 
Variance decomposition results on Nigeria 
  Oil price:          
 Period 
Standard 

















 1  0.100000  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.175924  82.39728  0.955398  16.30110  0.036423  0.020907  0.002128  0.272037  0.014732 
 3  0.237188  70.29222  3.315177  25.10840  0.058216  0.014241  0.083422  0.984253  0.144074 
 4  0.275154  66.56463  6.976654  21.59719  1.226006  0.035141  0.357599  2.028175  1.214604 
 5  0.318235  57.76501  9.970972  19.43692  5.818864  0.163669  0.755164  2.720902  3.368500 
 6  0.413054  37.86983  8.935860  33.48379  11.83914  0.297396  0.882260  2.223007  4.468714 
 7  0.574093  21.02449  5.985748  51.93130  14.84914  0.306379  0.727322  1.337276  3.838352 
 8  0.783550  11.87848  3.747091  64.62440  15.39054  0.248507  0.544630  0.754400  2.811951 
 9  1.019724  7.288532  2.405529  72.35368  14.92934  0.183115  0.411686  0.447657  1.980463 
 10  1.265745  4.874180  1.622535  77.25566  14.10489  0.129901  0.323194  0.291649  1.397997 
 11  1.509037  3.513209  1.155570  80.60757  13.14606  0.092600  0.264672  0.210807  1.009506 
 12  1.740031  2.697049  0.869990  83.06221  12.14763  0.070103  0.225662  0.167297  0.760062 
 
  Oil output 





















 1  0.100499  0.990099  99.00990  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.180053  1.502733  89.58806  5.435905  3.062012  0.066363  0.000107  0.027420  0.317401 
 3  0.255354  1.907488  72.43218  16.18168  8.409702  0.129854  0.003438  0.087458  0.848197 
 4  0.325415  2.169850  56.11372  27.18163  12.94271  0.135144  0.022732  0.138336  1.295888 
 5  0.385531  2.349643  44.17715  36.10108  15.44220  0.107315  0.061443  0.158106  1.603063 
 6  0.432074  2.509103  36.45633  42.81045  16.04547  0.086297  0.113579  0.153300  1.825472 
 7  0.464744  2.681056  31.78077  47.73263  15.38653  0.094344  0.169646  0.139744  2.015283 
 8  0.486117  2.870966  29.06073  51.11921  14.27793  0.132124  0.220325  0.128285  2.190429 
 9  0.500144  3.064256  27.47355  52.98335  13.57509  0.184529  0.258601  0.121246  2.339387 
 10  0.510675  3.234932  26.43481  53.30197  13.96291  0.231020  0.281211  0.116351  2.436804 
 11  0.520526  3.356317  25.56633  52.25394  15.70201  0.257124  0.288977  0.112266  2.463036 
 12  0.531225  3.410864  24.67025  50.31422  18.52893  0.260969  0.285616  0.110542  2.418617 
 
Interest rate:          
 Period 
Standard 

















 1  0.100935  0.993092  6.68E-05  98.01009  6.68E-05  0.008249  0.008249  8.25E-05  0.980101 
 2  0.190748  0.944624  0.003914  97.93149  0.326824  0.004368  0.028166  0.002922  0.757691 
 3  0.275138  0.883139  0.016926  97.57888  0.940918  0.002666  0.048572  0.008403  0.520500 
 4  0.352468  0.823838  0.039202  97.10506  1.607966  0.001956  0.066783  0.016008  0.339185 
 5  0.422700  0.774940  0.066597  96.64177  2.169976  0.001827  0.082571  0.025260  0.237061 
 6  0.486031  0.739789  0.094220  96.27396  2.552845  0.002222  0.096670  0.035502  0.204789 
 7  0.542578  0.718940  0.118918  96.03604  2.746829  0.003148  0.109943  0.045856  0.220330 
 8  0.592401  0.711630  0.139712  95.92384  2.779608  0.004527  0.123060  0.055365  0.262256 
 9  0.635585  0.716581  0.157071  95.91015  2.695411  0.006166  0.136436  0.063236  0.314950 
 10  0.672299  0.732325  0.172025  95.95695  2.542694  0.007809  0.150285  0.069029  0.368879 
 11  0.702823  0.757282  0.185565  96.02373  2.367827  0.009211  0.164676  0.072702  0.419003 
 12  0.727559  0.789727  0.198371  96.07281  2.211753  0.010194  0.179590  0.074539  0.463017 
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  Money 
supply 
growth:          
 Period 
Standard 

















 1  0.100913  0.794376  6.68E-07  0.980531  98.21512  8.25E-05  8.25E-05  8.25E-07  0.009805 
 2  0.208487  0.690536  0.001727  5.050738  94.19837  0.007023  0.010121  0.032863  0.008619 
 3  0.326395  0.535260  0.004388  12.03762  87.27367  0.019953  0.025656  0.099906  0.003552 
 4  0.452316  0.372264  0.005090  21.33889  78.02737  0.034834  0.041653  0.170410  0.009487 
 5  0.585576  0.238965  0.003710  31.80974  67.58490  0.048511  0.055946  0.221455  0.036771 
 6  0.724923  0.156251  0.002532  42.22200  57.16062  0.059279  0.068004  0.245606  0.085709 
 7  0.867607  0.127573  0.004129  51.66544  47.66052  0.066766  0.078185  0.247353  0.150034 
 8  1.009498  0.145120  0.009997  59.67667  39.55177  0.071379  0.087158  0.235461  0.222453 
 9  1.145779  0.196944  0.020434  66.15114  32.94691  0.073777  0.095567  0.217681  0.297551 
 10  1.271777  0.271493  0.034982  71.18992  27.75414  0.074569  0.103895  0.199009  0.372002 
 11  1.383645  0.359392  0.052843  74.97645  23.79899  0.074216  0.112449  0.181993  0.443670 
 12  1.478813  0.453564  0.073099  77.70602  20.89453  0.073042  0.121385  0.167609  0.510754 
 
Inflation 
rate:          
 Period 
Standard 

















 1  0.102329  0.073163  0.008171  0.802611  0.990878  97.09827  1.008794  0.010088  0.008026 
 2  0.199377  0.691032  0.123143  2.409503  8.345056  85.32409  1.362719  0.004124  1.740328 
 3  0.297589  1.109146  0.922942  1.429209  16.85416  72.09112  1.675197  0.001891  5.916341 
 4  0.395966  1.193413  2.400165  1.206581  23.21276  59.10811  1.844512  0.004783  11.02967 
 5  0.493701  1.071311  4.020877  3.475896  26.45392  47.77213  1.856013  0.019023  15.33084 
 6  0.587097  0.889970  5.304519  7.753942  27.31903  38.89006  1.767592  0.049555  18.02534 
 7  0.671711  0.726384  6.081791  12.98731  26.90313  32.36708  1.641410  0.095021  19.19787 
 8  0.745058  0.601546  6.397439  18.47447  25.94361  27.67051  1.513423  0.147478  19.25153 
 9  0.807324  0.512949  6.372189  23.90038  24.78931  24.24223  1.397244  0.195932  18.58977 
 10  0.860536  0.452722  6.131492  29.13753  23.56537  21.65203  1.295013  0.231195  17.53464 
 11  0.907270  0.413849  5.779644  34.10587  22.30955  19.61250  1.204976  0.249394  16.32422 
 12  0.949635  0.391131  5.392751  38.72105  21.04617  17.95055  1.125237  0.252344  15.12076 
 
  Exchange 
rate:          
 Period 
Standard 

















 1  0.103671  0.692304  0.783379  0.028229  0.034851  0.780407  96.71341  0.967134  0.000282 
 2  0.193309  0.906497  1.094470  4.919443  1.142381  0.764647  89.73465  1.113911  0.324000 
 3  0.287065  1.514537  1.419183  10.72038  4.980498  0.773494  78.28305  1.143999  1.164867 
 4  0.387478  2.446056  1.612448  14.17689  11.59766  0.816530  66.27695  1.053155  2.020312 
 5  0.494978  3.518759  1.613134  15.47576  19.48621  0.899534  55.67538  0.886993  2.444239 
 6  0.606537  4.579294  1.466473  15.50820  26.98432  1.030755  47.33960  0.706468  2.384897 
 7  0.716803  5.572161  1.254635  14.90413  33.14764  1.219195  41.30916  0.551172  2.041904 
 8  0.820032  6.513958  1.042599  13.94158  37.71344  1.473427  37.24103  0.434443  1.639528 
 9  0.911644  7.449211  0.865589  12.71493  40.76961  1.800569  34.71960  0.353753  1.326738 
 10  0.989319  8.418446  0.735981  11.31553  42.49038  2.203427  33.36391  0.300421  1.171893 
 11  1.053819  9.432885  0.652448  9.993476  42.98490  2.673762  32.81213  0.264933  1.185473 




growth:          

















 1  0.103132  0.398320  0.790161  0.640031  0.790161  0.804448  0.804448  95.76603  0.006400 
 2  0.165450  1.321111  0.360267  0.469775  1.081786  0.902054  0.670110  95.07335  0.121549 
 3  0.198445  2.526945  1.446064  0.326550  1.633574  0.995286  0.547589  92.40905  0.114939 
 4  0.216978  3.519631  3.666697  3.031914  2.132012  1.001943  0.458813  84.70869  1.480297 
 5  0.243420  3.532864  5.316171  14.96399  2.034975  0.835938  0.380524  67.95310  4.982438 
 6  0.286878  2.763763  5.279617  32.85794  1.498172  0.603085  0.301960  48.96858  7.726886 
 7  0.340164  1.996992  4.426185  48.70060  1.094082  0.431883  0.235718  35.06181  8.052729 
 8  0.393378  1.493273  3.582764  60.06311  0.989932  0.330024  0.186931  26.37432  6.979639 
 9  0.440767  1.195773  2.960102  67.55929  1.105370  0.268691  0.152748  21.04847  5.709552 
 10  0.480180  1.019081  2.536839  72.20146  1.333158  0.228568  0.129398  17.73541  4.816088 
 11  0.511310  0.909710  2.256771  74.88834  1.591596  0.201628  0.114132  15.65254  4.385281 
 12  0.534697  0.839729  2.074700  76.34862  1.824919  0.185623  0.105112  14.34127  4.280030 
 
GDP 
growth          
 Period 
Standard 

















 1  0.100779  0.003379  0.006703  0.005429  0.006703  0.827494  0.827494  0.008275  98.31452 
 2  0.165839  0.007367  0.150015  0.141699  0.193713  0.896338  0.659175  0.004314  97.94738 
 3  0.206110  0.007024  0.607489  0.189393  1.485102  0.906171  0.490188  0.011723  96.30291 
 4  0.231913  0.012350  1.393712  2.235470  4.701782  0.835955  0.389807  0.062718  90.36821 
 5  0.254945  0.060308  2.194643  7.820583  9.292997  0.709055  0.393017  0.150012  79.37938 
 6  0.278983  0.143328  2.667268  15.16390  13.47567  0.593316  0.468249  0.226080  67.26219 
 7  0.300840  0.215779  2.798615  21.51548  16.17847  0.529116  0.565646  0.263899  57.93299 
 8  0.316665  0.249740  2.758201  25.78554  17.47134  0.511966  0.662731  0.271464  52.28902 
 9  0.325496  0.250379  2.683246  28.18049  17.82405  0.521227  0.756057  0.266450  49.51811 
 10  0.329074  0.245393  2.634293  29.27800  17.72320  0.537436  0.844409  0.261239  48.47603 
 11  0.330171  0.269154  2.617698  29.60554  17.60772  0.547642  0.923376  0.260534  48.16834 
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2 4 6 8 10 12
Response of GDPGR to Shock8
Response to Structural One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
230 
 
Variance decomposition result on Algeria 
 Oil price:          
 Period 
Standard 

















 1  0.100000  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.206046  71.56736  3.222862  0.037951  14.37146  3.377708  1.747200  3.832780  1.842678 
 3  0.346476  40.21626  11.33654  12.70243  22.09776  5.498607  0.989350  6.307392  0.851654 
 4  0.546070  19.32824  16.28538  34.71563  17.86930  4.818473  0.470261  5.876131  0.636591 
 5  0.780754  9.901936  17.13052  50.07516  12.14274  3.662962  0.847039  5.021315  1.218327 
 6  1.008088  5.953473  16.27300  58.81694  8.285299  2.874537  1.586973  4.623972  1.585805 
 7  1.202102  4.213572  14.86605  63.85887  6.005721  2.416424  2.444010  4.648423  1.546935 
 8  1.357059  3.402700  13.33050  66.82694  4.714003  2.156960  3.340111  4.929083  1.299698 
 9  1.478962  3.012751  11.87302  68.47528  4.010446  2.001695  4.227407  5.301247  1.098150 
 10  1.576719  2.823526  10.62198  69.24966  3.645405  1.892183  5.058603  5.629521  1.079124 
 11  1.657317  2.732614  9.633668  69.52561  3.463158  1.796253  5.796048  5.835945  1.216700 
 12  1.724948  2.691044  8.894186  69.62340  3.370593  1.701344  6.421267  5.906864  1.391298 
 
  Oil output 
growth:          
 Period 
Standard 

















 1  0.100499  0.990099  99.00990  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.172668  0.860021  98.29363  0.037259  0.083393  0.193385  0.209764  0.032385  0.290159 
 3  0.219622  0.826700  97.51263  0.078896  0.141411  0.479065  0.558510  0.223334  0.179451 
 4  0.246187  0.836239  95.32967  0.171795  0.120741  0.693005  0.959860  0.667273  1.221412 
 5  0.263635  0.849116  89.73041  0.427037  0.175254  0.757115  1.312804  1.261833  5.486432 
 6  0.280159  0.851755  81.13137  0.957711  0.594231  0.703459  1.506047  1.737493  12.51793 
 7  0.297178  0.865786  72.33173  1.725070  1.555234  0.625194  1.522728  1.949754  19.42450 
 8  0.312325  0.925332  65.49152  2.535219  3.032510  0.583239  1.439392  1.972948  24.01984 
 9  0.323654  1.052862  60.98763  3.180646  4.886470  0.589306  1.344321  1.931996  26.02677 
 10  0.331218  1.249939  58.23718  3.542248  6.908595  0.634341  1.293660  1.895060  26.23897 
 11  0.336424  1.494861  56.50175  3.627050  8.830373  0.706743  1.303446  1.880899  25.65488 
 12  0.340773  1.748678  55.24467  3.554761  10.38942  0.797635  1.354707  1.895857  25.01427 
 
  Interest 
rate:          
 Period 
Standard 

















 1  0.100935  0.993092  6.68E-05  98.01009  6.68E-05  0.008249  0.008249  8.25E-05  0.980101 
 2  0.178421  0.966840  0.010488  98.43570  0.000341  0.010959  0.003264  0.001128  0.571283 
 3  0.241012  0.936829  0.017356  98.69360  0.001520  0.012655  0.019942  0.001708  0.316393 
 4  0.289432  0.904177  0.016980  98.66027  0.002557  0.014877  0.069187  0.022028  0.309923 
 5  0.326570  0.870185  0.013924  98.28383  0.002755  0.018084  0.156290  0.087409  0.567520 
 6  0.355559  0.835934  0.011856  97.58076  0.002400  0.021771  0.277225  0.210049  1.060003 
 7  0.378990  0.802293  0.011098  96.62045  0.002237  0.024701  0.420522  0.382467  1.736231 
 8  0.398747  0.769962  0.010493  95.49806  0.002822  0.025725  0.571959  0.583448  2.537526 
 9  0.416112  0.739469  0.009643  94.30725  0.004277  0.024733  0.718717  0.788827  3.407084 
 10  0.431936  0.711173  0.009579  93.12300  0.006391  0.022958  0.851462  0.979577  4.295864 
 11  0.446784  0.685291  0.012137  91.99631  0.008818  0.022479  0.964648  1.144714  5.165598 
 12  0.461031  0.661947  0.018976  90.95664  0.011230  0.025352  1.055934  1.280472  5.989451 
231 
 
  Money 
supply 
growth:          
 Period 
Standard 

















 1  0.100913  0.794376  6.68E-07  0.980531  98.21512  8.25E-05  8.25E-05  8.25E-07  0.009805 
 2  0.200831  2.046929  0.071012  1.160346  96.20256  0.090671  0.051769  0.224224  0.152487 
 3  0.319537  3.575931  0.317982  9.624737  85.17430  0.111178  0.247669  0.744989  0.203216 
 4  0.468123  4.726782  0.734554  23.48609  69.13702  0.069532  0.477657  1.233016  0.135343 
 5  0.645816  5.331561  1.235467  36.68840  54.51180  0.036547  0.622942  1.501923  0.071368 
 6  0.841934  5.564502  1.746828  46.86021  43.49735  0.032267  0.666155  1.581269  0.051423 
 7  1.042987  5.602353  2.225043  54.20773  35.67985  0.050323  0.636221  1.550996  0.047488 
 8  1.237178  5.545787  2.642826  59.51966  30.13845  0.082925  0.565218  1.468278  0.036857 
 9  1.416207  5.442392  2.980515  63.45253  26.12216  0.126233  0.478793  1.364032  0.033344 
 10  1.575557  5.312528  3.224221  66.42753  23.11915  0.179325  0.396974  1.253270  0.087009 
 11  1.713995  5.164168  3.367031  68.68088  20.79702  0.242526  0.335553  1.143428  0.269392 
 12  1.832696  5.000503  3.410883  70.33137  18.94270  0.316203  0.306221  1.039257  0.652857 
 
Inflation 
rate:          
 Period 
Standard 

















 1  0.102329  0.073163  0.008171  0.802611  0.990878  97.09827  1.008794  0.010088  0.008026 
 2  0.186039  0.261265  0.273537  8.032083  0.912583  88.36850  0.885773  0.037943  1.228314 
 3  0.281932  0.516769  1.069329  20.58701  0.865833  69.24148  0.757319  0.248144  6.714122 
 4  0.400473  0.721644  1.948560  31.40430  0.840451  49.71021  0.610833  0.544249  14.21975 
 5  0.534325  0.861309  2.538870  38.07849  0.845077  36.00314  0.492730  0.710014  20.47037 
 6  0.669029  0.970810  2.838451  41.98115  0.871760  27.53939  0.416223  0.710831  24.67139 
 7  0.792639  1.072264  2.944938  44.50394  0.906682  22.39018  0.375068  0.616039  27.19089 
 8  0.898451  1.170716  2.937333  46.36044  0.936638  19.19312  0.360674  0.501595  28.53949 
 9  0.984337  1.261831  2.868420  47.83664  0.950501  17.16261  0.365950  0.418090  29.13596 
 10  1.051223  1.337883  2.774388  49.02197  0.941213  15.85620  0.384701  0.387904  29.29574 
 11  1.101670  1.391927  2.680287  49.93255  0.908892  15.01627  0.410859  0.412005  29.24721 
 12  1.138859  1.420550  2.601777  50.56804  0.863324  14.48438  0.438649  0.479145  29.14413 
 
  Exchange 
rate:          
 Period 
Standard 

















 1  0.103671  0.692304  0.783379  0.028229  0.034851  0.780407  96.71341  0.967134  0.000282 
 2  0.189465  0.739346  0.711532  0.347013  0.011136  0.570888  95.87686  0.490202  1.253022 
 3  0.271925  0.742382  0.844015  1.889646  0.011991  0.397429  92.43763  0.239517  3.437389 
 4  0.353803  0.688145  1.072044  5.212213  0.008386  0.279159  86.97417  0.182225  5.583659 
 5  0.438411  0.585027  1.267067  10.57051  0.006787  0.203831  79.85194  0.214488  7.300350 
 6  0.528697  0.460013  1.340992  17.58272  0.012474  0.156851  71.62539  0.253684  8.567877 
 7  0.626187  0.342984  1.290350  25.33212  0.019311  0.128655  63.12720  0.262175  9.497201 
 8  0.730523  0.252622  1.165723  32.85522  0.020802  0.113213  55.15341  0.237831  10.20117 
 9  0.839913  0.193791  1.020606  39.53477  0.017257  0.106281  48.18137  0.195773  10.75015 
 10  0.952032  0.162778  0.887316  45.15964  0.013569  0.104656  42.34369  0.153797  11.17456 
 11  1.064805  0.152990  0.778242  49.78505  0.014574  0.105810  37.55382  0.124854  11.48466 





growth:          
 Period 
Standard 

















 1  0.103132  0.398320  0.790161  0.640031  0.790161  0.804448  0.804448  95.76603  0.006400 
 2  0.170932  0.393906  1.634644  0.605623  0.427075  0.986517  0.381011  93.63653  1.934696 
 3  0.218643  0.309415  2.190588  0.574823  0.273215  1.731715  0.239293  87.96335  6.717605 
 4  0.252894  0.231677  2.447407  0.456919  0.223545  3.168809  0.196449  80.01682  13.25837 
 5  0.280670  0.213038  2.577088  0.515875  0.316512  5.167378  0.246111  70.81821  20.14579 
 6  0.308444  0.234693  2.739144  1.727245  0.687814  7.235354  0.397010  60.73537  26.24337 
 7  0.341449  0.248944  3.048584  5.084749  1.314183  8.743888  0.579358  50.22461  30.75569 
 8  0.381866  0.233842  3.550404  10.33246  1.963203  9.371542  0.702521  40.36587  33.48016 
 9  0.428009  0.200103  4.183053  16.10652  2.426450  9.273727  0.736962  32.22488  34.84830 
 10  0.475746  0.165193  4.831373  21.19991  2.664293  8.806341  0.708233  26.16164  35.46302 
 11  0.520750  0.137996  5.403786  25.15125  2.743074  8.246303  0.651715  21.94161  35.72427 
 12  0.559992  0.119686  5.857290  28.02267  2.741843  7.731906  0.590879  19.13293  35.80279 
 
GDP 
growth:          
 Period 
Standard 

















 1  0.100779  0.003379  0.006703  0.005429  0.006703  0.827494  0.827494  0.008275  98.31452 
 2  0.174471  0.010702  0.002860  0.128843  0.004298  0.970108  1.409198  0.102614  97.37138 
 3  0.229547  0.011484  0.023665  0.255729  0.014379  1.116040  1.822775  0.313735  96.44219 
 4  0.267727  0.008890  0.136177  0.277912  0.022673  1.288186  2.029784  0.611128  95.62525 
 5  0.292839  0.008392  0.361850  0.243095  0.024411  1.499967  2.072020  0.937480  94.85279 
 6  0.308655  0.012314  0.658317  0.226842  0.023045  1.754650  2.024684  1.241252  94.05890 
 7  0.318258  0.019221  0.956493  0.276776  0.021840  2.044838  1.952536  1.491020  93.23728 
 8  0.323993  0.026096  1.205886  0.411417  0.021864  2.353894  1.891239  1.675035  92.41457 
 9  0.327545  0.030600  1.391890  0.632361  0.027674  2.660383  1.850455  1.795968  91.61067 
 10  0.330012  0.032166  1.526208  0.928923  0.051913  2.944094  1.825653  1.865582  90.82546 
 11  0.332020  0.031941  1.630048  1.276153  0.112351  3.190589  1.808716  1.899462  90.05074 
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2 4 6 8 10 12
Response of GDPGR to Shock8
Response to Structural One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
234 
 
Variance decomposition result on Gabon 
 Oil price:          
 Period 
Standard 

















 1  0.100000  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.181519  95.77021  1.093325  0.822977  2.295273  9.88E-06  0.005124  0.013076  7.70E-09 
 3  0.255832  90.04208  3.429450  2.670148  3.665155  0.010909  0.024189  0.011909  0.146163 
 4  0.322145  84.30775  6.263543  5.180565  3.484949  0.087086  0.059869  0.008026  0.608214 
 5  0.379755  79.21556  8.985140  7.586417  2.648921  0.307076  0.106992  0.005846  1.144052 
 6  0.427732  75.04342  11.28261  9.054220  2.266508  0.721682  0.156639  0.005331  1.469589 
 7  0.467276  71.28009  12.99975  9.168966  3.509870  1.313720  0.200070  0.008310  1.519225 
 8  0.503124  66.78192  13.94609  8.215321  7.446904  1.974427  0.229230  0.016870  1.389234 
 9  0.541984  60.59678  13.94027  7.133814  14.33656  2.523112  0.238222  0.030434  1.200807 
 10  0.588875  52.89413  13.04475  6.959561  22.99557  2.809036  0.227343  0.045329  1.024276 
 11  0.644344  44.89173  11.62957  8.116256  31.40730  2.815355  0.203870  0.057372  0.878548 
 12  0.704725  37.81977  10.12927  10.34581  38.06330  2.638617  0.176899  0.064419  0.761921 
 
  Oil output 
growth:          
 Period 
Standard 

















 1  0.100499  0.990099  99.00990  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.183051  1.615811  88.37416  9.742464  0.005080  0.060879  0.007391  0.073851  0.120362 
 3  0.253155  1.869292  79.01746  16.75963  0.024842  0.456863  0.019015  0.395128  1.457771 
 4  0.301814  1.787173  74.33491  16.49833  0.090885  1.309611  0.028213  0.983897  4.966989 
 5  0.336870  1.494088  69.85643  13.27293  1.265068  2.396827  0.032102  1.688594  9.993963 
 6  0.375572  1.239932  61.00016  14.04043  4.582707  3.114222  0.029677  2.168240  13.82463 
 7  0.426575  1.203851  49.17035  21.19052  8.511643  3.111979  0.023745  2.232521  14.55539 
 8  0.483674  1.307015  38.86117  31.15254  10.64219  2.692628  0.018478  2.046415  13.27957 
 9  0.536162  1.400541  31.77489  40.62973  10.47777  2.243004  0.015949  1.813324  11.64480 
 10  0.578847  1.408272  27.27621  48.29917  9.156803  1.924742  0.016834  1.610088  10.30789 
 11  0.614153  1.323210  24.23317  53.38966  8.572546  1.752840  0.021335  1.439734  9.267512 
 12  0.648907  1.188594  21.73243  55.17846  10.56250  1.680092  0.028719  1.290246  8.338955 
 
  Interest 
rate:          
 Period 
Standard 

















 1  0.100935  0.993092  6.68E-05  98.01009  6.68E-05  0.008249  0.008249  8.25E-05  0.980101 
 2  0.182447  1.081540  0.044266  97.67406  0.128749  0.016435  0.022158  0.019733  1.013062 
 3  0.252897  1.115667  0.158539  97.36436  0.194595  0.064858  0.037551  0.064453  0.999973 
 4  0.311942  1.112639  0.326015  97.14027  0.163949  0.127412  0.052176  0.128869  0.948669 
 5  0.361009  1.087071  0.525929  96.93397  0.122732  0.186975  0.064848  0.207555  0.870923 
 6  0.401888  1.050368  0.739324  96.68273  0.139356  0.235326  0.075228  0.295775  0.781894 
 7  0.436179  1.010537  0.951453  96.37086  0.227987  0.270583  0.083493  0.389454  0.695637 
 8  0.465158  0.972699  1.152085  96.02236  0.362440  0.294179  0.090041  0.484962  0.621233 
 9  0.489815  0.939868  1.334849  95.67908  0.501452  0.308630  0.095282  0.578975  0.561864 
 10  0.510930  0.913710  1.496370  95.38085  0.608333  0.316336  0.099541  0.668472  0.516392 
 11  0.529153  0.895136  1.635486  95.15219  0.662451  0.319176  0.103030  0.750807  0.481724 
 12  0.545051  0.884717  1.752597  94.99554  0.664352  0.318499  0.105867  0.823813  0.454620 
235 
 
  Money 
supply 
growth:          
 Period 
Standard 

















 1  0.100913  0.794376  6.68E-07  0.980531  98.21512  8.25E-05  8.25E-05  8.25E-07  0.009805 
 2  0.194120  1.039012  0.000880  0.492608  98.41913  0.032259  0.002462  0.006570  0.007084 
 3  0.284214  1.287367  0.000751  0.250237  98.33664  0.091993  0.005325  0.023287  0.004404 
 4  0.366856  1.537345  0.000702  0.154418  98.10362  0.146644  0.007228  0.047366  0.002681 
 5  0.438925  1.782720  0.003719  0.140380  97.80967  0.178276  0.007849  0.075401  0.001987 
 6  0.498072  2.016468  0.011618  0.156453  97.51665  0.184666  0.007516  0.104806  0.001822 
 7  0.542985  2.231576  0.024046  0.165969  97.26186  0.173989  0.006763  0.134080  0.001721 
 8  0.573767  2.420807  0.038970  0.156686  97.05500  0.158495  0.006079  0.162396  0.001568 
 9  0.592089  2.576253  0.053567  0.150710  96.87343  0.149715  0.005805  0.189023  0.001503 
 10  0.600999  2.689689  0.065080  0.208734  96.66055  0.155281  0.006099  0.212881  0.001690 
 11  0.604368  2.754706  0.071702  0.420262  96.33496  0.176880  0.006915  0.232437  0.002141 
 12  0.606077  2.770539  0.073474  0.872658  95.81687  0.209671  0.008014  0.246073  0.002702 
 
Inflation 
rate:          
 Period 
Standard 

















 1  0.102329  0.073163  0.008171  0.802611  0.990878  97.09827  1.008794  0.010088  0.008026 
 2  0.167681  0.077547  0.479668  0.366984  0.845078  96.71795  0.865200  0.192018  0.455552 
 3  0.207088  0.092216  0.878739  0.305303  0.563120  95.06802  0.792750  0.521942  1.777908 
 4  0.235235  0.126198  0.837659  0.789138  7.346122  85.88236  0.706664  0.700437  3.611418 
 5  0.292843  0.713367  0.562346  4.510554  31.62963  57.68010  0.481485  0.525087  3.897433 
 6  0.402337  1.606521  0.566152  9.327458  54.70956  30.64856  0.259949  0.279272  2.602526 
 7  0.545467  2.288640  0.754541  12.43171  66.01183  16.70162  0.142430  0.158609  1.510622 
 8  0.694240  2.763250  0.961319  14.14857  70.60996  10.38262  0.088417  0.111681  0.934190 
 9  0.827900  3.126410  1.151951  15.14862  72.39876  7.351189  0.062891  0.092039  0.668140 
 10  0.934788  3.431874  1.330572  15.79278  72.97628  5.781798  0.050810  0.082512  0.553368 
 11  1.011138  3.701621  1.502909  16.24868  72.97417  4.941744  0.046235  0.077781  0.506854 
 12  1.059187  3.940007  1.668772  16.58802  72.67836  4.512416  0.046683  0.076170  0.489574 
 
  Exchange 
rate:          
 Period 
Standard 

















 1  0.103671  0.692304  0.783379  0.028229  0.034851  0.780407  96.71341  0.967134  0.000282 
 2  0.489296  3.263641  2.190840  62.03314  10.15918  3.669329  16.70426  1.773461  0.206152 
 3  1.132273  2.704449  1.700820  79.19261  4.498067  3.580680  6.747723  1.515976  0.059678 
 4  1.919886  2.111911  1.113623  86.54575  1.602981  3.325023  3.902694  1.355738  0.042280 
 5  2.791165  1.605133  0.695470  89.23962  1.442504  2.973928  2.640048  1.242875  0.160424 
 6  3.711076  1.207263  0.436361  89.34446  2.985810  2.561660  1.936645  1.153484  0.374320 
 7  4.655679  0.915810  0.285749  88.33031  5.133197  2.138687  1.491172  1.079325  0.625746 
 8  5.604560  0.712929  0.198941  87.20724  7.065724  1.749754  1.187439  1.017908  0.860059 
 9  6.540417  0.576559  0.147385  86.51077  8.365292  1.420279  0.970746  0.967886  1.041088 
 10  7.450938  0.487923  0.116996  86.39405  8.951024  1.156669  0.811204  0.927699  1.154431 
 11  8.329121  0.433608  0.103107  86.77622  8.944377  0.953141  0.690888  0.895712  1.202949 





growth:          
 Period 
Standard 

















 1  0.103132  0.398320  0.790161  0.640031  0.790161  0.804448  0.804448  95.76603  0.006400 
 2  0.193477  2.287719  0.243264  13.66363  10.97864  3.168880  0.288221  69.32776  0.041874 
 3  0.278034  2.888955  0.210253  27.09687  14.82686  6.714051  0.164277  48.07132  0.027410 
 4  0.325469  2.658057  0.380061  33.86627  11.09757  12.12300  0.263632  39.57946  0.031948 
 5  0.369618  2.083036  0.465677  29.87131  19.18384  16.46140  0.411839  31.43823  0.084670 
 6  0.474967  2.035597  0.315008  18.09457  46.13403  13.88379  0.387522  19.04165  0.107826 
 7  0.644147  2.470486  0.172164  11.11088  66.46912  8.999381  0.269339  10.42480  0.083827 
 8  0.831201  2.911673  0.130413  8.794277  75.72017  5.825349  0.181752  6.378286  0.058076 
 9  0.996906  3.270043  0.150579  8.134385  79.59973  4.128187  0.131444  4.543552  0.042081 
 10  1.121214  3.569015  0.204024  7.895343  81.25262  3.264601  0.104399  3.676550  0.033451 
 11  1.200124  3.826335  0.276773  7.711165  81.92980  2.867952  0.091300  3.267464  0.029209 
 12  1.240615  4.041589  0.358769  7.516940  82.12962  2.744974  0.086899  3.093599  0.027614 
 
GDP 
growth:          
 Period 
Standard 

















 1  0.100779  0.003379  0.006703  0.005429  0.006703  0.827494  0.827494  0.008275  98.31452 
 2  0.170065  0.345778  0.064821  2.723534  7.918641  1.011145  0.707018  0.090098  87.13896 
 3  0.236822  1.105634  0.248118  7.155289  27.41976  1.202479  0.463131  0.097930  62.30766 
 4  0.313621  1.915702  0.417643  9.836860  47.34378  1.280868  0.268339  0.057083  38.87972 
 5  0.396702  2.541905  0.448007  10.66356  60.27445  1.244174  0.171023  0.055408  24.60148 
 6  0.473898  3.019794  0.382248  10.90241  67.08641  1.140289  0.127454  0.101168  17.24023 
 7  0.535199  3.423776  0.305535  11.24490  70.22180  1.010494  0.104237  0.165133  13.52412 
 8  0.576408  3.784371  0.270453  11.84301  71.23426  0.893845  0.090363  0.223420  11.66028 
 9  0.598788  4.095017  0.290169  12.59410  71.03283  0.829610  0.084321  0.264957  10.80900 
 10  0.607592  4.326576  0.349340  13.28077  70.31002  0.845881  0.085839  0.287997  10.51358 
 11  0.610249  4.441883  0.417965  13.66701  69.70232  0.941884  0.092727  0.295634  10.44058 
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2 4 6 8 10 12
Response of GDPGR to Shock8
Response to Structural One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
238 
 
Variance decomposition result on Libya 
 Oil price:          
 Period 
Standard 

















 1  0.100000  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.458749  9.461749  0.767338  4.340086  0.314346  0.824024  83.90492  0.387468  6.73E-05 
 3  1.740570  0.668027  0.832934  0.412858  0.165049  0.600689  96.59845  0.714638  0.007357 
 4  3.781955  0.410411  0.820387  0.161146  0.115153  0.508672  97.15477  0.818016  0.011443 
 5  6.257727  0.511536  0.809395  0.323406  0.092362  0.467919  96.91654  0.865254  0.013588 
 6  8.847111  0.604516  0.801523  0.536654  0.079763  0.449833  96.62291  0.889881  0.014915 
 7  11.32014  0.670267  0.795817  0.740415  0.072018  0.444249  96.35802  0.903309  0.015908 
 8  13.55219  0.715936  0.791567  0.924835  0.066949  0.446493  96.12678  0.910639  0.016803 
 9  15.50050  0.748437  0.788298  1.092403  0.063499  0.453795  95.92133  0.914505  0.017736 
 10  17.17151  0.772653  0.785665  1.250775  0.061088  0.464132  95.73051  0.916359  0.018815 
 11  18.59420  0.791955  0.783386  1.410907  0.059373  0.475857  95.54137  0.917007  0.020140 
 12  19.80378  0.808684  0.781219  1.586055  0.058139  0.487625  95.33959  0.916871  0.021820 
 
  Oil output 
growth:          
 Period 
Standard 

















 1  0.100499  0.990099  99.00990  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  4.791646  0.967999  1.382259  6.079828  0.001416  1.242371  89.98135  0.338143  0.006631 
 3  6.834360  1.049694  1.283799  12.43529  0.016138  1.357547  83.67065  0.178487  0.008398 
 4  7.279231  0.932327  1.133060  20.35573  0.169367  1.235750  75.50429  0.659809  0.009666 
 5  11.28707  0.759956  0.838376  9.711335  0.285837  0.719358  86.28971  1.390910  0.004520 
 6  19.19985  0.871760  0.780687  3.518225  0.248653  0.582721  92.69709  1.293140  0.007720 
 7  28.29550  1.006813  0.772525  3.095701  0.218991  0.557264  93.21127  1.119953  0.017485 
 8  37.09291  1.118983  0.762345  4.512638  0.204002  0.542041  91.83450  0.994071  0.031419 
 9  44.91806  1.206329  0.748440  6.420698  0.196710  0.527246  89.94482  0.908143  0.047614 
 10  51.50396  1.270916  0.734186  8.226688  0.193187  0.514096  88.14591  0.851061  0.063957 
 11  56.80045  1.316187  0.722115  9.657900  0.191490  0.503759  86.71508  0.814806  0.078666 
 12  60.88031  1.346280  0.713226  10.64969  0.190653  0.496232  85.71999  0.793205  0.090728 
 
  Interest 
rate:          
 Period 
Standard 

















 1  0.100935  0.993092  6.68E-05  98.01009  6.68E-05  0.008249  0.008249  8.25E-05  0.980101 
 2  0.182571  1.086460  0.003791  97.47931  0.001108  0.003067  0.464636  0.004408  0.957222 
 3  0.257189  1.183792  0.013720  96.15540  0.004331  0.003808  1.692284  0.016598  0.930062 
 4  0.325788  1.275906  0.029677  94.06087  0.008991  0.013617  3.675263  0.036807  0.898873 
 5  0.389630  1.356877  0.049805  91.43367  0.014246  0.031268  6.185429  0.062850  0.865860 
 6  0.449518  1.424414  0.071582  88.59660  0.019396  0.053204  8.909521  0.091547  0.833732 
 7  0.505754  1.478848  0.092713  85.84396  0.023999  0.075717  11.56016  0.119880  0.804723 
 8  0.558331  1.521867  0.111576  83.38389  0.027853  0.096132  13.93288  0.145608  0.780194 
 9  0.607143  1.555554  0.127297  81.32898  0.030932  0.113047  15.91612  0.167415  0.760660 
 10  0.652138  1.581844  0.139618  79.71311  0.033310  0.126079  17.47524  0.184793  0.745998 
 11  0.693398  1.602315  0.148703  78.51624  0.035103  0.135472  18.62866  0.197822  0.735690 
 12  0.731143  1.618177  0.154952  77.68739  0.036435  0.141775  19.42529  0.206948  0.729027 
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  Money 
supply 
growth:          
 Period 
Standard 

















 1  0.100913  0.794376  6.68E-07  0.980531  98.21512  8.25E-05  8.25E-05  8.25E-07  0.009805 
 2  0.820847  1.956339  0.600802  17.38460  5.770575  0.655001  72.88763  0.576688  0.168369 
 3  1.922375  1.845489  0.630708  17.51214  2.300668  0.550180  76.39681  0.596379  0.167620 
 4  3.172203  1.803633  0.640716  17.31529  1.415456  0.461775  77.59280  0.604294  0.166035 
 5  4.407673  1.782029  0.647063  16.96327  1.050719  0.397517  78.38339  0.611631  0.164384 
 6  5.515423  1.764798  0.653582  16.38847  0.867256  0.353093  79.19227  0.619149  0.161388 
 7  6.427755  1.746251  0.661406  15.58679  0.766803  0.323272  80.13276  0.626220  0.156502 
 8  7.118444  1.724534  0.670433  14.62551  0.711158  0.303581  81.18285  0.632019  0.149924 
 9  7.595708  1.699479  0.679802  13.63002  0.682134  0.290562  82.23978  0.635800  0.142424 
 10  7.892890  1.671859  0.688104  12.77343  0.669293  0.281680  83.14347  0.636957  0.135214 
 11  8.058457  1.643159  0.693544  12.26381  0.665314  0.275211  83.69406  0.635043  0.129857 
 12  8.146602  1.615468  0.694206  12.31713  0.664122  0.270165  83.68099  0.629818  0.128100 
 
Inflation 
rate:          
 Period 
Standard 

















 1  0.102329  0.073163  0.008171  0.802611  0.990878  97.09827  1.008794  0.010088  0.008026 
 2  0.179896  0.397879  0.008915  13.79826  1.077981  83.69922  0.933393  0.003457  0.080893 
 3  0.335082  0.966507  0.005636  61.11702  0.635934  36.19676  0.600223  0.004208  0.473710 
 4  0.633019  1.092718  0.016091  84.37125  0.294096  11.89974  1.606234  0.005901  0.713974 
 5  1.032541  1.063892  0.025240  90.77516  0.161447  4.688139  2.483070  0.007129  0.795924 
 6  1.478982  1.019812  0.031536  92.60114  0.106298  2.297842  3.110816  0.008727  0.823834 
 7  1.930200  0.984214  0.035425  93.17835  0.080054  1.350119  3.528295  0.010686  0.832858 
 8  2.358183  0.960542  0.037177  93.42901  0.066443  0.911970  3.747104  0.012674  0.835079 
 9  2.746869  0.948129  0.037144  93.63641  0.059180  0.681754  3.787703  0.014345  0.835335 
 10  3.089035  0.944817  0.035859  93.87070  0.055423  0.547300  3.694777  0.015520  0.835605 
 11  3.383284  0.947710  0.033945  94.12206  0.053675  0.462054  3.527781  0.016222  0.836551 
 12  3.631599  0.953705  0.031941  94.35862  0.053028  0.404822  3.343034  0.016623  0.838230 
 
  Exchange 
rate:          
 Period 
Standard 

















 1  0.103671  0.692304  0.783379  0.028229  0.034851  0.780407  96.71341  0.967134  0.000282 
 2  0.181668  0.695991  0.783953  0.026915  0.037639  0.774826  96.71671  0.963714  0.000252 
 3  0.245738  0.714311  0.783647  0.074215  0.040341  0.770807  96.65316  0.962738  0.000778 
 4  0.297289  0.741347  0.782364  0.210365  0.042916  0.767011  96.49148  0.962143  0.002372 
 5  0.338629  0.773749  0.779913  0.475997  0.045324  0.762262  96.19666  0.960582  0.005514 
 6  0.371948  0.809505  0.776112  0.903281  0.047550  0.755791  95.73998  0.957266  0.010512 
 7  0.399108  0.847276  0.770812  1.516042  0.049597  0.747274  95.09968  0.951792  0.017531 
 8  0.421655  0.886032  0.763922  2.328301  0.051472  0.736737  94.26292  0.944011  0.026601 
 9  0.440838  0.924902  0.755445  3.341308  0.053184  0.724440  93.22913  0.933972  0.037621 
 10  0.457630  0.963151  0.745494  4.541596  0.054740  0.710764  92.01202  0.921882  0.050356 
 11  0.472756  1.000185  0.734292  5.901822  0.056146  0.696137  90.63887  0.908083  0.064464 





growth          
 Period 
Standard 

















 1  0.103132  0.398320  0.790161  0.640031  0.790161  0.804448  0.804448  95.76603  0.006400 
 2  0.235664  0.296447  0.155886  20.91343  0.162262  0.959789  26.60769  50.00090  0.903593 
 3  0.302072  0.712950  0.190408  36.53174  0.208016  0.978220  16.60568  42.41003  2.362961 
 4  0.365132  1.020319  0.574679  27.89055  0.420923  0.698209  35.04688  31.39007  2.958364 
 5  0.491713  0.734470  0.790406  17.97915  0.434278  0.758370  59.83480  17.42270  2.045835 
 6  0.620594  0.477003  0.772451  20.51692  0.372742  0.874647  64.67463  10.94096  1.370644 
 7  0.698103  0.379592  0.718166  25.69918  0.339629  0.918373  62.18827  8.656659  1.100132 
 8  0.722802  0.366864  0.690286  28.48978  0.337764  0.927310  60.07678  8.075873  1.035344 
 9  0.723561  0.368704  0.688843  28.59296  0.350095  0.930008  59.95133  8.062153  1.055906 
 10  0.735964  0.371368  0.669413  30.44252  0.352351  0.902037  58.37689  7.799950  1.085464 
 11  0.786357  0.445278  0.587521  38.68036  0.329376  0.795707  51.25184  6.833642  1.076279 
 12  0.884695  0.641346  0.466397  50.74537  0.289891  0.628813  40.80708  5.402371  1.018731 
 
GDP 
growth:          
 Period 
Standard 

















 1  0.100779  0.003379  0.006703  0.005429  0.006703  0.827494  0.827494  0.008275  98.31452 
 2  0.833825  1.743276  0.305524  55.10110  0.097681  0.961600  38.91766  0.468394  2.404771 
 3  2.040215  1.709561  0.444965  39.17248  0.098909  1.027990  56.44144  0.669883  0.434770 
 4  3.457202  1.597863  0.539376  27.41542  0.094110  1.086571  68.30812  0.807104  0.151430 
 5  4.849861  1.478061  0.601970  19.52278  0.086746  1.118899  76.21264  0.900910  0.077991 
 6  6.030360  1.370965  0.641643  14.48340  0.078741  1.132494  81.27712  0.964437  0.051200 
 7  6.892818  1.283482  0.665067  11.46720  0.071291  1.136034  84.33080  1.006824  0.039303 
 8  7.422726  1.217743  0.676926  9.893020  0.065273  1.135510  85.94389  1.033678  0.033956 
 9  7.680719  1.174269  0.680680  9.343220  0.061421  1.133948  86.52595  1.048189  0.032320 
 10  7.769036  1.151993  0.679384  9.457086  0.060220  1.131734  86.43403  1.052601  0.032950 
 11  7.791824  1.146887  0.676069  9.872463  0.061574  1.127509  86.03126  1.049591  0.034651 
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Response of GDPGR to GDPGR
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
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Variance decomposition result on Egypt 
 Oil price:          
 Period 
Standard 

















 1  0.100000  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.196143  71.91690  1.597387  0.017001  1.026900  0.449013  23.02707  0.149145  1.816581 
 3  0.390908  28.06356  3.354045  0.028986  1.808762  0.642436  61.34829  0.064111  4.689811 
 4  0.675118  11.47936  3.681793  0.036056  1.966667  0.562671  76.22696  0.022270  6.024219 
 5  0.991016  5.840303  3.574238  0.038766  2.039933  0.472741  81.56740  0.015468  6.451146 
 6  1.306669  3.510938  3.344075  0.033884  2.102824  0.395842  84.39764  0.008905  6.205896 
 7  1.621763  2.327501  3.055989  0.023772  2.120919  0.321674  86.72177  0.023862  5.404517 
 8  1.956905  1.610537  2.731003  0.017621  2.055706  0.246725  88.95091  0.102942  4.284551 
 9  2.340528  1.126271  2.392892  0.024497  1.897701  0.177600  90.96819  0.262653  3.150198 
 10  2.796867  0.791946  2.073889  0.045419  1.674515  0.124430  92.59496  0.473554  2.221287 
 11  3.337790  0.570547  1.801672  0.073724  1.431827  0.092582  93.78178  0.685791  1.562076 
 12  3.961144  0.433450  1.587480  0.101653  1.206697  0.080369  94.59662  0.864237  1.129495 
 
  Oil output 
growth:          
 Period 
Standard 

















 1  0.100499  0.990099  99.00990  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.192494  1.870886  64.29260  0.522328  0.630149  0.578690  31.03880  0.240036  0.826504 
 3  0.309718  2.042725  33.72296  0.681996  1.317931  1.021292  59.54632  0.096031  1.570744 
 4  0.404635  2.054039  21.72586  0.577036  2.047561  1.317885  70.06457  0.588248  1.624801 
 5  0.447273  2.085636  18.21117  0.482908  3.218833  1.759020  70.60406  2.235379  1.402997 
 6  0.461460  2.017640  17.23298  0.494925  4.866083  2.372056  66.33263  5.121379  1.562305 
 7  0.521350  1.616227  13.59990  0.540447  5.517848  2.546123  66.71164  6.959320  2.508489 
 8  0.678872  1.146152  8.160214  0.476168  4.411507  2.025509  74.76425  5.860917  3.155284 
 9  0.909997  0.887749  4.720338  0.372698  3.198984  1.498045  82.04918  4.168632  3.104380 
 10  1.169607  0.759957  3.056660  0.295017  2.469212  1.173049  86.38494  3.038239  2.822925 
 11  1.427394  0.679906  2.255486  0.246038  2.095679  0.980939  88.80317  2.388460  2.550322 
 12  1.668572  0.615637  1.847450  0.216941  1.939039  0.857260  90.14889  2.028596  2.346193 
 
  Interest 
rate:          
 Period 
Standard 

















 1  0.100935  0.993092  6.68E-05  98.01009  6.68E-05  0.008249  0.008249  8.25E-05  0.980101 
 2  0.403266  0.315237  0.725316  13.39238  0.001296  1.060236  83.48795  0.763866  0.253716 
 3  0.824965  0.472949  0.818358  3.944936  0.000878  1.151935  92.60982  0.850918  0.150209 
 4  1.180437  0.551277  0.848354  1.970234  0.000471  1.177223  94.46713  0.859366  0.125947 
 5  1.400569  0.589709  0.865595  1.404454  0.000544  1.198564  94.97986  0.845081  0.116194 
 6  1.497338  0.606193  0.877096  1.257450  0.001981  1.220712  95.10284  0.823581  0.110143 
 7  1.521583  0.610369  0.883609  1.244819  0.006206  1.237927  95.10137  0.808583  0.107113 
 8  1.522540  0.610218  0.885087  1.254133  0.014793  1.243690  95.07433  0.809416  0.108331 
 9  1.526188  0.611672  0.882437  1.249028  0.028903  1.238229  95.05317  0.823389  0.113168 
 10  1.536877  0.616828  0.877379  1.232602  0.049435  1.228190  95.03658  0.839486  0.119497 
 11  1.550109  0.624969  0.871494  1.215592  0.077755  1.220036  95.01480  0.849300  0.126051 
 12  1.561829  0.634803  0.865764  1.202530  0.116068  1.216488  94.97989  0.851280  0.133172 
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  Money 
supply 
growth:          
 Period 
Standard 

















 1  0.100913  0.794376  6.68E-07  0.980531  98.21512  8.25E-05  8.25E-05  8.25E-07  0.009805 
 2  0.261343  2.249473  0.000437  0.152383  68.03470  0.763162  27.16166  0.058081  1.580108 
 3  0.484151  2.882352  0.002558  0.123209  53.00414  1.217218  38.90868  0.061724  3.800115 
 4  0.719877  3.349863  0.023836  0.200786  49.97384  1.459954  38.61572  0.030242  6.345766 
 5  0.944454  3.765229  0.084953  0.243130  52.50245  1.632248  32.45988  0.052843  9.259265 
 6  1.162441  4.058707  0.204024  0.229515  57.18929  1.757792  23.99649  0.238932  12.32525 
 7  1.397790  4.116112  0.380581  0.178673  61.23621  1.812702  16.60153  0.653378  15.02081 
 8  1.681419  3.884789  0.586039  0.124006  62.51997  1.773409  13.09391  1.246954  16.77092 
 9  2.041558  3.426626  0.779179  0.089283  60.43908  1.646193  14.40817  1.878193  17.33329 
 10  2.500146  2.867646  0.932072  0.078511  55.82430  1.463035  19.53032  2.414942  16.88918 
 11  3.073921  2.317138  1.038678  0.083981  49.98712  1.259808  26.69943  2.798759  15.81509 
 12  3.776591  1.834615  1.106545  0.096916  43.98007  1.062448  34.42860  3.035066  14.45575 
 
Inflation 
rate:          
 Period 
Standard 

















 1  0.102329  0.073163  0.008171  0.802611  0.990878  97.09827  1.008794  0.010088  0.008026 
 2  0.168890  0.034204  0.009495  0.511902  1.106265  85.28898  12.12999  0.474406  0.444761 
 3  0.217825  0.026666  0.016867  0.308461  0.947655  76.87957  18.77488  2.348216  0.697681 
 4  0.246278  0.216143  0.182106  0.444472  0.756363  75.76178  16.31962  5.688601  0.630912 
 5  0.272440  0.775338  0.613928  0.850988  0.734982  72.11046  15.56626  8.817548  0.530497 
 6  0.316122  1.396478  1.121560  1.106616  1.148199  59.90568  25.73016  9.127256  0.464052 
 7  0.385489  1.643139  1.433259  0.988797  1.991916  43.98220  42.67394  6.971421  0.315325 
 8  0.481967  1.513972  1.524216  0.696615  3.025605  30.22018  58.18099  4.525016  0.313402 
 9  0.607617  1.217637  1.492078  0.440852  4.027084  20.18283  69.01982  2.902696  0.716999 
 10  0.765665  0.910843  1.417971  0.285124  4.874621  13.37427  75.55320  2.129897  1.454078 
 11  0.958573  0.659569  1.344279  0.209108  5.541369  8.918578  79.17941  1.882385  2.265302 
 12  1.187105  0.473962  1.286042  0.177336  6.058079  6.045270  81.13250  1.876648  2.950168 
 
Exchange 
rate:          
 Period 
Standard 

















 1  0.103671  0.692304  0.783379  0.028229  0.034851  0.780407  96.71341  0.967134  0.000282 
 2  0.218195  0.701463  0.779473  0.052272  0.030357  0.790363  96.67131  0.971814  0.002944 
 3  0.340500  0.707791  0.778798  0.077022  0.027127  0.798941  96.62677  0.976718  0.006834 
 4  0.461615  0.711948  0.779974  0.099677  0.024555  0.806188  96.58458  0.981474  0.011601 
 5  0.576606  0.714402  0.782189  0.118477  0.022314  0.812381  96.54718  0.985995  0.017062 
 6  0.683506  0.715545  0.784927  0.132836  0.020220  0.817789  96.51526  0.990439  0.022986 
 7  0.782197  0.715694  0.787865  0.143059  0.018182  0.822572  96.48846  0.995063  0.029106 
 8  0.873478  0.715082  0.790809  0.149940  0.016176  0.826778  96.46591  1.000101  0.035203 
 9  0.958425  0.713860  0.793649  0.154404  0.014230  0.830373  96.44662  1.005692  0.041175 
 10  1.038046  0.712106  0.796334  0.157276  0.012413  0.833283  96.42967  1.011866  0.047054 
 11  1.113146  0.709840  0.798852  0.159186  0.010825  0.835416  96.41432  1.018575  0.052982 





growth:          
 Period 
Standard 

















 1  0.103132  0.398320  0.790161  0.640031  0.790161  0.804448  0.804448  95.76603  0.006400 
 2  0.299195  0.179948  0.152108  0.968649  0.376410  0.095639  57.14643  40.10432  0.976497 
 3  0.596466  0.405075  0.266771  0.805301  0.235182  0.132586  77.95759  19.05568  1.141806 
 4  0.916251  0.571379  0.346500  0.668172  0.211259  0.249504  85.49260  11.43131  1.029272 
 5  1.205640  0.695610  0.382357  0.572041  0.241586  0.363656  88.90732  7.981321  0.856112 
 6  1.438500  0.798552  0.394174  0.505786  0.319176  0.466422  90.63480  6.189068  0.692018 
 7  1.608482  0.891169  0.393486  0.461040  0.454620  0.558831  91.48678  5.186949  0.567128 
 8  1.721291  0.978885  0.386396  0.431911  0.667784  0.643295  91.78240  4.612442  0.496883 
 9  1.788640  1.063597  0.376468  0.413912  0.985100  0.721682  91.65815  4.290301  0.490791 
 10  1.824321  1.144233  0.366489  0.403336  1.436696  0.794328  91.17397  4.124301  0.556648 
 11  1.841959  1.216847  0.359504  0.396938  2.051088  0.859440  90.36010  4.054212  0.701868 
 12  1.853902  1.274926  0.359240  0.391845  2.846497  0.913037  89.24534  4.037134  0.931984 
 
GDP 
growth:          
 Period 
Standard 

















 1  0.100779  0.003379  0.006703  0.005429  0.006703  0.827494  0.827494  0.008275  98.31452 
 2  0.209328  0.342349  0.283883  0.071145  0.011258  0.215752  40.66901  0.632944  57.77366 
 3  0.348748  0.583235  0.474743  0.219829  0.012092  0.295038  66.75793  1.435790  30.22134 
 4  0.486279  0.692795  0.559659  0.364229  0.013082  0.378198  77.74180  2.110677  18.13956 
 5  0.601536  0.744076  0.592686  0.479663  0.014632  0.412368  82.44623  2.642342  12.66800 
 6  0.690157  0.770372  0.599003  0.556608  0.016142  0.424758  84.64755  3.027555  9.958009 
 7  0.756509  0.785823  0.591406  0.595163  0.016841  0.433268  85.82338  3.266866  8.487255 
 8  0.807075  0.797090  0.577765  0.603775  0.016354  0.445419  86.56934  3.376575  7.613679 
 9  0.846939  0.807587  0.562961  0.594428  0.015082  0.463252  87.12238  3.388307  7.046002 
 10  0.878853  0.819039  0.549751  0.577747  0.014156  0.485916  87.56608  3.340237  6.647075 
 11  0.903711  0.832016  0.539393  0.560880  0.015044  0.510940  87.91786  3.267754  6.356116 
 12  0.921599  0.846160  0.532061  0.547584  0.019177  0.535412  88.17223  3.197343  6.150030 
 
 
 
